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	 ABSTRACT		This	 thesis	 is	 about	 the	 relationship	 between	 research,	 data	 and	 the	 population	 problem	 in	India	between	1938	and	1974.	 	It	argues	that	the	research	practices	and	the	data	collected	by	demographers	 and	 social	 scientists	 in	 India	 are	 crucial	 to	 understanding	 how	 the	 population	problem	was	framed,	understood,	and	acted	on.	New	kinds	of	research	such	as	sample	surveys,	and	knowledge	attitude	and	practice	(KAP)	surveys	were	instrumental	in	constructing	India	as	an	 overpopulated	 country	 in	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 as	 well	 as	 in	 furnishing	 India	 with	 the	means	 to	 use	 and	 challenge	 this	 label	 by	 the	 1970s.	Many	 of	 the	 arguments	made	 about	 the	history	of	population	control	in	India	have	focused	on	the	role	of	the	international	network	of	population	control	experts	in	shaping	the	policies	implemented	by	the	Indian	Government.	This	historiography	has	 stressed	 the	 importance	of	 contraception	 and	of	American	 expertise.	This	thesis	re-frames	this	narrative	by	 focusing	on	social	science	research	and	researchers	as	 they	worked	 in	 and	 on	 India.	 It	 examines	 the	 importance	 of	 behavioural	 approaches	 to	 family	planning	 and	 population	 control,	 and	 their	 role	 in	 shaping	 how	 the	 population	 problem	was	understood	 and	 acted	 on.	 It	 revisits	 the	 importance	 of	 arguments	 about	 development,	modernization,	and	fertility,	focusing	on	the	importance	of	different	developmental	models	and	their	impact	on	population	policy	in	the	post-colonial	period.	It	charts	the	connections	between	research	and	policy,	exploring	how	they	raised	new	questions	about	the	empirical	reality	of	the	population	 problem,	 about	 the	 proper	 way	 to	 measure	 and	 understand	 it,	 and	 ultimately,	explores	the	relationship	between	the	state,	statistics	and	individuals.		
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In	 1951,	 the	 young	 demographer	 Sripati	 Chandrasekhar	 gave	 the	 Presidential	 Speech	 at	 the	First	All-India	Family	Planning	Conference.	Arguing	with	a	 ‘torrential	eloquence’,	he	sought	to	convince	 those	 assembled	 of	 the	 scale	 of	 India’s	 population	 problem	 and	 to	 plead	 for	 family	planning.	 ‘Uncontrolled	 human	 fertility’	was,	 he	 claimed,	 ‘one	 of	 the	 gravest	 problems	 of	 our	time’.1	It	 was	 problem	 of	 many	 dimensions,	 and	 Chandrasekhar	 drew	 on	 a	 well-established	body	of	population	thought	in	India	to	argue	about	it,	ranging	from	population	distribution	to	growth,	from	food	and	natural	resources	to	international	peace.	India’s	population	density,	 its	rate	 of	 growth	 and	 declining	 mortality,	 and	 their	 impact	 on	 the	 vision	 many	 held	 for	 a	prosperous,	developed	nation	constituted	the	population	problem.2	The	situation	was	dire,	he	argued,	 but	 there	 was	 a	 solution.	 Agriculture	 could	 be	 modernized	 to	 increase	 yields,	industrialization	would	increase	labour	productivity	and	produce	new,	urban	patterns	of	social	life,	 but	 most	 importantly	 birth	 control	 would	 give	 people	 the	 means	 to	 bring	 parenthood	‘under	voluntary	control’.3	Having	babies	 ‘by	choice	and	not	by	chance’	was	linked	not	only	to	individual	 reproductive	 decision-making,	 but	 also	 to	 economic	 planning	 and	 the	 future	prosperity	 of	 the	nation.	 For	Chandrasekhar,	 the	population	problem,	 and	 its	 solutions,	were	part	 of	 a	 broader	 process	 of	 national	 progress	 -	 progress	 towards	 ‘civilized	 values’,	 the	‘conservation	 of	 life’	 and	 a	 democratic	 society.4	His	 speech	 was	 forceful,	 if	 not	 completely	accepted	by	all	present,	and	it	succeeded	in	driving	home	the	‘spectre	of	overpopulation’.5		




from	demographic	disarmament	to	demographic	dividend	–	ranges	across	a	broad	intellectual	and	 historical	 plain.	 Situated	 within	 the	 overlapping	 historiographies	 of	 demography,	population	control,	modernization	and	development,	and	the	history	of	twentieth	century	India,	what	unifies	 these	two	accounts,	and	provides	 the	thread	through	these	diverse	narratives,	 is	the	idea	of	overpopulation.		
	 The	history	of	overpopulation	is	often	presented	as	one	of	progress,	of	moving	towards	a	democratic	society,	towards	the	recognition	of	individual	reproductive	rights,	the	realization	of	a	demographic	dividend	or,	in	a	more	negative	reading,	towards	the	Malthusian	doom	so	long	predicted	and	now	typically	articulated	in	environmental	terms.9	While	scholarship	has	fleshed	out,	critiqued	and	complicated	many	aspects	of	this	story	it	has	also	left	other	avenues	less	well	trodden.10	Overpopulation	discourse	–	and	the	research	and	policy-practices	that	accompanied	it	 –	 could	 be	 said	 to	 have	 been	 profoundly	 undemocratic,	 elitist,	 classist,	 and	 blinkered	 by	professional,	 cultural,	 social,	 economic	 and	 political	 assumptions	 and	 misunderstandings.	However,	 family	 planning	 and	 the	 larger	 project	 of	 population	 control	 was	 also	 part	 of	 an	attempt	 made	 by	 demographers	 and	 social	 scientists	 to	 make	 sense	 not	 only	 of	 population	numbers,	but	also	of	social	change.	These	attempts	to	understand	and	manipulate	fertility,	most	often	 of	 the	 poor,	 were	 frequently	 misguided;	 demographers	 and	 social	 scientists,	 having	hitched	 their	professional	and	 intellectual	horse	 to	 the	wagon	of	domestic	and	 foreign	policy,	often	found	themselves	conducting	research	that	was	scientifically	compromised.	As	Mahmood	Mamdani	 perceived	 in	 1972,	 ‘the	 political	 and	 scientific	 reasons	 for	 the	 emphasis	 on	overpopulation	 are,	 in	 fact,	 two	 sides	 of	 the	 same	 coin’. 11 		 Believing	 they	 knew	 that	overpopulation	 would	 severely	 hamper	 economic	 growth	 and	 development,	 social	 scientists	
																																																																				
9	See	for	example	Nilekani,	Imagining	India;	Sarah	Hodges,	‘Review	Article:	Malthus	is	Forever:	The	Global	Market	for	Population	Control’	Global	Social	Policy	10:120	(2010),	p.126			10	Significant	 texts	 include:	 Matthew	 Connelly,	 Fatal	 Misconception:	 The	 Struggle	 to	 Control	
World	Population,	(Kindle	ebook,	Belknap	Press,	2008);	Mohan	Rao,	From	Population	Control	to	
Reproductive	Health:	Malthusian	Arithmetic	 (New	Delhi,	 2004);	Betsy	Hartmann,	Reproductive	
Rights	 and	 Wrongs:	 The	 Global	 Bio-Politics	 of	 Population	 Control	 (New	 York,	 1995);	 Alison	Bashford,	Global	 Population:	History,	 Geopolitics	 and	 Life	 on	 Earth	 (New	 York,	 2014);	 Sanjam	Ahluwalia,	Reproductive	Restraints:	Birth	Control	in	India,	1877-1947	(Kindle	ebook,	University	of	 Illinois	Press,	2007);	Sarah	Hodges,	Contraception,	Colonialism	and	Commerce:	Birth	Control	
in	India	1920-1940	 (Ashgate,	2008),	 ‘Governmentality,	Population	and	Reproductive	Family	 in	Modern	India’	Economic	and	Political	Weekly,	39:11	(2004),	pp.1157-1163;	Saul	E.	Halfon,	The	
Cairo	 Consensus:	 Demographic	 Surveys,	 Women’s	 Empowerment	 and	 Regime	 Change	 in	




not	only	 created	 through	 their	 research	 the	objective	 and	scientific	 ‘reality’	of	 the	population	problem,	they	also	believed	they	could	provide	solutions	for	it.		









techniques	and	policies,	in	which	India	features	predominantly	as	a	site	of	experimentation	or	as	a	 laboratory.13	Finally,	 as	national	histories	of	population	 that	have	 their	primary	 focus	on	domestic	rather	 than	 international	 factors.	These	accounts,	 in	 the	 Indian	case,	have	 tended	to	focus	on	the	colonial	period,	charting	the	 links	between	population,	birth	control	and	debates	about	social	and	moral	reform,	nationalism,	and	development.14		











well	as	for	providing	the	means	to	use	and	challenge	this	label	by	the	1970s.	Behind	the	bland	averages,	 or	 more	 typically,	 the	 fear	 inducing	 upward	 line	 on	 the	 graph,	 were	 researchers	engaged	in	projects	of	gathering	data,	understanding	their	world,	and	representing	it	as	fact	-	a	process	 that	 often	 involved	 long	 and	 difficult	 journeys,	 sometimes	 dangerous	 conflicts,	 and	varying	degrees	of	co-operation.	As	Mahmood	Mamdani	argued	in	1972,	and	Sarah	Igo	in	2008,	ways	 of	 knowing	 –	 and	 what	 and	 how	 things	 are	 known	 –	 are	 critical	 for	 shaping	 public	identities,	 political	 communities	 and	 ‘structuring	 encounters’	 not	 just	 in	 the	 social	world,	 but	the	international	political	world	as	well.16		
	 Social	 statistics	 are	 not	 a	 twentieth	 century	 phenomenon.	 The	 collection	 of	demographic	data	has	occurred	for	nearly	a	millennium,17	but	the	nineteenth	century	creation	of	 the	 disciplines	 of	 demography	 and	 vital	 statistics,	 as	 well	 as	 rising	 public	 interest	 in	surveying,	introduced	new	ways	of	thinking	‘statistically’	about	populations	and	ushered	in	the	period	Ian	Hacking	calls	 ‘the	avalanche	of	numbers’.18	The	role	of	statistics,	data,	and	research	in	nation	building	and	the	construction	of	identities	has	been	extensively	explored	in	histories	of	 colonial	 knowledge-making	 and	 governance.19		 In	 Castes	 of	 Mind,	Nicholas	 Dirks	 uses	 an	analysis	 of	 the	 techniques	 of	 social	 measurement	 to	 support	 his	 argument	 that	 caste	 is	 a	modern	 phenomenon,	 resulting	 out	 of	 the	 ‘historical	 encounter’	 of	 colonial	 rule.20	Caste,	 as	 a	category,	was	 used	 to	 systematize	 social	 identity,	 community	 and	 organization.	 Dirks	 argues	that	the	‘career’	of	caste	as	a	category	changed	over	time	–	starting	as	textual	knowledge	before	being	subjected	to	the	‘enumerative	obsessions’	of	colonial	administrators	and	the	census	office	in	 the	 nineteenth	 century.21	Through	 its	 classification	 of	 society	 (using	 techniques	 such	 as	cartography,	 museums,	 taxation	 and	 the	 census),	 Dirks	 argues	 that	 Britain	 set	 in	 motion	 a	transformation	 as	 powerful	 as	 those	 wrought	 by	 ‘military	 and	 economic	 imperialism’.22	This	emerged	in	its	strongest	form	in	the	second	half	of	the	nineteenth	century	as	what	he	calls	the																																																																					
16	Sarah	Igo,	The	Averaged	American,	loc.67;	Mahmood	Mamdani,	The	Myth	of	Population	
Control	17	Igo	argues	that	the	process	of	counting	people	for	administrative	purposes	can	be	argued	to	extend	as	far	back	as	the	Domesday	Book	of	1086.	Ibid,	loc.72	18	Sarah	Igo,	The	Averaged	American,	loc.72;	Libby	Schweber,	Julia	Adams,	George	Steinmetz	
Disciplining	Statistics:	Demographic	and	Vital	Statistics	in	France	and	England	1830-1885	(Durham,	2006)	19	See	 for	 example:	 Benedict	 Anderson	 Imagined	 Communities:	 Reflections	 on	 the	 Origin	 and	





‘ethnographic	 state’.23	Shifting	 away	 from	 an	 ‘extractive’	 understanding	 of	 India	 (based	 on	revenue	and	the	relation	between	the	state	and	the	land),	the	colonial	state	turned	its	gaze	to	‘social	 classification	 and	 understanding’.24	As	 Dirks	 explains,	 this	was	 a	 transformation	 away	from	knowledge	limited	to	the	political	economy,	emphasizing	instead	knowledge	about	Indian	society.25	
	 The	 ‘enumerative	 obsessions’	 of	 census	 officials	 and	 administrators	 have	 also	 been	widely	explored.	Arjun	Appadurai	argues	that	it	was	the	urge	to	quantify,	as	much	as	the	urge	to	classify,	 that	 shaped	 the	nineteenth	 century	 ‘logic’	 of	 the	 colonial	 regime.26	Drawing	 from	 the	work	of	Sudipta	Kaviraj	and	Ian	Hacking,	he	argues	that	‘state	generated	numbers’	were	put	to	a	wide	 variety	 of	 uses,	 from	 setting	 tax	 levels	 to	 policy	 change.27	Beyond	 their	 administrative	utility,	 numbers	 also	 came	 to	 be	 a	 key	 part	 the	 colonial	 state’s	 ‘illusion	 of	 control’,	 and	were	significant	 not	 only	 in	 how	 the	 colonial	 state	 justified	 its	 rule	 to	 itself,	 but	 also	 how	 it	communicated	with	 the	metropole.28	More	 than	 providing	 numerical	 grist	 for	 the	 policy	mill,	Appadurai	argues	that	numbers	and	official	statistics	became	a	crucial	part	of	disciplining	both	the	 apparatuses	 of	 the	 colonial	 state,	 as	 well	 the	 populations	 they	 wished	 to	 ‘control	 and	reform’.29	Between	1870	and	1930	the	practices	of	the	colonial	state	ushered	in	a	new	era;	that	of	 the	 ‘great	 All-India	 Census’,	 which	 had	 enumerating	 people	 (rather	 than	 land	 or	 other	resources)	 as	 its	 dominant	 project.30 	These	 censuses	 opened	 up	 the	 possibility	 for	 new	questions	 and	 analyses	 of	 society.	 Increasingly,	Apparaduri	 argues,	 it	was	believed	 that	what	needed	 to	 be	 known	 about	 Indian	 society	 would	 ‘become	 intelligible	 only	 by	 the	 detailed	enumeration	 of	 the	 population	 in	 terms	 of	 caste’. 31 	Significantly,	 Appadurai	 links	 these	processes	with	the	‘politics	of	numbers’	that	persisted	into	the	twentieth	century	–	even	as	the	importance	of	caste	declined	after	1931,	the	idea	of	‘politics	as	the	contest	of	essentialized	and	enumerated	communities’	persisted.32	




America,	argues	that	there	was	a	dramatic	shift	 in	the	 ‘purposes	and	effects	of	gathering	such	data’	–	efforts	to	collect	data	were	expanded,	surveys	turned	to	recording	attitudes,	beliefs	and	behaviours,	and	new	people	were	targeted	for	investigation.33	Professionalization,	innovations	in	 survey	 design,	 and	 the	 needs	 of	 the	 war-time	 state	 all	 contributed	 to	 the	 rise	 of	 social	surveys.	Most	significantly,	she	argues	that	over	the	twentieth	century	there	was	a	significant	change	 in	 the	 proper	 province	 of	 statistics	 –	 from	 statisticians,	 reformers,	 and	 the	 census	bureau	at	 the	beginning	of	 the	century	to	 the	virtual	 ‘omnipresence’	of	 the	 ‘methods,	 findings	and	 vocabularies’	 of	 surveys	 and	 statistics	 by	 its	 end.34	Putting	 social	 surveys	 to	work,	 social	scientists	 in	 the	 mid-twentieth	 century	 were,	 she	 argues,	 ‘covert	 nation-builders’,	 creating	 a	picture	of	a	collective	society	possible	only	because	it	was	‘radically	simplified’.35	Mike	Savage,	in	 his	 history	 of	 social	 science	 sampling	 in	 twentieth	 century	 Britain	 also	 stresses	 the	significance	of	the	social	survey	for	explaining	and	exploring	social	change.	Like	Igo,	he	argues	that	 social	 surveys	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 ‘nation-building’.36	Social	 surveys,	 he	 argues,	created	 a	 ‘distinctive	 politics	 of	 the	 abstracted	 individual’	 in	 the	 post-war	 period,	 as	 surveys	themselves	became	the	‘quintessential	research	arm	of	the	modern	state’.37		










also	 argued,	 however,	 that	 modernization	 and	 rapid	 development	 could	 help	 create	 the	conditions	 -	 through	 development	 of	 industry	 and	 agriculture,	 and	 inculcating	 the	 desire	 for	smaller	families	-	for	lowering	population	growth	and	alleviating	the	population	problem.47	By	the	 1950s,	 demographers	 were	 advocating	 a	 more	 aggressive	 approach	 –	 the	 provision	 of	contraceptives	 to	 the	 Third	 World	 to	 induce	 a	 fertility	 decline	 and	 therefore	 speed	development.48	This	 was,	 Dennis	 Hodgson	 argues,	 ‘as	 much	 a	 development	 strategy	 as	 a	demographic	perspective’	 –	 one	which	was	 closely	 linked	 to	 the	politics	 of	 the	Cold	War	 and	American	foreign	policy.49		





international	 agencies	 and	 non-governmental	 organizations	 and	 provided	 a	 site	 for	 them	 to	trial	their	interventions.	
	 A	 number	 of	 authors	 have	 advanced	 and	 strengthened	 this	 narrative,	 which	 looks	predominately	 at	 population	 control	 and	 overpopulation	 through	 the	 lens	 of	 policy.	 Betsy	Hartmann’s	 seminal	 polemic	 on	 population	 control,	 Reproductive	 Rights	 and	Wrongs,	 argues	forcefully	that	the	basic	premise	of	population	control	–	the	need	to	reduce	women’s	fertility	to	slow	 worldwide	 population	 growth	 –	 is	 fundamentally	 wrong.56	Following	 from	 arguments	made	 in	 the	 inter-war	 period,	 and	 again	 in	 the	 1970s,	 Hartmann	 contends	 that	 population	growth	 is	 the	 symptom,	 not	 the	 cause,	 of	 ‘problematic	 economic	 and	 social	 development’.57	Taking	aim	at	arguments	that	linked	population	growth	to	poor	economic	development,	and	at	technocratic,	top-down	programs	of	family	planning,	Hartmann	casts	population	control	as	an	‘unfair	and	ineffective	burden	placed	by	rich	countries	upon	the	poor’.58	Population,	she	argues,	should	be	 removed	 from	 the	 ‘development	 lexicon’	 and	 instead	 replaced	by	 ‘concern	 for	 real	people,	 real	 environments,	 not	 the	 fixed	 images	 of	 dark	 babies	 as	 bombs,	women	 as	wombs,	statistical	manipulations	as	absolute	truth’.59		











until	the	1980s	population	control	functioned	as	both	an	‘arena	and	an	agenda’	–	an	intellectual	and	political	space	where	 ‘feminists,	environmentalists	and	a	host	of	others…together	tried	to	change	 the	way	people	considered	 their	 sexuality,	 their	 families,	 their	place	 in	 the	world	and	their	collective	future’.64		






poverty	or	high	 fertility	and	provide	solutions	was	one	of	 the	defining	 tenants	of	 liberalism	–	particularly	American	liberalism	–	in	the	twentieth	century.70	This	belief	permeated	attempts	to	address	social	ills,	not	only	in	America	but	around	the	world,	through	projects	of	development	and	 modernization. 71 	As	 Alice	 O’Conner	 argues,	 ‘for	 well	 over	 a	 century,	 liberal	 social	investigators	 have	 scrutinized	 poor	 people	 in	 the	 hopes	 of	 creating	 a	 knowledge	 base	 for	informed	social	action’.72		
Demography	 and	 demographers	 are	 often	 cast	 as	 the	 ‘handmaidens’	 of	 population	control.	Professional	demographers	are	argued	to	have	played	a	‘critical	role’	by	‘tailoring	their	theories	 to	 provide	 a	 respectable	 justification	 for	 questionable	 policy	 intervention’.73	Firmly	established	 within	 the	 wider	 ‘population	 establishment’,	 demographers	 and	 other	 social	scientists	are	argued	to	have	been	key	players	in	creating	legitimacy	for	population	control	and	a	 scientific	backing	 for	 the	political	project	of	 family	planning.74	This	history	 is	 closely	 tied	 to	the	narrative	of	population	control	and	the	population	problem	that	takes	the	post-war	period	as	 the	 moment	 of	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 population	 problem,	 closely	 linking	 demography	 to	American	 foreign	 policy,	 and	 arguing	 that	 the	 family	 planning	 programmes	 supported	 by	demographers	provided	a	solution	to	Third	World	development	and	the	population	problem.75			










planning	as	a	‘solution’	to	the	population	problem.77	The	close	connections	were	responsible	for	the	 ‘preoccupation	 with…programmatic	 factors’,	 the	 neglect	 of	 personal	 preferences	 and	 of	socioeconomic	 context,	 as	 well	 the	 ‘perverse	 persistence	 of	 demographic	 transition	 theory’	which	was	more	 closely	 aligned	 to	policy	making	 than	 ‘scholarly	 inquiry’.78	Greenhalgh	notes	that	 these	 accounts	 –	 like	 those	 of	 the	 population	 control	 movement	 more	 broadly	 –	 have	illustrated	 the	 multiple	 impacts	 of	 policy	 and	 political	 developments	 on	 the	 ‘evolution	 of	demographic	thought’.79		
	 Work	 on	 demography	 and	 population	 control,	 as	 well	 as	 broader	 accounts	 of	 the	growth	of	environmentalism,	and	of	modernization	and	development,	have	all	helped	to	trace	the	 outlines	 of	 the	 intellectual,	 political,	 and	 professional	 space	 that	 demographers,	 social	scientists,	 activists	 and	 ideas	 (for	 example	 about	 economic	 growth,	 development,	 resources,	food,	 and	 land)	 occupied.	 Recent	 work	 has	 begun	 to	 explore	 how	 important	 the	 projects	 of	research	and	data-gathering	were	to	this	process.	To	quote	Mamdani,	‘the	method	of	analysis	in	large	part	determines	the	results	that	follow.	As	important	as	“knowing”	is	the	method	one	uses	to	“know”’.80	Greenhalgh	has	argued	for	the	need	to	attend	to	the	practice	of	science	–	including	demography	 –	 as	 a	 social	 activity,	 drawing	 attention	 to	 three	 main	 problems	 in	 the	historiography	of	demography.	The	first	problem	is	that	of	the	‘essentialization	of	demographic	science’.	 Casting	 demography	 as	 a	 science	 with	 a	 ‘fixed	 nature’,	 whether	 that	 is	 as	 a	 “policy	science”	 or	 something	 else,	 is	 wrong	 –	 instead,	 it	 must	 be	 recognized	 that	 science	 has	 no	essential	nature,	 ‘it	 is	what	people	make	 it’.81	Her	second	critique	 is	 that	 insufficient	attention	has	been	paid	to	the	practices	that	‘demographers	themselves	have	undertaken	in	constructing	their	discipline’.82	Her	third	critique	draws	attention	to	the	need	to	resist	creating	narratives	of	‘demographic	exceptionalism’;	demographers,	she	argues,	were	no	more	ignorant,	unprincipled	or	‘susceptible	to	politicization’	than	other	social	scientists.83		




the	field	necessarily	involved	interaction	with	the	subject	of	study	–	the	general	public	–	who,	as	Corinna	 Unger	 and	 Heinrich	 Hartmann	 highlight,	 ‘often	 understand	 much	 more	 about	 the	methodology	of	the	surveys	and	their	underlying	assumptions	than	statisticians	suspect’.84	Saul	Halfon	 has	 convincingly	 shown	 that	 survey	 research	 and	 ‘associated	 practices’	 are	 extremely	effective	 at	 stripping	 themselves	 of	 politics	 –	 and	 in	 their	 depoliticized	 form	 became	increasingly	 important	 for	 ‘structuring	 the	 institutional	 space	of	population	policy’.85	In	doing	this	surveys	–	and	particularly	the	Knowledge,	Attitude	and	Practice	(KAP)	survey	–	helped	to	‘produce	the	political	space	within	which	policy	functions’.86	While	surveys	were	claimed	to	be	objective	 and	 scientific,	 they	nevertheless	 constituted	 a	 ‘crucial	 arena’	 for	 the	 contestation	of	population	policy.87		






POPULATION	IN	INDIA		In	the	history	of	population	control,	population	is	taken	as	being	crucial	to	the	development	of	modern	 India.	The	 impact	of	 the	population	on	 the	economy	and	development	programs,	 the	effect	of	demographic	changes	in	the	wake	of	partition,	the	pressure	of	the	large	population	and	its	outcome	on	food	production	and	resources,	are	presented	as	dominant	concerns	and	highly	influential	 factors	 shaping	 the	 population	 policies	 of	 the	 period.	 However,	 while	 population	features	 in	 the	 background	 of	 general	 narratives	 of	 twentieth	 century	 India,	 government	actions	 or	 policies	 that	 directly	 addressed	 or	 impacted	 population	 are	 rarely	 given	 serious	mention	aside	from	discussions	of	the	Emergency.91	When	population	is	discussed,	for	example	as	 in	Barbara	and	Thomas	Metcalf’s	A	Concise	History	of	Modern	India,	mention	is	made	of	the	longstanding	 ‘government	priority’	 to	control	population,	but	 it	 is	not	 further	discussed	other	than	 through	 reference	 to	 the	 ‘family	 planning	 slogans	 plastered	 on	 billboards’.92	They	 also	reproduce	 the	main	argument	of	 the	period,	 that	population	growth	needed	 to	be	 controlled,	silencing	the	debates	over	the	meaning	of	overpopulation,	its	relationship	to	development,	the	economy,	and	democracy	that	occurred	particularly	between	the	late	1930s	to	the	late	1950s,	and	again	in	the	late	1960s	and	early	1970s.	Highlighting	the	Emergency	as	an	aberrant	episode	of	compulsory	sterilization,	the	long	and	complex	relationship	between	population,	democracy,	individual	rights	and	development	in	India	is	bypassed.	Population	control	is	presented	both	as	the	unproblematic	policy	outcome	of	‘problematic	growth’,	and	as	having	been	‘defeated’	by	the	post-Emergency	triumph	of	democracy.	These	accounts	of	population	control	fit	into	the	more	general	outlines	of	histories	of	twentieth	century	India	that	stress	the	modernizing	projects	of	the	 state.	 The	 history	 of	 post-Independence	 India,	 and	 particularly	 of	 the	 ‘Nehruvian	 era’	between	 the	 1950s	 and	 the	 early	 1960s	 is	 often	 argued	 to	 have	 been	 one	 of	 ‘profound	modernism’.	Jawaharlal	Nehru,	India’s	first	Prime	Minister,	is	portrayed	as	dedicated	to	science,	part	of	a	‘technocratic	style	of	politics’,	and	with	a	‘zeal	for	high	impact	modernist	projects’.93		







postcolonial	 state.94	As	 Immerwahr	 notes,	 this	 account	 glosses	 over	many	 of	 the	 factors	 that	shaped	the	build-up	to	Independence,	not	only	the	relationship	between	Nehru	and	Gandhi,	but	also	the	vigorous	contestation	over	how	India	should	be	conceived	and	administered,	and	what	the	aims,	goals	and	guiding	 rationale	of	 the	state	 should	be.	 In	particular,	 Immerwahr	argues	that	 alternative	 forms	of	 development,	 largely	 erased	 in	 the	 grand	modernizing	narratives	 of	the	 twentieth	 century,	 need	 to	 be	 acknowledged.	 In	 India,	 one	 such	 strategy	 –	 community	development	–	counted	among	 its	supporters	 the	stars	of	standard	modernization	narratives:	Jawaharlal	 Nehru	 and	 the	 Ford	 Foundation’s	 Douglas	 Ensminger.	 The	 importance	 of	 local	development	projects,	their	support	from	the	state,	and	eventual	outcome	as	‘neither	utopia	or	panacea’	 lays	 the	 foundations	 for	 re-examining	 the	 relationship	 between	 overpopulation	 and	development	discourses	in	India.	Recent	work	on	the	‘everyday	state’	has	also	turned	to	these	questions.	 As	 Taylor	 Sherman,	 William	 Gould	 and	 Sarah	 Ansari	 argue,	 the	 pre-	 and	 post-independence	period	was	one	of	marked	continuity	in	terms	of	the	discourses	of	development,	nationalist	movement,	 and	 the	 relationship	 between	 citizens	 and	 the	 State.95		 They	 call	 for	 a	new	 periodization	 of	 the	 post-colonial	 period	 that	 sees	 the	 1930-1960s	 as	 distinct,	 and	 the	period	 after	 the	 1960s	 as	 the	 eruption	 of	 tensions	 accumulated	 during	 the	 ‘nation-building	phase’.96	





program’	–	and	influenced	the	‘welfare,	outlook	and	politics	in	India’.99	He	nevertheless	follows	the	 general	 narrative	 laid	 down	 in	 population	 control	 accounts.	 It	 is	 the	 Princeton-based	demographers	 Frank	 Notestein	 and	 Kingsley	 Davis	 that	 he	 identifies	 as	 having	 early	significance	in	developing	the	discipline	of	demography,	and	it	was	their	work,	he	argues,	that	resulted	in	population	control	being	made	‘part	of	the	modernization	process’.100		
While	Premananda	stresses	the	importance	of	field	studies	and	research,	as	well	as	the	importance	of	 the	small	 family	norm	in	demographic	practice	and	policy-making,	he	does	not	situate	 demography	 within	 its	 wider	 social-science	 setting,	 a	 setting	 in	 which	 the	 return	 to	empiricism	 and	 particularly	 to	 the	 field	 study	 was	 becoming	 increasingly	 important	 by	 the	1950s.	 That	 the	 Indian	 state,	 and	 social	 and	 political	 sciences	 in	 the	 twentieth	 century	were	engaged	in	projects	of	development	and	modernization	guided	by	liberal	modernization	theory	is	relatively	uncontested.	However,	new	research	focusing	on	the	empirical	practices	of	social	scientists,	 on	 the	 ‘everyday	 state’,	 and	 on	 social	 experiments	 is	 illustrating	 that	 the	 period	between	the	late	1930s	and	the	1970s	needs	to	be	thought	of	as	highly	experimental,	not	only	in	 terms	 of	 infrastructure	 and	 the	 natural	 sciences,	 but	 also	 in	 terms	 of	 social	 and	 economic	experimentation.	




‘temples	 of	 the	 modern	 age’,	 but	 her	 villages	 were	 equally	 sites	 of	 intensive	 social	experimentation	and	development	projects.	THE	THESIS	This	 thesis	makes	 three	main	 arguments	by	 following	 the	paths	of	 Indian	population	experts	and	 professionals	 –	 the	 researchers,	 intellectuals,	 and	 policy-makers	 –	 who,	 alongside	 their	international	 colleagues,	 acted	 to	understand	and	 shape	 the	way	 India’s	population	was	both	conceived	and	acted	upon.	 In	particular,	 it	 follows	 the	work	of	 Sripati	Chandrasekhar,	whose	ideas	and	career	reflect	the	many	intellectual	and	political	factors	shaping	population	control	in	India	 in	 the	 twentieth	 century.	His	 legacy,	 and	portrayal	 in	histories	 of	 population	 control,	 is	also	 indicative	 of	 the	 broader	 trends	 emphasizing	 the	 importance	 of	 contraception	 that	 have	dominated	the	field,	and	demonstrates	where	new	lines	of	inquiry	are	needed.	Chandrasekhar,	despite	being	a	sociologist,	demographer,	prolific	author	and	elected	official	who	as	Minister	of	Health	and	Family	Planning	oversaw	the	massive	expansion	of	India’s	family	planning	program	and	 of	 programs	 to	 instil	 the	 small	 family	 norm	 across	 society	 in	 the	 late	 1960s,	 is	 most	frequently	remembered	for	his	vocal	and	longstanding	support	for	sterilization.101		







about	national	development,	 individual	 rights	and	 the	biological	 emancipation	of	women.	His	position	on	sterilization	–	developed	in	large	measure	through	his	work	with	the	1951	Census	Commissioner	R.A	Gopalaswami	–	was	only	one	aspect	of	his	larger	vision	of	population	policy.	He	contrasted	arguments	for	the	need	for	compulsion	with	claims	about	individual	freedom	and	rights;	 contraceptive	 ‘solutions’	 to	 the	 population	 problem	 with	 a	 wide-reaching	 plan	 to	producing	long-lasting	social	change	through	targeting	behaviours	and	social	norms.	Dowbiggin	credits	Chandrasekhar	with	doing	more	than	any	other	person	to	advance	sterilization,	but	he	also	did	a	great	deal	–	arguably	more	than	any	other	Minister	of	Health	in	India	–	to	define	and	develop	a	project	of	social	engineering	as	well.		
A	single	person’s	career	and	 ideas,	while	an	 inadequate	mirror	 for	 India’s	population	control	policies	as	a	whole,	nevertheless	highlights	where	current	accounts	of	this	history	have	tended	 to	wash	 out	 arguments	 about	 social	 change,	 alternate	 arguments	 about	 development,	and	 debates	 over	 rights	 and	 freedoms	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 narrative	 that	 focuses	 on	 international	actors,	 authoritarian	 tendencies,	 and	 contraceptive	 technologies.103	In	 these	 narratives	 the	Indian	 state	 is	 largely	 passive,	 until	 the	 Emergency,	 when	 it	 emerges	 as	 an	 authoritarian	presence	 coercing	 and	 compelling	 people	 to	 be	 sterilized.	While	 the	 international	 population	control	 movement	 was	 undeniably	 powerful,	 and	 while	 the	 international	 intellectual	 and	professional	context	shaped	how	population	was	understood	and	acted	on,	the	state	was	also	a	key	player	prior	to	the	Emergency.	Looking	again	at	how	and	why	the	state	acted	prior	to	the	Emergency	 through	 individuals	 like	 Chandrasekhar	 reveals	 not	 only	 that	 the	 authoritarian	tendencies	typically	associated	to	the	Emergency	had	their	origins	in	the	practices	and	policies	of	 the	1960s104	it	 also	 reveals,	 as	Daniel	 Immerwahr	has	 shown	 for	 community	development,	the	many	 strategies	 of	 development,	 planning	 and	 social	 change	 that	were	being	 trialled	 and	tested	which	were	linked	not	to	the	 ‘high	modernism’	of	Nehruvian	science	but	to	the	village-oriented	ethos	of	Gandhian	development.		






control	around	the	nation	challenges	the	standard	population	control	narratives	that	prioritize	international	 and	American	 influence	 in	 the	post-war	period,	 and	builds	 on	 recent	work	 that	has	called	for	a	new	chronology	and	framing	in	history	of	both	population	control	and	twentieth	century	 India.	Following	 the	arguments	of	Gould,	Ansari,	Sherman	and	Bashford,	bridging	 the	‘Independence	 gap’	 reveals	 not	 rupture	 but	 striking	 continuity	 in	 how	 population	 was	perceived	 as	 a	 problem	 and	 how	 the	 state	 should	 act	 to	 address	 it.	 These	 continuities	 range	from	 how	 the	 problem	 was	 understood	 –	 particularly	 in	 economic	 arguments	 about	development,	and	how	the	state	could	know	about,	and	tackle	it	–	through	centralized	planning,	policy-making	 and	 state-led	 projects	 of	 data	 collection,	 but	 also	 through	 the	 activities	 of	research	institutes,	individual	researchers	and	non-governmental	organizations	working	within	India.		
	 Most	accounts	of	population	control	in	India	focus	on	the	relationship	between	policy-making	and	contraception	–	particularly	sterilization	–	culminating	in	the	Emergency.	However,	building	on	the	work	of	Marika	Vicziany,	Matthew	Connelly,	and	Rebecca	Williams,	this	thesis	argues	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 de-centre	 the	 Emergency	 by	 showing	 how	 competing	 narratives	 of	development,	family	planning,	freedom	and	coercion	were	articulated	in	the	context	of	creating	social	 change.	These	narratives	had	 their	origins	 in	 the	 research	 conducted	 in	 the	 late	1950s	and	 early	 1960s,	 and	 arguably	 reached	 their	 apex	 not	 during	 the	 Emergency	 but	 in	 the	 late	1960s.	The	appointment	of	Sripati	Chandrasekhar	to	Minister	of	Health	and	Family	Planning	in	1967	initiated	a	period	of	intensive	family	planning	activity	by	the	state.	Chandrasekhar	argued	for	compulsory	sterilization	but	also,	significantly,	for	a	massive	project	of	social	engineering	to	change	 social	 norms	 about	 family	 size.	 I	 argue	 that	 narratives	 about	 sterilization	 specifically,	and	contraception	in	general,	have	overshadowed	the	importance	of	behavioural	policies	aimed	to	 change	 family	 size	 which	 were	 a	 key	 part	 of	 the	 family	 planning	 policies	 of	 the	 state.	Attitudes	and	public	opinion	on	family	planning	were	key	research	interests	in	the	1950s,	and	behavioural	 approaches	 appeared	 to	provide	 an	 alternative	 to	 centralized	 clinic-based	 family	planning	in	the	early	1960s.	Looking	at	how	behaviours	were	studied,	understood	and	written	into	and	out	of	the	family	planning	policies	therefore	broadens	our	understanding	of	population	control	 in	 India	 and	 challenges	 the	 Emergency-driven	 narratives	 that	 pass	 over	 the	 many	variations	 of	 family	 planning	 and	 population	 control	 that	 were	 implemented	 prior	 to	 the	Emergency.		
	 This	 thesis	 argues	 thirdly	 that	 data	 and	 research	 are	 key	 to	 understanding	 how	 the	population	problem	was	understood	and	acted	on	in	India.	Debates	over	population	data		-	how	to	collect	it,	where	to	collect	it,	and	what	was	most	useful	for	policy	–	emerged	in	the	interwar	period	and	persisted	throughout	the	twentieth	century.	Early	debates	centred	on	what	counted	as	the	correct	unit	of	measurement	for	population,	and	whether	there	was	a	single	population	problem	or	many	different	 ones,	 as	well	 as	 if	 these	were	 local,	 regional	 or	 national	 in	 scope.	Debates	also	addressed	what	data	was	most	useful	for	policy-making,	spanning	both	the	state-
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run	mechanisms	 for	data	 collection	 (including	 the	 census	and	 the	national	 sample	 survey)	as	well	as	non-state	projects	run	by	both	research	organizations	(from	the	UN	to	small	institutes)	and	 individual	 researchers.	Paying	 attention	 to	debates	 about	data	 and	 research	 reveals	how	highly	 politicized	 these	 data	 and	 research	 were,	 and	 how	 varied	 understandings	 of	 the	population	problem	were.	This	 is	significant	because	not	only	does	research	and	data	present	itself	 as	depoliticized,	 the	population	problem	 is	 itself	presented	as	being	a	 single	monolithic	problem	rather	than	as	a	combination	of	problems	that	varied	at	different	times	and	in	different	locations.		
	 Chapter	One	examines	two	official	inquiries	into	population	data:	the	National	Planning	Commission’s	 Sub-Committee	 on	 Population,	 and	 the	 Government	 of	 India	 Population	 Data	Committee;	 and	 two	methods	 of	 data	 collection:	 the	 census	 and	 the	 National	 Sample	 Survey	(NSS).	 It	argues	that	 the	definitions	of	overpopulation,	and	the	sources	of	data	on	population,	were	 highly	 contested	 during	 this	 period.	 While	 recent	 work	 has	 assessed	 the	 diverse	intellectual	 arguments	 about	 population	 in	 the	 inter-war	 period,	 this	 chapter	 explores	 how,	looking	at	new	and	different	ways	to	collect	population	data,	social	scientists	and	policy-makers	engaged	in	debates	about	not	only	what	the	population	problem	was	and	how	to	measure	it,	but	where	it	was	(national	or	regional)	and	whether	it	could	be	thought	of	as	a	single	problem.		
	 Chapter	 two	argues	 that	population	became	constructed	as	a	national	problem	in	 the	late	1940s	and	early	1950s.	Looking	at	the	rising	importance	of	new	methods	of	data	collection	like	 the	National	Sample	Survey,	and	 the	growing	 importance	of	 field	research	carried	out	by	demographers,	 this	 chapter	 explores	 the	 links	 between	 population,	 national	 planning,	 and	family	planning	that	were	established	in	the	build-up	to	the	First	Five	Year	Plan.		
	 Chapter	three	argues	that	the	research	supported	and	pursued	during	the	Second	Five	Year	Plan	period,	particularly	demographic	 research,	 is	a	 significant	 factor	accounting	 for	 the	rising	 importance	placed	on	motivation	and	attitudes	 in	 the	 family	planning	programme.	The	experiments	 conducted	during	 the	Second	Five	Year	Plan,	 the	networks	of	 governmental	 and	international	 support	 for	 research,	 and	 the	 professional	 networks	 established	 during	 this	period	 had	 a	 significant	 impact,	 laying	 the	 groundwork	 for	 policies	 pursued	 from	 the	 1960s	onwards.	Key	to	this	was	the	rising	importance	of	the	field	study.	Exploring	the	work	conducted	in	the	Khanna	Study,	by	the	Indian	Institute	of	Population	Studies,	and	by	the	Gokhale	Institute	of	 Politics	 and	 Economics,	 this	 chapter	 links	 the	 rising	 importance	 of	 new	 research	methodologies	 with	 the	 institutionalization	 of	 demography	 and	 rising	 policy	 importance	 of	demographic	expertise	and	data.		
	 Research,	family	planning	policy	and	broader	ideas	about	development	faced	a	number	of	 challenges	 in	 the	 early	 1960s,	 demonstrated	 through	 the	 numerous	 changes	 in	 family	planning	policy	pursued	between	1960-1965.	This	period	 is	 typically	portrayed	as	one	where	family	 planning	 policy	 is	 given	 greater	 emphasis	 from	 the	 Government	 of	 India,	 and	
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technological	and	technocratic	approaches	are	given	freer	reign.	Looking	to	the	shifts	from	the	clinic	approach	 to	 the	extension	education	approach,	and	 from	the	extension	approach	 to	 the	Intrauterine	contraceptive	device	(IUCD)	approach,	chapter	four	challenges	this	interpretation	and	 explores	 how	 research,	 implementation,	 and	 ideas	 about	 development	 influenced	 family	planning	in	India	during	the	early	1960s.	It	argues	that	the	shift	to	extension	education,	and	its	abandonment	soon	after,	 is	part	of	 larger	shift	away	 from	a	community-based	developmental	model.		
	 In	 1967,	 Sripati	 Chandrasekhar	 was	 made	 Minister	 of	 Health	 and	 Family	 Planning.	Chapter	 five	 explores	 how,	 between	 1967-1970,	 India	 pursued	 both	 a	 policy	 of	 social	engineering	in	an	attempt	to	inculcate	the	small	family	norm,	as	well	as	initiating	a	new	forms	of	 family	 planning	 administration	 and	 contraceptive	 distribution,	 first	 through	 channels	 of	commercial	distribution	and	later	through	mass	camps.	Exploring	how	the	Government	of	India	and	 the	 Foundations	 sought	 to	 spread	 the	 small	 family	 norm	 through	 projects	 of	 mass	communication	 as	well	 as	 through	 commercial	 contraceptive	 distribution,	 it	 argues	 that	 this	reflected	 wider,	 longstanding	 ideas	 about	 social	 change	 and	 social	 planning	 that	 had	 been	influential	in	demography	since	the	1950s.		
	 Chapter	six	explores	the	rise	of	critical	backlash	to	population	control,	culminating	 in	the	 1974	 World	 Population	 Conference.	 Development,	 modernization,	 the	 economy,	 and	population	policies	 faced	 increasing	 criticism	 in	 this	 period.	As	demography	 faced	 challenges	from	within	 and	without,	 arguments	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 population	 change,	 the	 relationship	between	demographic	theory	and	policy,	and	the	form	that	population	policies	should	take	(i.e.	voluntary	or	coercive)	were	hotly	debated.	Researchers	who,	like	Mahmood	Mamdani,	revisited	and	 challenged	 the	 foundational	 studies	 conducted	 in	 the	 1950s,	 were	 part	 of	 a	 growing	critique	 that	 questioned	 the	 basis	 for	 population	 policies	 of	 fertility	 control.	 These	 critiques	came	to	a	head	at	the	1974	World	Population	Conference	which	saw	an	alliance	of	Third	World	countries	 challenging	 the	 developmental	models	 of	 the	 preceding	 two	 decades,	 and	 at	which	India	famously	proclaimed	‘development	is	the	best	contraceptive’.	This	chapter	highlights	how,	by	 the	 mid-1970s,	 the	 consensus	 and	 confidence	 of	 demographers	 had	 evaporated	 into	 the	multiple	and	contested	intellectual,	political	and	economic	uncertainty	of	the	1970s.		








Over	the	course	of	the	early	twentieth	century,	understandings	of	the	population	problem	went	through	 several	 shifts	 –	 moving	 from	 population	 ‘understood	 as	 natural	 history’,	 to	overpopulation	 tied	 to	 economic	and	 social	development.1	This	 changing	 conception	 is	 linked	not	only	to	the	‘global	emergence’	of	the	population	problem	in	the	mid-twentieth	century2,	but	to	new	data	gathering	practices	carried	out	in	India.	This	chapter	looks	at	how	methods	of	data	collection	 and	 debates	 over	 the	 sources	 of	 data	 –	 as	 played	 out	 in	 the	 census,	 the	 National	Sample	Survey,	the	Government	of	India	Population	Data	Committee	and	the	National	Planning	Committee’s	 Sub-Committee	 on	Population	 –	were	 instrumental	 in	 re-shaping	 the	population	problem,	linking	it	not	only	to	development,	but	to	new	questions	about	where	population	was,	how	to	measure	it,	and	whether	it	was	a	single	problem	or	many.		





time.	 Sanjam	 Ahluwahlia	 argues	 that	 the	 creation	 of	 overpopulation	 as	 a	 problem	 in	 India	resulted	primarily	from	the	arguments	of	male	middle-class	birth	control	advocates	who	linked	rising	population	numbers	to	arguments	that	a	large	population	was	‘incommensurate	with	the	national	goals	of	a	fit	and	healthy	citizenry’.6	This	established	the	‘deployment	of	demographic	numbers’	 as	 a	 central	 focus	 of	 debates	 on	 population,	 helping	 create	 overpopulation	 as	 a	national	problem	linked	to	health,	reproduction	and	population	size.7	
While	Ahluwahlia	focuses	on	the	links	between	demographic	data,	the	census	and	the	birth	 control	 movement	 in	 interwar	 India,	 both	 David	 Arnold	 and	 Rahul	 Nair	 outline	 the	importance	of	 the	 colonial	 administration	–	particularly	 the	public	health	administration	–	 in	creating	 the	population	problem.	David	Arnold	argues	 that	 in	 the	 interwar	period	population	underwent	 a	 shift,	 switching	 from	 the	 ‘population	 question’	 of	 the	 1920s	 to	 the	 ‘population	problem’	 of	 the	 1930s.8	Key	 to	 this	 shift	 was	 the	 1931	 census,	 which	 he	 argues	 provided	 a	‘benchmark’,	 both	 for	 colonial	 officials	 and	 the	 middle	 class.9	Debates	 over	 the	 population	problem	 were	 largely	 informed	 by	 the	 census,	 which	 was	 often	 more	 influential	 in	 shaping	thinking	 about	 population	 in	 India	 than	 official	 policies.10	Arnold	 links	 these	 debates	 to	 the	growing	 support	 for	 birth	 control	 in	 this	 period,	 concluding	 that	 even	 as	 birth	 control	 was	increasingly	recognized	as	a	way	to	‘solve’	to	the	population	problem,	the	colonial	government	was	cautious	about	 linking	advocacy	 for	birth	 control	 closely	 to	 the	 state,	waiting	 instead	 for	‘educated	public	opinion’	to	‘take	the	lead’.11	





and	 intellectuals.	 It	 was	 these	 factors,	 he	 argues,	 more	 than	 census	 reports,	 that	 led	 to	 the	creation	of	the	population	problem.13				




Indian	nationalists	rejected	outright	claims	that	India	was	overpopulated	arguing	instead	that	India’s	growth	 rate	was	comparatively	 slow,	particularly	 in	 light	of	 the	growth	 rates	of	many	European	 countries,	 which	 had	 been	 both	 augmented	 and	 alleviated	 by	 their	 territorial	expansion.18	Others	argued	that	a	large	absolute	population	size	was	a	good	general	indicator	of	health	and	relative	prosperity,	in	addition	to	providing	a	large	labour	force.19		
	 However,	 the	 argument	 that	 large	 populations	were	 a	 negative,	 rather	 than	 positive	symptom	 -	 signs	 of	 cultural,	 economic	 and	 social	 ‘backwardness’	 -	 was	 increasingly	 gaining	traction.20	One	of	the	first	authors	to	publish	on	the	problem	of	India’s	population,	understood	as	 growth	 impacting	 negatively	 on	 health	 and	 on	 economic	 wellbeing,	 was	 P.K	Wattal.	 First	published	in	1916,	and	revised	in	1934	and	1938	his	book,	The	Population	Problem	in	India:	A	




publication	of	the	1931	Census,	which	had	drawn	attention	to	population	growth.	In	the	1920s	the	 first	 wave	 of	 population	 ‘experts’	 working	 on	 population	 –	 economists,	 sociologists,	 and	statisticians,	among	others	–	 including	R.C	Dutt,	P.K	Wattal,	B.T	Ranadive,	Brij	Narain	and	D.G	Karve	 were	 starting	 to	 reformulate	 the	 links	 between	 poverty	 and	 population.	 These	 two	factors	had	been	linked	to	the	supposedly	natural	events	of	famine	and	disease,	but	increasingly	it	 was	 being	 argued	 that	 poverty	 was	 not	 a	 consequence	 of	 population	 growth	 per	 se,	 but	instead	 the	 direct	 consequence	 of	 colonial	 misrule.27	In	 particular,	 they	 cited	 the	 lack	 of	investment	 by	 the	 state	 into	 agriculture	 and	 industry,	 as	 well	 as	 excessive	 taxation,	 for	exacerbating	 the	 conditions	 leading	 to	poverty	 throughout	 India.	This	 increasingly	politicized	formulation	of	the	population	problem	originated	in	the	early	twentieth	century,	between	1910	and	1920,	and	had	started	to	re-shape	the	boundaries	in	which	debate	on	population	occurred	in	India.28		





	 In	1932	Hutton	presented	a	short	account	of	 the	1931	census	at	 the	Royal	Society	of	the	Arts	in	London.	He	did	not	stress	the	population	problem	in	his	account	and	instead	began	by	noting	that	there	had	been	no	significant	changes	in	how	the	census	–	either	in	enumeration	or	tabulation	–	was	carried	out.	However	the	particular	political	conditions	of	1931	had	made	certain	 aspects	 of	 census	 taking	 problematic.	 One	 of	 the	 main	 problems	 had	 been	 finding	enough	 enumerators	 to	 conduct	 the	 census	 operations.	 The	 census	 relied	 heavily	 on	 unpaid	volunteers,	who	received	no	payment	other	than	‘the	unsatisfactory	consciousness	of	virtuous	conduct’.35	Enumerators	 faced,	 variously,	 non-cooperation,	 super-cooperation,	 and	 complete	apathy	when	collecting	the	census	data.36	These	political	circumstances	and	their	effect	on	the	census	led	Hutton	to	question	the	current	method	of	census	taking	in	India	on	the	whole.	‘The	question	 of	 the	 authority	 by	whom	 the	 census	 is	 to	 be	 taken	 is	 also	 one	which	 gives	 rise	 to	difficulty…it	may	be	necessary	in	a	federated	India	to	provide	that	each	unit	of	federation	shall	be	responsible	for	its	own	enumeration’,	though,	he	argued,	the	results	should	still	be	handled	by	the	Central	government.37		




linked	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 permanent	 statistical	 department,	 instead	 of	 the	 current	 ‘pitiable	ephemeron’,	which	was	 ‘unable	to	put	into	practice	the	knowledge	acquired	from	its	too	brief	experience	 or	 to	 continue	 experiments	 until	 a	 satisfactory	 solution	 is	 obtained	 for	 its	problems’.39			
	 Hutton’s	 report	 also	 explored	 the	 census	 returns	 in	 greater	 detail,	 examining	 the	results	 for	 population	 growth,	 infirmities,	 education,	 religion	 and	 caste.	 It	 was	 however	population	growth,	more	than	any	other	subject,	which	got	the	most	reaction	from	those	who	had	come	to	hear	him.	Opening	the	discussion,	the	Chairman,	Edward	Gait,	stated	that	‘the	first	thing	 to	 be	 noted	 was	 the	 great	 increase	 in	 population’.40	The	 ‘great	 increase’	 Hutton	 had	discussed	was	 the	 growth	 rate	 of	 10.6%,	which	 though	higher	 than	 anticipated,	 had	 in	 some	areas	resulted	in	little	more	than	a	return	to	the	population	levels	of	1891.	Gait	argued	that	the	population	 increase	had	resulted	 from	 ‘the	absence	of	positive	checks	on	 the	population’	and	the	 generally	 favourable	 economic	 and	 public	 health	 conditions	 that	 had	 prevailed	 between	1921	 and	 1931.41	Lacking	 ‘preventive	 checks’	 owing	 to	 the	 traditions	 of	 universal	 marriage,	high	 birth	 rates	 and	 the	 ‘tendency	 to	multiply	 to	 the	 limit	 of	 the	means	 of	 subsistence’,	 Gait	believed	 that	 India’s	 population	 –	 and	 particularly	 the	 agricultural	 population	 –	 would	 soon	reach	‘saturation	point’.	This	situation	Gait	linked	unequivocally	to	poverty	in	India.		




that	 greater	 attention	 needed	 to	 be	 placed	 on	 collecting	 information	 on	 life	 expectancy	 and	relative	 fertility	 (differential	 fertility).	 Fertility	 data	was	 of	 particular	 importance,	 and	 it	was	needed	 –	 along	 with	 information	 about	 the	 ‘artificial	 reduction	 of	 families’	 –	 by	 those	 who	wanted	to	study	the	‘economic	condition	of	India’.45		
	 Hutton’s	paper,	and	the	discussion	it	sparked,	demonstrates	the	wide	range	of	concerns	that	were	connected	to	the	collection	of	demographic	data	and	the	problem	of	population	in	the	1930s.	 For	 Hutton	 and	Wattal	 demographic	 data	 collection,	 and	 particularly	 the	 problem	 of	generating	 accurate	 data,	 was	 closely	 linked	 not	 only	 to	 the	 difficulties	 inherent	 in	 census	taking	 but	 also	 to	 the	 larger	 political	 relationship	 between	 the	 state	 and	 data	 collection.	However,	for	others	like	How-Martyn,	the	problems	of	health,	differential	fertility,	and	fertility	control	were	more	pressing.	All	agreed,	however,	that	the	population	problem	was	linked	to	the	problem	 of	 poverty,	 to	 food	 production,	 and	 to	 economic	 development.	 One	 of	 the	 most	significant	 aspects	 of	 the	 1931	 Census	 however,	 was	 that	 it	 had	 in	 fact	 collected	 new	 data,	asking	for	the	first	time	how	long	people	had	been	married;	how	many	children	(alive	or	dead)	they	 had;	 how	many	 children	were	 still	 living;	 and	 the	 sex	 of	 the	 first	 born	 child.	With	 this	information,	it	was	possible	to	try	and	calculate	fertility	rates,	and	on	the	basis	of	this,	to	make	population	 projections.46	These	 two	 factors	 -	 fertility	 and	 population	 projections	 -	 featured	prominently	 alongside	 other	 understandings	 of	 population	 in	 the	 1930s.	 The	 1931	 census	opened	up	a	debate	between	medical	and	public	health	officers	about	overpopulation	and	the	population	 problem.	 Arnold	 argues	 that	 these	 debates,	 while	 inconclusive,	 had	 a	 hand	 in	‘heightening	 the	 sense	 that	 a	 demographic	 crisis	 was	 about	 to	 engulf	 India’.47	However,	 the	population	 problem	 was	 also	 occupying	 another	 space	 –	 one	 that	 remained	 more	 cautious	about	 whether	 there	 was	 such	 a	 problem	 at	 all,	 and	 centred	 on	 debates	 over	 population	projections.		





this	 growth	 would	 increase	 more	 quickly	 than	 had	 been	 previously	 suggested.48	Adarkar	disagreed,	 and	 argued	 instead	 that	 the	 Indian	 population’s	 ‘future	 growth’	 would	 ultimately	manifest	as	a	declining	population.	 	Underlying	this	was	a	broader	set	of	concerns	about	what	constituted	the	correct	methods	to	measure	and	calculate	the	growth	of	the	Indian	population.	For	Adarkar,	the	ability	to	predict	‘future	growth’	was	the	most	important,	and	yet	most	under-studied,	 aspect	 of	 the	 population	 problem.	 In	 this,	 he	 was	 articulating	 a	 concern	 that	 had	featured	 in	 demographic	 discussions	 from	 the	 1920s.49	The	 primary	 debate	 over	 projecting	population	 growth	 rested	 on	 whether	 growth	 was	 conceived	 of	 as	 a	 biological	 or	 statistical	phenomenon.	 Raymond	 Pearl’s	 logistic	 curve,	 based	 on	 his	 experiments	 with	 fruit	 flies,	provided	one	of	 the	most	well-known	 justifications	 for	 looking	at	 growth	 in	biological	 terms.	The	statistical	argument,	on	the	other	hand,	was	increasingly	dominated	by	what	was	becoming	known	as	Kuczynski	Fertility	–	the	measure	of	net	fertility	rates	-	that	allowed	projections	to	be	made	on	the	basis	of	fertility	and	age	data.		
	 It	was	within	 this	 debate	 –	 between	 the	 biological	 and	 the	 statistical	 –	 that	 Adarkar	located	 both	 himself	 and	 Raja.	 Adarkar	 argued	 that	 future	 growth	 was	 best	 predicted	 using	Kuczynski’s	 techniques.	 The	 problem,	 and	 the	 reason	 for	 the	 debate,	 was	 that	 using	 these	techniques	to	make	a	projection,	as	Raja	had	attempted	to	do,	required	knowing	the	net	fertility	rate,	the	information	for	which	was	unavailable	in	India.	Net	fertility	was	found	by	multiplying	the	 specific	 fertility	 rates	 (female	births:	 female	population)	of	 individual	 years	of	 age	by	 the	number	of	currently-alive	women	at	that	age,	according	to	the	life	table.	The	sum	of	this	is	the	net	reproduction	rate,	and	calculating	this	rate	therefore	required	knowing	the	age	of	mothers	at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 birth	 of	 their	 children,	 information	 which	 was	 not	 collected	 at	 birth	registration	in	India.50		This,	Adarkar	argued,	had	led	Raja	to	an	erroneous	conclusion,	namely	that	 India’s	 population	was	 projected	 to	 increase.	 Adarkar	 argued	 strongly	 that	 the	 situation	was	 in	 fact	 the	 opposite	 –	 India’s	 population	 would	 briefly	 increase,	 before	 ultimately	declining.51	He	pointed	 to	 the	 low	survival	 rates	–	both	maternal	and	 infant	–	 for	women	and	girls	 in	support	of	his	argument.	Since	population	replacement	depended	on	 the	survival	and	fertility	of	women,	 the	 low	survivals	rates	of	women	–	where	only	250	of	every	1000	women																																																																					





completed	a	 full	 reproductive	cycle	–	meant	 that	 it	was	unlikely	 that	 India’s	net	 reproductive	rate	would	exceed	the	rate	needed	for	replacement.	This	was	compounded	by	the	‘unfavourable	sex	ratio’	of	940	females	to	1000	males,	as	of	1931.52	His	trump	card,	however,	was	that	while	‘fertility	 and	mortality	may	 increase	or	decrease	 in	 India’	 once	birth	 control	 ‘took	 root’	 there	was	‘bound	to	be	a	progressive	fall	in	fertility’.53		







sufficiency	 and	doubling	 living	 standards	within	 ten	 years.59	It	 had	 included	population	 in	 its	planning	requirements,	forming	a	Sub-committee	on	Population	to	consider	how	population	fit	within	 the	 broader	 planning	 and	 developmental	 aims	 envisioned	 for	 an	 Independent	 India.	Chaired	by	Radhakamal	Mukerjee,	 the	Sub-Committee	approached	 the	population	problem	as	fundamentally	 one	 of	 growth.60 	While	 there	 were	 many	 other	 problems	 associated	 with	population,	it	was	the	‘excess	of	births	over	deaths’	that	structured	how	the	population	problem	was	to	be	understood.		






	 While	Mukerjee	based	much	of	thinking	about	overpopulation,	density	and	economics	in	 India’s	 rural	 villages,66	the	 Sub-Committee	 on	 Population	 relied	 on	 the	 census	 results	 as	evidence	for	population	growth,	despite	the	acknowledgement	they	were	open	to	‘considerable	doubt’	 regarding	 their	 reliability.	 The	 margin	 of	 error,	 however,	 was	 determined	 to	 be	acceptable	 –	 ‘judging,	 however,	 by	 comparison	 with	 previous	 censuses,	 it	 is	 permissible	 to	believe	that	the	margin	of	error	cannot	be	very	large	–	perhaps	not	exceeding	1%’	in	the	case	of	the	1931	census,	and	assumed	to	be	larger,	around	5%,	for	the	1941	census.67	This	growth	was	perceived	 to	be	problematic	because	 the	high	birth	and	high	death	 rates	were	believed	 to	be	both	 indicative	 of,	 and	 responsible	 for,	 much	 of	 the	 poverty	 in	 India.	 Explanations	 for	 this	situation	 rested	on	 social	practices	 like	early	marriage	which	–	by	maximizing	 the	amount	of	time	women	were	able	to	reproduce	–	‘continuously	adds	to	the	total	population	regardless	of	hygienic,	eugenic	or	economic	considerations	affecting	every	community	in	the	country’.68	
	 The	Sub-Committee	stressed	the	need	for	a	planned	population	to	prevail	for	a	planned	economy	to	succeed.	Referring	directly	to	optimum	population	theory,	the	report	argued	that,	‘at	any	given	moment,	there	is	for	every	country	an	optimum	figure	of	population	in	relation	to	the	 available	 resources	of	 the	 community,	 and	 its	potentiality	 for	 further	development.	 If	 the	population	 is	 in	 excess	 of	 this	 optimum,	 unemployment	 and	wastage…would	 be	 inevitable’.69	However,	 finding	 the	 ‘optimum	population’	 required	understanding	not	 only	 the	 relationship	between	 the	 population	 and	 all	 available	 resources,	 but	 also	 the	 generation	 of	 an	 accurate	picture	of	how	the	population	could	be	expected	to	change	in	both	the	near	and	distant	future.	For	 this,	 the	 report	 relied	on	 the	predictions	being	made	about	 the	probable	 trends	 in	 future	population	change,	which	were	calculated	using	existing	age	tables	and	estimates	of	fertility	–	figures	which,	 though	the	report	does	not	discuss	 it,	were	highly	contentious	at	 the	 time,	and	hotly	debated	by	demographers,	statisticians	and	other	social	scientists.70			





polygamy	and	of	untouchability.71	The	report	also	discussed	birth	control	and	abortion,	arguing	that	 while	 reducing	 child	 marriage,	 providing	 more	 education	 and	 a	 better	 quality	 of	 living	would	reduce	maternal	and	infant	mortality,	the	likelihood	would	also	be	that	it	would	–	owing	to	higher	rates	of	maternal	survival	–	increase	population	growth	as	well.	Therefore,	the	report	argued,	these	policies	had	to	be	‘backed	up	by	the	programme	of	birth	control	for	the	masses	in	this	 country’. 72 	Using	 evidence	 derived	 from	 abortion	 in	 cattle,	 the	 report	 noted	 that	malnutrition	 and	 “irregular	 breeding”	 had	 resulted	 in	 abortion,	 which	 was	 reported	 to	 be	common	also	among	women	who	regularly	experienced	food	shortages.	Access	to	birth	control	would,	it	was	argued,	help	ensure	that	each	pregnancy	was	wanted,	and	would	help	lead	to	the	birth	 of	more	 healthy	 children	 –	 this	 emphasis	was	 also	 expressed	 in	more	 outright	 eugenic	terms,	as	a	way	to	combat	the	‘mispopulation’	that	was	‘in	evidence	among	the	more	fertile	but	less	intellectual	strata	of	society’.73	The	report	recommended	that	contraceptive	knowledge	be	diffused	 though	 the	 medical	 colleges,	 the	 training	 of	 women	 doctors	 and	 nurses,	 and	 the	establishment	of	birth	control	clinics	which	would	supply	free	contraceptives,	encouraging	the	local	manufacture	of	contraceptives	–	‘whether	rubber,	cotton	or	chemical,	which	will	be	used	for	the	purpose	of	contraception’.	It	also	advocated	the	distribution	of	birth	control	propaganda	through	municipalities,	district	boards	and	panchayats,	encouraging	‘2-4	years	spacing	of	births	and	the	limitation	of	the	total	family	to	4	children	in	India’.74		





	 The	 Sub-Committee	 on	 Population	 was	 formulating	 its	 recommendations	 in	 a	 time	when	much	was	unclear	about	the	nature	of	the	population	problem,	particularly	as	it	related	to	economic	development.	Not	only	was	 the	relationship	between	 fertility	and	economic	growth	contested	 –	 Nehru	 himself	 remained	 unconvinced	 that	 fertility	 decline	 was	 required	 for	economic	growth77		 –	 the	 sources	of	data	 about	 fertility,	 and	on	 the	utility	of	 family	planning	and	birth	 control	were	 of	 variable	 quality,	were	 often	derived	 from	 research	 conducted	 on	 a	small	 scale,	 and	 largely	 considered	 to	 be	 of	 questionable	 reliability.	 However,	 the	 emphasis	placed	by	the	Sub-Committee	on	the	population	problem	(as	 linked	to	population	growth	and	economic	development),	family	planning	and	demography,	was	a	formulation	actively	taken	up	by	researchers	and	academics	during	the	1940s.	PRODUCING	FACTS	ABOUT	POPULATION:	RETURNING	TO	THE	CENSUS	Population,	 data	 collection	 and	 government	 statistics	 were	 topics	 of	 international	 interest	during	 the	 interwar	 period,	 and	 various	 programmes	were	 being	 promoted	 by	 international	bodies	 like	 the	League	of	Nations	 in	an	effort	 to	promote	 ‘greater	comparability’	between	the	statistics	 that	 were	 being	 gathered	 by	 states.	 Supported	 by	 the	 Rockefeller	 Foundation,	 the	League	 of	Nations	 ran	 a	 programme	 that	was	 intended	 to	 enable	 government	 statisticians	 to	travel	 and	 observe	 the	 way	 statistical	 administrative	 systems	 operated	 in	 other	 countries.78	This	 support	 for	 statistical	 expertise	 coincided	 with	 a	 renewed	 interest	 in	 population	 in	League,79	and	with	 the	preparations	 for	 the	decennial	 census	 in	 India.	Thus,	when	 in	 the	 late	1930s	 the	Government	of	 India	were	 invited	 to	suggest	a	candidate	 for	 this	programme,	 they	chose	 M.W	 Yeatts	 –	 Commissioner	 for	 the	 Census	 –	 who,	 like	 his	 predecessor	 Hutton,	 was	particularly	 interested	 in	 census	 statistics	 and	 differential	 fertility.	 Yeatts	 requested	 that,	 in	addition	to	the	United	States,	Canada,	and	Switzerland,	he	be	funded	to	visit	Sweden,	which	had	the	most	established	tradition	of	measuring	vital	statistics	and	calculating	differential	 fertility	‘as	expressed	statistically’	than	any	other	country.	He	hoped	that	he	would	be	able	to	collect	the	data	necessary	to	study	differential	fertility	in	the	1941	census,	and	believed	it	to	be	a	category	with	 particular	 bearing	 on	 ‘the	 future	 economic	 position	 of	 any	 country’	 and	 that	 there	was	‘considerable	scope	for	it	in	India’.80		




Royal	Society	of	 the	Arts,	Yeatts	submitted	a	somewhat	delayed	paper	 in	1943.	 In	 it,	he	drew	attention	to	the	decisions	that	had	been	made	by	the	Government	of	India	to	constrain	census	operations	to	the	 ‘bare	tabulation	of	communities’	owing	to	the	constraints	of	 the	war.	Yeatts	also	pointed	to	the	problematic	functioning	of	the	census	in	general:	‘the	phoenix	system	under	which	 the	 census	 in	 India	 has	 been	 run	 had,	 even	 in	 1931,	 endangered	 its	 successful	continuation’,	he	argued,	noting	that	the	problems	with	the	overall	administration	of	the	census	needed	to	be	addressed.81	What	was	needed,	and	what	Yeatts	suggested	he	intended	to	do,	was	to	 push	 both	 the	 administration	 and	 execution	 of	 the	 census	 towards	 ‘proper	 adaptation	 to	changes	in	the	administrative,	political	and	social	scene’.82	The	main	problem	with	the	census	as	it	currently	stood,	he	argued,	was	that	it	was	too	much	of	a	‘blunt	instrument’,	when	what	were	increasingly	needed	were	 specialized	 inquiries.	 This	was	not	 only	 an	 issue	of	 data	 collection.	Pointing	in	particular	to	‘quasi-medical	enquiries’,	he	argued	that	the	census	concealed	the	real	responsibilities	of	provincial	governments	–	responsibilities	that	would	be	made	clear	through	‘skilled	enquiry’	generating	accurate	data.83		




condition’	of	India.	What	was	needed,	Yeatts	argued,	was	a	mode	of	continuous	data	collection	rather	 than	 the	 current	 episodic	 system,	 as	 well	 as	 ‘perfect	 statistics’,	 uncorrupted	 by	‘emotional	or	factitious	elements’.87		
	 By	the	1940s	the	Government	of	India	was	in	the	midst	of	a	confidence-crisis	regarding	its	population	statistics.	Increased	government	interest	into	population,	and	reports	like	those	made	 by	 Yeatts,	 had	 led	 to	 calls	 for	 better	 data.	 The	 1944	 Population	 Data	 Committee	 was	tasked	 with	 looking	 into	 available	 data	 on	 population	 growth	 as	 part	 of	 the	 reconstruction	planning	efforts	being	undertaken	by	the	government.	Driving	the	formation	of	the	Committee	were	 many	 of	 the	 same	 concerns	 and	 questions	 that	 had	 typified	 population	 studies	 in	 the	1920s	 and	1930s,	 particularly	 those	of	 planning,	 projection,	 and	population	 growth.	 Scholars	who	had	been	 involved	 in	 the	early	debates	over	 India’s	population	and	 the	ability	 to	predict	future	growth	–	such	as	Yeatts,	KCKE	Raja,	and	P.C	Mahalanobis	–	were	also	closely	connected	to	 the	 large-scale	attempts	of	national	planning	and	population	projection	being	made	by	 the	Government	of	India.	The	Population	Data	Committee,	 formed	explicitly	against	this	backdrop	of	 population	 change,	 industrial	 development,	 and	 large	 scale	 planning,	 was	 tasked	 with	assessing	the	knowledge	required	to	forecast	how	population	could	be	‘expected	to	change’.88		
	 For	Yeatts,	the	concern	of	the	Population	Data	Committee	was	to	determine	‘what	are	the	 facts?’	 In	 this	 he	 saw	many	 parallels	 with	 other	 Government	 inquiries	 into	 population	 –	particularly	 the	 Royal	 Commission	 on	 Population	 being	 undertaken	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom.	However,	 while	 the	 Royal	 Commission	 was	 happy	 to	 provide	 limited	 assistance	 –	 including	helping	establish	lines	of	communication	between	Yeatts	and	R.R	Kuczynski	and	Kingsley	Davis	–	those	working	on	the	Royal	Commission	remained	adamant	that	the	data	being	collected	had	little	relevance	for	India.	Replying	to	these	concerns,	Yeatts	stressed	the	universality	of	facts	–	‘The	big	point	I	am	trying	to	get	over’,	he	wrote	to	C.F	Wood	at	the	Colonial	Office	in	London,	‘is	the	basic	 importance	of	 information	 and	methods…information	does	not	 drop	 form	 the	 skies	but	has	to	be	organized’.89		He	pointed	out	that	mathematical	analysis	could	be	applied	in	any	scientific	 inquiry,	and	that	 ‘it	 is	precisely	the	general	attitudes,	approach	and	methods	we	are	after,	and	 if	 these	are	exhibited	 through	material	arising	 in	England	 that	does	not	affect	 their	value	to	us’.90		




from	the	abstract	and	generalized	category	of	 ‘population’,	and	to	return	to	a	focus	on	people,	who	were	the	subjects	not	only	of	administration,	but	also	of	development	projects.	What	was	at	stake,	the	report	argued,	was	the	solution	to	the	population	problem	itself:	‘we	cannot	solve	the	 so-called	 “population	problem”	 except	 at	 second	hand	 through	 the	 individual	 volitions	 of	human	beings…one	might	say	that	the	prime	aspect	of	any	so-called	population	problem	is	this	elementary	but	elemental	one	that	“population”	 is	 just	another	way	of	saying	people’.91		Thus,	while	 the	 Population	 Data	 Committee	 stressed	 the	 need	 to	 develop	 methods	 to	 accurately	survey	 and	 assess	 population	 events	 and	 changes,	 they	 also	 emphasized	 the	 importance	 of	‘evolving	methods	 in	harmony	with	the	 life	of	 the	people	whose	births	and	deaths	we	seek	to	record’.92		
	 Nevertheless,	the	problem	of	planning	and	providing	for	people	had,	by	1945,	become	acutely	apparent	and	 the	requirement	of	 the	Government	 for	 information	–	 including	present	population	 and	more	 important,	 an	 indication	 of	 future	 growth	 –	was	 becoming	 increasingly	pressing.	 	 The	 report	 had	 indicated	 that	 an	 organization	 administered	 from	 the	 centre	 was	required	to	co-ordinate	information	on	population	growth,93	and	recommended	the	creation	of	age	 tables,	 life	 tables	 and	 population	 forecasts.94 	In	 proposing	 this,	 the	 Population	 Data	Committee	sought	to	provide	the	Government	of	India	with	precise	(but	not,	 they	made	clear,	final)	data	 that	 reflected	 the	scope	of	existing	knowledge	on	a	particular	question.95	This	was	crucial	to	understand,	the	Committee	argued,	if	policy	decisions	were	to	be	made	on	the	basis	of	population	 statistics.	 Pointing	 to	 the	 collection	 and	 analysis	 of	 vital	 statistics	 in	 India,	 they	argued	 that,	 though	 there	 was	 knowledge	 –	 such	 as	 that	 India’s	 birth,	 death,	 and	 infant	mortality	 rates	 were	 higher	 than	 in	 the	 West	 –	 this	 did	 not	 correspond	 to	 an	 ability	 to	accurately	 state	 the	 actual	 rates	 themselves.96	The	 problem	 that	 the	 report	 highlighted	 for	policy-makers	was	one	of	generating	the	‘accurately	reported	facts’	that	were	needed	to	write	good	policy:	the	key	concern	of	the	Committee	and	key	finding	of	the	report	was	the	question	of	how	to	gather	and	organize	the	correct	information	about	population.		




perceived	to	be	one	of	inaccurate	data	collection:	vital	statistics	were	‘collected	in	many	cases	at	second	 or	 even	 third	 hand’	 with	 potentially	 ‘no	 stronger	 basis	 than	 the	 recollections	 of	 an	illiterate	chowdikar’.98	This,	it	was	made	clear,	was	not	the	fault	of	the	Chowdikar,	‘who	with	his	fellow	officers	is	in	many	ways	the	basis	of	the	whole	Indian	governmental	scene’,	but	with	the	role	he	was	being	asked	 to	perform.99	The	 lack	of	 contact	between	 the	 collector	 and	 the	data	introduced,	 it	 was	 argued,	 error	 and	 delay	 in	 a	 sometimes	 ‘pronounced	 form’.	 The	 goal,	therefore,	 was	 to	 ‘produce	 a	 record	 as	 close	 as	 possible	 to	 the	 phenomena	 and	 as	 free	 as	possible	 from	 intervening	 human	 agencies’.	 A	 large	 part	 of	 the	 ‘serious’	 study	 of	 Indian	population	–	rather	than	the	production	of	year	figures	“for	the	League	of	Nations	Yearbook”	–	was	to	locate	the	‘proper	unit	for	population	measurement’.100		







After	the	data	for	the	1941	census	was	collected,	Mahalanobis	persuaded	Yeatts	to	produce	the	‘Y-Sample’	 tables105–	 2%	 samples	 of	 the	 total	 census	 enumeration	 –	 so	 that	 the	 ISI	 could	machine-tabulate	 the	 results.106	Tabulation	 had	 been	 strongly	 promoted	 by	Yeatts	 during	 the	1941	census,	and	he	had	experimented	with	machine	tabulating	the	Delhi	census	results	at	the	Central	Board	of	Revue.	Ultimately	the	problematic	process,	and	the	enormous	cost	of	collecting	‘one	slip’	data,	which	required	a	vast	number	of	enumerators,	and	faced	additional	difficulties	due	to	India’s	low	levels	of	literacy,	meant	this	approach	was	not	carried	forward	into	the	1951	census.107	
	 The	Population	Data	Committee,	however,	were	interested	in	using	the	Y-Sample	tables	to	assess	available	population	data,	 though	 there	remained	concerns	over	 the	data’s	accuracy	and	on	the	possibility	of	providing	accurate	India-wide	statistics.	This	was	particularly	the	case	when	birth	and	death	rates	were	calculated	from	small	villages	and	towns	ranging	from	under	5,000	people	 to	up	to	10,000.	The	outcome	of	 this	was	to	produce	a	rate	–	particularly	at	 the	smaller	end	of	the	sample	–	that	had	no	statistical	significance.	The	small	town,	the	Population	Data	Committee	 argued,	 ‘offers	no	 serious	base	 for	 the	 calculation	of	 regular	birth	 and	death	rates’.108	The	 Committee’s	 search	 for	 the	 correct	 unit	 of	 population	 measurement	 and	 for	accurate	data	that	was	useful	for	policy-making	had	led	it	down	the	methodological	path	carved	out	 by	 Mahalanobis	 and	 Yeatts,	 both	 of	 whom	 were	 committed	 to	 providing	 population	statistics	 on	 an	 India-wide	 scale.	 However,	 finding	 population	 data	 to	 work	 with	 was	problematic	 –	 ‘the	 field’,	 the	 Committee’s	 report	 lamented,	 ‘is	 bare’.	 Obvious	 sources	 of	 data	included	 the	 census	 and	 vital	 registration,	 and	 other	 potential	 sources,	 including	 the	 data	collected	by	life	insurance	companies,	was	too	limited.		




process	that	 led	to	the	creation	of	the	National	Sample	Survey.	 In	1949,	the	Central	Statistical	Unit	and	National	Income	Committee	were	formed.	The	National	Income	Committee	Chairman	was	 P.C	Mahalanobis,	 and	members	 included	 D.R	 Gadgil	 and	 VKRV	 Rao.	 The	 purpose	 of	 the	National	 Income	 Committee	 was	 to	 provide	 reports	 on	 national	 income	 and	 to	 suggest	improvements	–	particularly	as	regarded	the	quality	of	data	–	and	to	indicate	what	further	data	should	be	collected.110	By	the	end	of	1949	the	work	of	both	the	National	Income	Committee	and	the	Standing	Committee	had	indicated	the	existing	gaps	in	statistical	information,	coupled	with	an	urgent	sense	that	the	quality	and	quantity	of	statistical	information	needed	to	be	improved.	The	 Population	 Data	 Committee,	 Standing	 Committee	 of	 Departmental	 Statisticians	 and	National	 Income	Committee	drew	attention	 to	population	 statistics	 and	administration	 in	 the	1940s.	 By	 the	 late	 1940s	 the	 role	 of	 population	 projection	 as	 an	 administrative	 tool	 in	 the	arsenal	of	governments	–	and	especially	for	planning	–	had	been	solidified.	However,	this	had	not	subsumed	population	to	abstractions,	as	was	made	clear	in	the	emphasis	placed	on	people	as	well	as	on	the	sources	of	data.	The	problem	of	the	availability	and	the	quality	of	the	data,	and	particularly	about	the	proper	units	and	sites	of	data	were	very	much	up	for	discussion.	Whether	it	was	 possible	 to	 extrapolate	 from	 specific	 regions	 to	 all	 of	 India,	whether	 it	was	 death	 and	birth,	 or	 only	 birth,	 that	 was	 within	 the	 administrative	 concern	 of	 the	 planner	 and	 the	administrator,	 and	 how	 best	 to	 collect	 high	 quality	 data,	 were	 all	 being	 debated	 in	 the	Government.111		THE	QUESTION	OF	UNITS	While	 the	 Population	 Data	 Committee	 had	 largely	 concentrated	 on	 the	 population	 data	available	through	the	large-scale	governmental	projects	like	the	census,	they	were	also	aware	of	the	 newly	 emerging	 pool	 of	 population	 data	 being	 generated	 by	 individual	 research	organizations.	One	of	 the	 first	 institutions	engaged	 in	demographic	 research	 in	 India	was	 the	Gokhale	Institute	of	Politics	and	Economics.	Following	early	field	studies	in	the	1930s,112	by	the	mid-1940s	the	Gokhale	Institute	was	tackling	demographic	research	on	a	larger	scale.		





and	 life	 expectancy,	 which	 were	 often	 treated	 as	 separate	 from	 each	 other	 –	 had	 produced	‘curious	theories’	about	India’s	population	that	dominated	much	of	the	literature.113		D.R	Gadgil,	head	of	the	Gokhale	Institute,	argued	forcefully	in	the	foreword	for	a	re-framing	of	the	study	of	India’s	 population	 problems	 from	 an	 India-wide	 scale,	 which	 had	 ‘failed	 to	 yield	 significant	conclusions	 and	was	 indeed	 apt	 to	mislead’,	 to	 instead	 look	 at	 ‘smaller	 and	more	 integrated	regions’. 114 	To	 achieve	 this,	 Sovani	 had	 amassed	 available	 data	 on	 economic	 conditions,	population	movement	 and	 composition	 within	 ‘homogenous	 and/or	 integrated	 regions’.	 The	aim	was	to	identify	from	this	data	trends	and	correlations	between	movement,	the	environment	and	 population	 composition	 (including	 growth)	 for	 a	 particular	 area.	 The	 justification	underlying	 the	 study,	 Gadgil	 argued,	 was	 ‘the	 assumption	 that	 India	 is	 too	 vast	 and	 too	heterogeneous	 in	 respect	 of	 all	 factors	 which	 should	 count	 in	 a	 study	 of	 the	 problem	 of	population….and	that	the	Indian	population	problem	is	not	a	single	problem	but	a	collection	of	a	 number	 of	 different	 types	 of	 problem’.115	These	 assumptions	 undercut	 the	 results	 –	 and	particularly	 the	 averages	 –	 worked	 out	 in	 all-India	 studies,	 by	 rendering	 the	 calculations	effectively	 meaningless.	 What	 was	 required	 instead	 were	 studies	 of	 the	 population	 problem	that	 looked	 both	 to	 general	 population	 theory	 but	 also	 to	 the	 particularities	 of	 not	 only	 the	Indian	situation	as	a	whole,	but	within	India	as	well.	It	was	therefore	‘vitally	necessary’	to	split	the	population	problem	into	 ‘a	number	of	properly	constituted	units’.116	These	units	were	not	chosen	freely;	Gadgil	highlighted	that	their	choice	was	constrained	primarily	by	the	ways	that	data	 had	 been	 collected	 in	 the	 past.117	Understanding	 how	 this	 had	 shaped	 the	 data	 on	 India	meant	 looking	 to	 the	 census	 and	 to	 the	 ‘natural	 units’	 created	 by	 it.	 ‘Natural	 units’	were	 the	product	 of	 the	 census	 compilers,	 who	 divided	 their	 data-collecting	 areas	 according	 to	geographic	 features.	 These	 areas	 tended	 to	 be	 homogenous	 with	 regards	 to	 language	 and	society,	as	well	as	small	in	size.	By	rendering	this	division	‘natural’,	the	Census	could	reproduce	its	measurements	 in	 each	 successive	 enumeration.	By	 constructing	 this	 system,	 however,	 the	census	effectively	locked-in	a	particular	way	to	view	the	limits	of	population	with	respect	to	the	data	–	defining	a	region	in	a	different	way	made	the	census	data,	which	was	the	chief	source	of	all	demographic	data	on	India	–	‘impossible	to	compile’.118		





‘realistic	point	of	view’	using	a	different	method	to	many	other	population	studies.119	In	doing	this	Sovani	directly	 set	himself	against	 the	current	 trend	 in	population	writing,	waging,	as	he	put	 it	 ‘an	 armed	 resistance’	 against	 general	 population	 theory.	 Taking	 up	 the	 arguments	 of	Gadgil,	 Sovani	 contended	 that	 this	 battle	 was	 to	 be	 waged	 against	 arguments	 about	 India’s	population	that	were	ignoring	the	specificity	of	particular	cases.	He	cited	the	arguments	made	about	 population	 and	 continually	 discussed	 –	 looking	 at	 Malthus,	 Raymond	 Pearl	 and	 R.R	Kuszynski	 in	 particular.	 Dismissing	Malthus	 and	 accepting	 Pearl	 only	 so	 far	 as	 accepting	 the	importance	 of	 biology	 (without	 accepting	 the	 logistic	 curve),	 Sovani	 instead	 sided	 with	Kuszynski,	praising	his	work	on	fertility	rates,	though	he	noted	that,	problematically,	there	was	insufficient	data	on	India	to	use	his	techniques	effectively.	What	all	of	these	debates	meant	for	the	 population	 problem	 in	 India	 was	 to	 lead	 to	 the	 questioning	 of	 whether	 there	 was	 a	population	 problem:	 ‘The	 cry	 of	 over-population	 has	 been	 ringing	 in	 our	 ears	 for	 so	 many	years…that	 we	 are	 at	 last	 beginning	 to	 wonder	 whether	 such	 a	 thing	 exists	 at	 all’.120	The	alarmist	–	both	in	terms	of	denying	over-population,	and	in	overstating	it	–	‘is	always	with	us’,	Sovani	 stated.	 The	 competing	 claims	 of	 food	 production,	 birth	 control,	 death	 control121	and	public	health	had	the	effect	of	detracting	attention	away	from	an	already	vague	understating	of	‘the	 main	 problem’.	 This	 was	 exacerbated	 by	 the	misapplication	 of	 general	 theories	 such	 as	optimum	 population	 theory,	 biological	 theories,	 and	 population	 forecasts.	 Population	forecasting	 in	 India	was	particularly	problematic,	 Sovani	 argued,	 being	plagued	by	 ‘sweeping	generalizations	and	prophetic	predictions’,	based	principally	on	Swedish	‘age	group	theory’	that	had	 been	 convincingly	 undermined	 by	 Kuszynski. 122 	Given	 this,	 discussing	 the	 Indian	population	problem	therefore	required	a	‘realistic	approach	and	an	open	mind’	–	and	one	of	the	first	and	most	necessary	steps	was	to	stop	considering	the	Indian	population	as	a	whole,	and	to	instead	take	a	regional	approach.123		











The	 national	 story	 of	 population	 control	 and	 of	 the	 population	 problem	 in	 India	 is	 typically	argued	to	begin	in	1952,	when	the	Government	of	India	announced	an	official	policy	of	fertility	limitation	 as	 part	 of	 the	 First	 Five	 Year	 Plan.1	This	 chapter	 argues	 that	 1952	marked	not	 the	beginning	of	ideas	about	the	population	problem	but	rather	the	consolidation	of	several	strands	of	 argument	 that	 had	 developed	 over	 the	 1930s	 and	 1940s.	 The	 effect	 was	 to	 create	 the	‘national’	 population	 problem	 that	 could	 be	 addressed	 in	 policy.	 This	 chapter	 explores	 how	population	 became	 national,	 and	 population	 data	 became	 linked	 to	 national	 planning	 and	policy-making,	by	 looking	at	 the	 to	 the	 creation	and	deployment	of	 a	new	kind	of	population	research	 –	 the	 sample	 survey	 and	 the	 field	 survey	 –	 and	 the	 changing	 arguments	 about	population	in	demographic	thought.		
	 The	 changing	 nature	 of	 arguments	 about	 population	 from	 the	 colonial	 to	 the	 post-colonial	 period	 has	 been	 well	 documented.	 Sarah	 Hodges	 argues	 that	 population	 thought	underwent	 three	 broad	 changes	 –	 from	 natural	 history	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 to	 being	linked	through	a	nationalist	critique	to	ideas	of	a	‘nascent	modernity’,	before	being	consolidated	as	 ‘overpopulation’	 thought	 in	 the	 post-war,	 post-colonial	 period.	 This	 last	 shift	 to	overpopulation,	 she	 argues,	 involved	 the	 linking	 of	 population	 to	 arguments	 about	 economic	and	political	development,	and	resulted	primarily	from	the	work	of	American	demographers.2	This	shift,	she	states,	also	involved	a	move	from	the	national	to	the	global,	both	in	terms	of	the	statistics	 of	 overpopulation,	 as	 well	 in	 terms	 of	 population	 policy.3	Like	 Hodges,	 Nilanjana	Chatterjee	and	Nancy	Riley	argue	that	population	thought	underwent	a	change	in	the	transition	from	colonialism	in	India,	a	change	they	ground	more	firmly	in	the	developmental	ideology	of	the	Indian	state.	This	national	basis	for	fertility	control	derived	from	the	combined	influences	of	the	1945	Bengal	Famine	 Inquiry,	 the	1946	Bhore	Committee	and	 the	consolidation	of	private	family	planning	advocacy	in	the	Family	Planning	Association	of	India	in	1949.4		




proceed	to	develop’.5	This	line	of	argument	created	a	framework	in	which	an	economic	critique	of	colonialism	took	centre	stage.6	The	developmental	ideology	became	a	key	aspect	of	how	the	postcolonial	 state	defined	 itself	 –	 acquiring	 its	 representativeness,	Chatterjee	 argues,	not	 just	from	representative	government,	but	also	from	its	project	of	economic	development.7	Planning,	a	key	part	of	state-led	development,	became	the	‘domain	of	rational	determination	and	pursuit	of	universal	goals’	–	and	it	was	through	planning	that	the	state	claimed	to	act	with	‘the	will	of	the	nation	–	pursuing	a	task	that	was	both	universal	and	rational:	the	well-being	of	the	people	as	 a	 whole’.8	Planning,	 Chatterjee	 argues,	 required	 ‘constituting	 the	 objects	 of	 planning	 as	objects	of	knowledge’.9	






VISIONS	OF	THE	NEW	WORLD:	PLANNING	AND	SOCIAL	CHANGE	While	 the	 developmental	 logic	 of	 the	 Indian	 state	 was	 largely	 inflected	 around	 economic	development,	 in	 the	1940s	planning	 -	 including	 family	planning	 -	was	being	 invoked	 in	wider	arguments	about	planned	social	change	in	India.	Reflecting	the	arguments	about	scale	that	were	present	in	debates	about	population	in	the	early	1940s,	social	change	was	also	being	considered	at	 radically	different	 levels	 –	 ranging	 from	 the	province	of	 the	 central	 state,	 to	 the	 individual	family	and	home.	Linking	 these	arguments	was	a	key	 idea:	 that	 social	 change	was	 something	that	could	be	planned.	 In	1938,	Radhakamal	Mukerjee	had	argued	 that	 India	needed	 ‘rational	family	planning’	 combined	with	 ‘education	of	 the	masses	 in	birth	control’	 as	a	means	 to	 curb	population	 growth:	 ‘The	 small	 family	 system,	 deliberately	 planned	 and	 integrated	with	 other	habits	 and	 traditions	which	 regulate	different	 sides	of	domestic	 life,	must	now	be	adopted	 in	India	as	the	social	and	ethical	norm’.12	Creating	the	correct	‘mental	attitude’	was	based	in	larger	programs	of	development	and	efforts	 to	 improve	 the	standard	of	 living.	 ‘Fatalism’,	he	argued,	‘has	 to	 give	 place	 to	 a	 consciousness	 of	 individual	 responsibility’.13	As	 a	 solution	 to	 the	population	problem,	birth	control	required	cultural	support	and	its	spread	and	adoption	would	result	 from	 education	 and	 spread	 of	 public	 hygiene.	 The	 links	 between	 ‘rational	 family	planning’	and	population	growth	had	become	established	in	India	in	the	1930s,	and	Mukerjee’s	discussion	of	 the	need	 for	 family	planning	and	education	 in	birth	control	 to	 lower	population	growth	was	connected	to	an	on-going	wider	public	discussion	of	birth	control	and	population	that	was	 itself	 linked	to	gendered	arguments	about	nationalism,	rising	communalism,	and	the	development	 of	 women’s	 associations.14		 However,	 family	 planning	 was	 also	 featuring	 in	another	set	of	arguments,	about	planned	social	change.		






an	 era	 of	 inclusive	 change’.16	Having	 been	 set	 in	 motion,	 the	 ‘whole	 of	 life’	 would	 be	 re-arranged.	Most	importantly,	he	noted,	this	process	of	social	change	‘can	be	planned’.17	Amenable	to	 human	 reason	 and	 intelligence,	 social	 change	 could	 be	 predicted	 and	 directed.	 Applying	science	 ‘to	 the	 problems	 of	 living’	 would	 revolutionize	 all	 aspects	 of	 life.	 These	 new	developments	in	science,	he	argued,	were	profoundly	altering	society	and	man’s	place	within	it	–	the	‘atomic,	arrogant	“rugged	individualism”’	of	the	past	was	being	‘snuffed	out’.18	In	its	place	was	 emerging	 a	 new	 philosophy	 of	 duties,	 of	 social	 integration,	 and	 of	 ‘subordination	 of	 the	parts	to	the	claims	of	the	whole’.19	Even	the	right	to	life	itself	had	been	brought	under	this	new	logic	–	children	needed	to	be	wanted	‘even	before	they	were	born’,	and	assured	a	high	quality	of	life.	Population	had	to	be	reduced	to	find	the	balance	between	man	and	land.	All	of	this	social	change	should	be	overseen,	he	argued,	by	a	strong	central	state	that	could	adopt	and	adapt	the	techniques	of	social	science	into	effective	administration.20		
	 The	application	of	the	natural	sciences	and	the	social	sciences	to	revolutionize	life	was	a	 concept	 that	 had	 been	 gathering	 momentum	 since	 the	 inter-war	 period.	 The	 projects	 of	planning	 society	 and	 planning	 biological	 life	 were	 increasingly	 seen	 as	 linked.	 While	developments	in	industry	and	agriculture	had	given	people	command	over	the	life	of	plants	and	animals,	social	science	was	believed	the	hold	the	key	to	controlling	the	life	of	society.	Motwani’s	vision	 of	 social	 planning	 was	 one	 conducted	 on	 a	 large-scale;	 the	 strong	 centralized	 state	exerting	control	over	the	nation.	However,	others	envisioned	planning	and	social	change	on	the	small	scale.	In	1949,	F.L	Brayne,21	late	of	the	Indian	Civil	Service	and	the	Indian	Army	and	self-proclaimed	 ‘pioneer	 of	 rural	 reconstruction’,	 published	 a	 treatise	 on	 the	 implications	 of	planning	 and	 development,	 relating	 these	 to	 the	 population	 problem	 in	 India.	 The	 Peasant’s	







	 The	key,	Brayne	explained,	was	planning.	Effective	planning	 rested	on	knowing	what	people	wanted	and	needed,	which	would	give	the	planner	something	to	work	with,	as	well	as	giving	people	 a	 reason	 to	 execute	 the	plan.	Rather	 than	 ‘planning	 from	above’,	 it	was	best	 to	start	 from	 the	 home	 and	 ‘plan	 up’.	 Modern	 communications	 had	 ‘pitchforked’	 the	 ‘ancient	villages’	into	the	‘vortex	of	world	prices	and	world	shortages	and	surplus	that	made	up	modern	life’.24 	Likewise,	 modern	 administration	 had	 removed	 the	 Malthusian	 controls	 of	 famine,	pestilence	 and	warfare.	Ordinary	 administration	 and	welfare	were	 not	 sufficient	 to	 persuade	people	to	change	their	behaviours,	he	argued,	and	‘the	gap	between	the	laboratory	and	the	field’	was	 large	 and	 growing	 larger.25	The	 villager,	 Brayne	 despaired,	was	 ‘advancing	 backwards’	 –	resistant	to	change	and	progress,	unable	to	achieve	a	higher	standard	of	living,	and	unaided	by	the	Government	which	was	‘too	timid	to	attempt	radical	social	change’.26	What	was	needed	he	argued,	with	a	prophetic	quality,	was	a	target	to	aim	at	for	Government	planning.	The	absence	of	targets	had	led	to	‘lop-sided	development’	which	could	and	should	be	corrected	by	creating	a	‘new	 way	 of	 life	 carefully	 planned	 and	 systematically	 taught’.27	Such	 a	 scheme,	 he	 admitted,	‘may	 sound	 drastically	 totalitarian’,	 but	 it	 was	 too	 late	 to	 question	 –	 millions	 were	 heading	towards	starvation,	and	something	had	to	be	done.28		




account,	a	home	magazine,	 listened	to	 the	radio,	was	an	equal	partner	with	her	husband,	and	engaged	 in	the	 ‘great	national	work	of	keeping	home	and	bringing	up	children’.31	Crucially,	as	he	explained	in	his	second	treatise	The	Neglected	Partner,	attaining	this	vision	of	idyllic	village	life	relied	on	family	planning.32		





broader	 and	 increasingly	 popular	 usage	 of	 the	 term	 ‘demography’	 included	 studies	 of	demographic	variables	 in	 their	 social	as	well	as	biological	 contexts’.37	By	1949,	 this	definition	was	becoming	even	more	closely	linked	to	society,	with	Kingsley	Davis	defining	demography	as	‘a	fundamental	approach	to	the	understanding	of	human	society’.38		
	 The	attempts	of	demographers	to	understand	human	society	are,	by	the	late	1940s	and	early	 1950s,	 often	 seen	 to	 have	 been	 narrowing	 down	 to	 a	 focus	 on	 fertility	 patterns	 and	fertility	change.	Demographic	transition	theory,	a	historical	description	of	the	change	from	high	to	 low	 fertility	 and	 mortality,	 was	 by	 the	 1940s	 being	 joined	 by	 a	 host	 of	 new	 theories	 of	demographic	transition	–	attempts	to	explain	why	and	how	this	change	occurred.	This	history	of	the	changing	formulations	of	demographic	transition	theory	from	the	inter-war	period	to	the	1950s	 has	 been	 extensively	 explored.	 In	 brief,	 demographic	 transition	 theory	 had	 been	reformulated	from	its	interwar	origins	during	the	1940s,	to	position	fertility	as	‘integral	to	the	modernization	 process’.39	Dudley	 Kirk,	 a	 demographer	 based	 at	 Princeton	 University,	 had	predicted	in	1944	that	rapid	population	growth	following	declining	mortality	(in	the	 ‘western	pattern’)	 was	 going	 to	 spread	 throughout	 Asia.	 The	 solution,	 he	 argued,	 was	 to	 ‘assist	development	 in	 order	 to	 reduce	 birth	 rates…fertility	 would	 not	 begin	 to	 fall	 until	 peasants	moved	 to	 cities,	 earned	 pay	 checks,	 and	 enrolled	 their	 children	 in	 school’.40	Dudley	 Kirk’s	arguments	 embodied	 the	 ‘classic’	 theory	 of	 demographic	 transition,	 which	 posited	 that	 high	levels	 of	 population	 growth	 occurred	 during	 industrialization	 because	 fertility	 was	‘uncontrolled	and	high’	while	at	the	same	time	mortality	declined	due	to	better	access	to	food	and	a	higher	standard	of	living.	These	resulted,	according	to	the	theory,	from	the	effects	of	the	industrial	 revolution	 –	 including	 improvements	 in	 agriculture,	 transport,	 manufacturing	 and	medicine.41		





changes	wrought	by	industrialization	and	urbanization.43	This	was,	as	Simon	Szreter	argues,	an	‘unabashedly	evolutionary’	 theory.	Though	there	was	nothing	 ‘historically	 inevitable’	about	 it,	the	 theory	 stipulated	 that	 to	 industrialize	 and	 modernize	 a	 country	 must	 pass	 through	 the	stages	of	the	demographic	transition,	and	that	 fertility	regulation	marked	the	final	stage,	with	the	 ‘general	 spread	 of	 such	 behaviour	 [to	 regulate	 fertility]	 confirming	 the	 successful	sociocultural	adjustment	to	the	conditions	of	a	modernized,	economically	developed	nation’.44		
	 One	of	 the	 theory’s	most	well-known	proponents,	 the	demographer	Frank	Notestein,	who	in	the	1940s	was	the	head	of	the	Office	of	Population	Research	(OPR)	at	Princeton,	found	that	 the	 theory	 was	 eagerly	 received	 when	 he	 presented	 it,	 being	 has	 providing	 one	 of	 the	‘much	 needed	 building	 blocks	 for	 social	 analysis’.45	Szreter	 notes	 that	 the	 attraction	 of	 the	theory	doubtless	 lay	 in	 its	ability	 to	make	sense	of	 low	 fertility	 in	many	developed	countries,	locating	 it	with	 a	 ‘global	 historical	 pattern’.	However,	 he	 argues,	 it	was	 also	 beginning	 in	 the	1940s	 to	 be	 applied	 –	 as	 Dudley	 Kirk	 had	 done	 –	 to	 explanations	 about	 high	 fertility	 in	developing	countries,	and	that	it	was	the	‘policy	application’	of	the	theory	that	let	to	it	receiving	a	far	wider	attention	after	1944,	and	providing	the	‘impetus	for	its	further	elaboration’	over	the	second	half	of	the	1940s.46	






	 These	 factors	 culminated	 in	 Davis’	 exploration	 of	 a	 population	 policy	 for	 India.	 He	argued	 that	 a	population	policy	was	a	 ‘deliberate	attempt	 to	modify	 an	existing	demographic	trend	for	some	ulterior	purpose’	–	and	because	India’s	population	growth	was	putting	pressure	on	reaching	national	goals,	a	‘cessation	of	the	present	rate	of	growth	was	required’.51	Achieving	this,	 he	 acknowledged,	 would	 be	 problematic.	 Allowing	 the	 death	 rate	 to	 rise	 would	 be	untenable,	and	allowing	greater	migration	to	other	countries	politically	impossible.	Therefore,	the	only	option	 left	was	 the	 reduction	of	 fertility.52	Davis’	 advocacy	 for	a	population	policy	 in	India	 was	 part	 of	 a	 larger	 set	 of	 arguments	 emerging	 about	 the	 demographic	 effect	 of	modernization	 on	 society.	 Classic	 transition	 theory	 had	 established	 the	 link	 between	 fertility	and	broad	patterns	of	change,	but	by	the	1944s	these	links	were	becoming	more	refined.	




society	to	the	point	of	altering	fertility	behaviours.58	However,	unlike	Davis,	he	went	into	more	detail	about	the	solution:	for	India	to	gain	its	autonomy	and	to	establish	a	‘market	economy	and	democratic	society’,	which	would	 lead	 to	a	change	 in	 fertility.59	This	 formula	 for	demographic	change	in	the	underdeveloped	countries	had,	Szreter	argues,	a	‘great	appeal	to	the	New	World’s	post-war	 reconstructionist	 planners’.60	Advocating	 American	 ‘liberal	 democratic	 and	 political	economic	practices’	 the	 theory	appeared	 to	establish	 the	 institution	of	American-style	 ‘liberal	and	democratic	ground-rules’	as	a	‘necessary	precondition	for	entering	the	evolutionary	path	of	transition’.61	However,	 while	 the	 mid-1940s	 formulation	 of	 democratic	 transition	 theory	 as	expressed	by	the	OPR	demographers	offered	a	powerful	and	compelling	theory	of	social	change	and	development,	 it	was	not	accepted	wholesale	by	Indian	demographers,	who	had	their	own	spin	on	the	relationship	between	colonial	exploitation,	development	and	population.	Formed	in	conversation	with	these	American	ideas,	they	nevertheless	did	not	uncritically	reproduce	them.		
	 One	 such	 set	 of	 arguments	 was	 made	 by	 Sripati	 Chandrasekhar,	 an	 Indian	demographer	who	had	come	to	America	for	his	doctoral	study	and	was	in	close	connection	with	the	 developments	 occurring	 in	 American	 demography.	When	 Chandrasekhar	 first	 applied	 to	study	 in	America	he	drew	on	contracts	 that	existed	between	American	and	 Indian	academics	studying	 statistics.62	He	 was	 put	 in	 touch	 with	 economists	 at	 the	 University	 of	 Chicago,	Columbia	University,	and	New	York	University,	all	of	whom	were	interested	in	the	connections	between	 economics,	 population	 growth	 and	 food	 production.63		 These	 were	 the	 same	 issues	that	 had	 risen	 to	 prominence	 in	 discussions	 about	 population	 in	 India,	 and	 Chandrasekhar’s	PhD	 application	proposal	 demonstrates	 the	 extent	 to	which	he	had	been	 influenced	by	 these	arguments.	He	proposed	to	study	the	‘dynamics	of	population	change	in	India	in	relation	to	the	total	available	resources’,	and	wanted	to	start	by	exploring	the	causes	contributing	to	growth,	as	well	as	to	provide	a	projection	of	growth	for	the	next	twenty	to	thirty	years.	All	of	this	would	be	 in	order	 to	make	a	 reliable	 food	plan,	providing	 the	 ‘basis	of	 a	balanced	diet’	 for	both	 the	present	and	projected	population.64	




food	produced.	 Finally,	 he	 included	 as	 part	 of	 his	 proposal	 a	 ‘Population	 and	Food	Policy	 for	India’	which	would	cover	a	projected	ten	years	and	explain	how	to	increase	food	productively	while	 also	 ‘limiting	 the	 growth	 of	 population	 through	 means	 acceptable	 to	 their	 cultural	milieu’.65	This	 would	 include	 understanding	 how	 sanitation,	 hygiene	 and	 access	 to	 medical	facilities	had	lowered	the	death	rate,	and	the	effect	that	could	have	‘on	the	growth	of	population	and	the	consequent	need	to	control	the	birth	rate	in	the	initial	stages	of	the	population	policy’.	He	linked	this	directly	to	raising	standards	of	living,	stating	that	once	increased	standards	had	been	made	possible,	 ‘the	individual	family	may	be	expected	to	become	jealous	of	the	its	rising	level	 and	 maintain	 it,	 if	 not	 raise	 it	 further,	 by	 curtailing	 the	 number	 of	 children’.66	These	arguments	 clearly	 place	 Chandrasekhar’s	 early	 population	 thinking	 in	 the	 context	 of	 wider	trends	he	would	have	had	access	 to.	Arguments	about	 the	 links	between	food	and	population	had	been	made	throughout	the	twentieth	century,	but	their	incorporation	into	arguments	about	family	 size	 limitation	 and	 standards	 of	 living	 were	 emerging	 in	 his	 largely	 contemporary	context.	





the	 ‘agricultural	 proletariat’	 was	 not	 due	 to	 population	 pressure,	 but	 to	 the	 problems	 of	agricultural	development	and	the	lack	of	industrialization.71	





question	of	how	–	and	 from	where	–	 to	 collect	 the	 correct	data	 remained.	Arguably	 the	most	significant	 statistical	 programme	 undertaken	 by	 the	 Government	 in	 the	 post-war	 period,	 the	National	 Sample	 Survey	 (NSS)	 had	 begun	 to	 investigate	 the	 best	 way	 to	 gather	 this	‘representative’	data.		
	 The	NSS	was	 intended	 to	 address	many	 of	 the	 problems	 that	 had	 been	 raised	 in	 the	1940s	over	 statistics	and	 the	 issue	of	 accuracy.	To	do	 this	 the	NSS	drew	on	 the	demographic	expertise	of	the	Gokhale	Institute	of	Politics	and	Economics	for	help	with	designing	the	surveys	that	would	be	used	for	the	NSS’s	research.77	The	short-lived	collaboration	between	the	NSS	and	the	 Institute,	 lasting	 for	 only	 one	 year	 (1950-1951),	 illustrates	 the	 significant	 differences	 in	approach	 to	 population	 data	 that	 had	 already	 emerged	 between	 the	 Government	 and	 the	research	institutes	by	the	early	1950s.		Characterized	by	frequent	conflicts	between	Gadgil	and	Mahalanobis,	the	key	issues	remained	those	of	what	data	to	collect,	how	to	collect	it,	and	who	had	the	relevant	expertise,	but	also	touched	on	larger	organization	and	governmental	concerns	over	whether	data	collection	should	be	centralized	in	a	dedicated	agency,	and	if	large-scale	data	collection	was	useful	at	all.		








	 The	process	of	 selecting	 random	sample	villages	 caused	 the	 first	major	difficulties	 in	the	 NSS-Gokhale	 Institute	 relationship.	 Initially,	 the	 plan	 had	 been	 to	 select	 sample	 villages	from	large-scales	maps,	thus	producing	a	geographical	range	spanning	all	of	India.	However,	the	lack	 of	 availability	 of	 maps	 caused	 serious	 setbacks	 for	 this	 plan:	 maps	 were	 not	 centrally	located	in	any	of	the	States,	and	what	maps	were	available	did	not	cover	the	country	equally.83	Having	ruled	out	sampling	on	this	basis,	 the	NSS	turned	to	village	 lists	and	the	 ‘population	of	individual	villages’.84	Again,	the	lack	of	uniformity	between	the	different	States	with	regards	to	‘both	 population	 and	 area	 figures	 of	 individual	 villages’,	 many	 of	 which	 were	 simply	unavailable,	produced	significant	problems.	The	NSS	found	that,	for	5.6%	of	India,	there	was	no	data	on	population	size,	geographical	location,	or	even	village	name	–	this	information	had	to	be	gathered	 on	 site	 by	 enumerators	 at	 a	 later	 time. 85 	There	 were	 also	 more	 deep-seated	methodological	differences	over	how	the	study	as	a	whole	should	be	conducted.	V.M	Dandekar,	one	of	 the	senior	Gokhale	 Institute	statisticians,	argued	 that	a	sample	design	based	on	a	half-square	 mile	 grid	 was	 too	 artificial,	 that	 the	 questionnaires	 drafted	 by	 the	 Indian	 Statistical	Institute	were	too	complicated,	and	that	the	investigators	were	assigned	too	short	an	amount	of	time	in	each	village.86		






from	9201	households	in	total.87		Statistically	speaking,	Gadgil	argued,	the	information	collected	through	 the	 Poona	 Schedules	 was	much	more	 valuable.	 This	 emphasis	 on	 the	 village	 as	 the	proper	 unit	 directly	 affected	 how	 Gadgil	 believed	 data	 should	 be	 collected.	 He	 argued	 that	repeated	visits	by	the	investigator	were	critical,	and	that	 investigators	should	have	good	local	knowledge,	command	of	the	local	language,	and	be	familiar	with	the	local	rural	background,	in	addition	 to	being	 trained	 in	 investigative	work.	These	were	 the	chief	 reasons	why	Gadgil	had	argued	for	a	separate	schedule	in	the	survey.88		
	 Establishing	 the	 organizational	 structures	 and	 necessary	 manpower	 needed	 for	conducting	 such	 a	 wide-ranging	 survey	 was	 also	 a	 source	 of	 tension.	 Though	 the	 Indian	Statistical	Institute	and	the	Gokhale	Institute	had	the	expertise	required	to	work	with	the	data	once	it	was	collected,	organizing	the	actual	collection	of	the	data	was	another	matter.	The	State	governments	 were	 charged	 with	 filling	 the	 posts	 of	 Assistant	 Directors	 Superintendents	 of	fieldwork	 throughout	 India. 89 	Finding	 enough	 people	 to	 conduct	 the	 fieldwork	 required	advertising	 the	 position	 in	 newspapers	 and	 seeking	 employees	 through	 the	 Government	employment	exchange.	Training	was	provided	by	both	gazetted	and	non-gazetted	officers,	who	had	themselves	received	only	a	three-week	training	course	at	the	Indian	Statistical	Institute	in	Calcutta.	The	low	pay	and	temporary	job	status	made	it	difficult	for	the	NSS	to	recruit	enough	workers,	and	by	October	1950	at	the	start	of	the	survey	only	40%	of	the	needed	staff	had	been	recruited.	 The	 remaining	 60%	were	 recruited,	 trained	 and	 appointed	 over	 the	 following	 five	weeks.90		






villages	were	connected	by	roads,	trains	and	bus	routes,	but	in	other	areas	investigators	were	reliant	on	walking,	or	catching	a	lift	on	a	bullock	cart	where	possible.93	The	sometimes	sensitive	nature	of	data	collection	presented	 its	own	set	of	problems	for	 the	 investigators,	and	was	the	cause	 of	 another	 major	 rift	 between	 the	 NSS	 and	 the	 Gokhale	 Institute.	 Interviewers	 were	provided	with	books	 ‘containing	detailed	 instructions	as	 to	how	to	approach	 the	respondents	and	what	was	meant	by	the	various	questions’.94	The	major	problem,	the	NSS	Report	suggested,	was	not	that	the	villagers	interviewed	were	not	forthcoming	in	their	responses,	but	rather	that	there	was	no	way	for	the	interviewer	to	verify	the	answers,	particularly	in	the	case	of	first-time	investigators.95		Gadgil	argued,	however,	that	that	the	Institutes	were	not	familiar	enough	with	the	rural	conditions,	and	that	the	schedules	–	including	the	Poona	Schedule	–	did	not	allow	the	investigators	 to	 establish	 ‘contacts	 in	 the	 proper	 way	 with	 the	 respondents’.96	This	 was	compounded	by	 the	 fact	 that	while	 the	results	were	recorded	 in	English,	 the	 interviews	were	necessarily	conducted	in	the	vernacular.	While	care	was	taken	to	ensure	that	the	exact	meaning	of	the	questions	and	answers	was	conveyed,	the	fifteen	languages	in	which	the	National	Sample	Survey	was	conducted	rendered	that	a	complex	task.97		







I	suppose	views	on	this	matter	depend	substantially	on	what	one	expects	the	National	Sample	Survey	to	do.	So	far	as	I	can	judge	the	National	Sample	Survey	at	best	can	yield	fairly	reliable	information	regarding	certain	national	aggregates.	By	themselves,	these	national	 aggregates	 cannot	 form	 the	 basis	 for	 policy	 formation.	 For	 policy	 formation	you	 require,	 not	 the	National	 aggregates,	 but	much	more	of	 the	detailed	 information	concerning	 specific	 regions	 and	 activities…as	 long	 as	 detailed	 information	 is	 not	available,	 National	 aggregates	 by	 themselves	 would	 prove	 of	 little	 use	 for	 policy	formation	or	for	judging	of	its	implications.100	
	 	





noted	 that	 the	 census	 department	 had	 been	 recently	 established	 on	 a	 permanent	 basis,	 he	argued	that	collect	 ‘raw	data’	alone	was	not	enough:	 ‘A	solution	of	our	problems	will	become	easier	only	when	trained	researchers	take	up	different	aspects	of	the	problem	and	study	them	with	scientific	accuracy’.104	 		MOVING	INTO	THE	FIELD		The	 Gokhale	 Institute	 of	 Politics	 and	 Economics	 was	 also	 conducting	 research	 into	 fertility.	Their	 early	 experiences	 illustrate	 the	 difficulties	 involved	 in	 taking	 up	 and	 studying	 the	population	problem.	Not	only	did	 researchers	 face	new	difficulties	 regarding	 the	 relationship	between	 data	 gathering	 practices	 and	 the	 investigators	 collecting	 the	 data,	 they	 also	 found	themselves	 needing	 to	 ‘prepare	 the	 ground’	 in	 order	 to	 get	 a	 response.	 In	 1952	 N.V	 Sovani	completed	The	Social	Survey	of	Kolhapur	City.	One	of	 the	 first	 large-scale	demographic	studies	undertaken	 by	 the	 Gokhale	 Institute,	 the	 study	 illustrates	 the	 problems	 researchers	encountered,	even	before	they	started	to	collect	their	data.	One	of	the	first	difficulties	was	the	need	 for	women	 investigators.105	While	 the	 other	 two	 branches	 of	 the	 study	 –	 into	 industry,	trade	and	labour,	and	family	living	and	social	life	–	were	conducted	by	male	investigators,	it	was	believed	 that	 the	only	way	 to	gather	 reliable	data	on	 fertility	 from	women	was	 to	use	 female	investigators.	 The	 role	 of	 women	 in	 the	 research	 was	 felt	 in	 two	 other	 ways:	 women	 social	workers	were	needed	to	help	drum	up	public	opinion	and	sympathy	for	the	study;	and	a	council	of	women	from	Kolhapur	City	was	required	to	give	the	survey	social	legitimacy.106		




which	surveyed	women	in	particular	reproductive	age	groups	and	had	the	advantage	of	being	both	shorter	and	more	accurate.109		Accuracy,	however,	remained	a	pressing	concern,	and	the	survey	deployed	new	techniques	to	try	to	ensure	they	had	the	best	possible	results.	One	of	the	major	problems,	Sovani	explained,	was	that	fertility	surveys	relied	heavily	on	accurate	age	data,	which	 was	 notoriously	 unreliable.	 This	 was	 not	 because	 people	 were	 trying	 to	 mislead	investigators,	Sovani	elaborated,	but	resulted	instead	from	‘sheer	ignorance’.110	To	counter	this,	Sovani	employed	a	technique	that	had	been	trialled	a	year	previously,	intended	to	generate	an	accurate	measurement	 for	age	by	relying	on	people’s	subconscious	memories.111	This	method	was	based	on	the	theory	that	people	subconsciously	associated	major	events	in	their	lives	with	major	events	 in	 their	wider	environment.	Thus,	while	people	 ‘might	not	bother	 to	remember’	the	age	they	were	when	they	got	married	or	had	a	child,	they	would	associate	that	event	with	something	 significant	 that	 had	 happened	 in	 the	 wider	 world.112	To	 this	 end,	 Sovani	 had	 the	Committee	of	women	draw	up	a	 list	of	 important	events	 that	had	occurred	 in	 the	City	 for	 the	previous	half	century,	and	issued	it	to	the	women	investigators	to	use	as	a	reference.113		






in	 English	 and	 ‘if	 any	 answer	 is	 vague	 or	 doubtful’,	 to	 ‘write	 down	 the	 answer,	 as	 given	 and	mark	it	D.	In	case	any	answer	sounds	misleading	or	obviously	incorrect	(for	example	age	of	the	person	interviewed),	put	down	your	impression	along	with	the	answer	supplied	and	mark	with	I’.117		The	interview	sheet	opened	with	the	statement:		
This	enquiry	 is	 sponsored	by	 the	M.S	University	of	Baroda.	The	 information	supplied	will	be	treated	as	strictly	confidential,	and	no	names	will	be	divulged.	The	information	will	 be	 used	 for	 academic	 and	 scientific	 purposes	 only.	 For	 any	 useful	 reforms	 the	community	or	Government	must	know	basic	 facts,	 for	without	 them	no	policy	can	be	formulated.	You	are	requested	to	co-operate	with	the	interviewer.118		
The	 survey	 asked	 questions,	 directed	 to	 women,	 about	 age,	 name,	 mother	 tongue,	 religion,	occupation,	income,	education	and	family	size	of	both	‘husband	and	wife’	being	interviewed.	It	also	enquired	as	to	whether	those	interviewed	were	living	in	a	 ‘joint	 family’,	 the	age	at	which	the	woman	first	menstruated,	when	they	were	first	married,	and	how	old	the	woman	was	when	she	 first	 had	 children.	 It	 asked	what	 ages	 any	 living	 children	were,	 if	 any	 children	 had	 died,	what	they	died	of,	and	whether	the	woman	had	had	any	abortions.	It	asked	what	the	cause	of	the	abortions	was,	and	how	long	mothers	nursed	their	children,	 if	they	wanted	more	children	(or	if	not),	and	how	many	were	either	desired	or	permitted	by	health	and	economic	reasons.	It	asked	if	parents	would	like	to	limit	the	number	of	children,	if	they	had	attempted	to	do	so,	and	when	 these	 attempts	 had	 taken	 place.	 It	 explicitly	 requested	 the	 husband’s	 views	 on	 birth	control,	and	asked,	in	the	case	that	no	more	children	were	desired	at	all,	 ‘would	you	prefer	an	operation	on	yourself	(salpingectomy);	or	a	minor	operation	on	your	husband	(vasectomy)?’,119	and	 concluded	 with	 asking	 ‘Would	 you	 prefer	 contraceptives	 for	 yourself	 or	 for	 your	husband?’.120		





mortality	 and	 their	 economic	 and	 social	 correlates’.121	The	 Section	 was	 also	 expanding	 its	research	aims,	and	was	beginning	to	investigate	attitudes	towards	contraception	in	both	rural	and	urban	areas.122	Davis,	who	had	arrived	in	India	for	the	first	time	early	in	1952,	travelled	for	a	number	of	weeks	meeting	with	Indian	demographers	and	touring	some	villages.	Attending	a	session	of	the	Planning	Commission,	he	was	gratified	to	find	that	many	members	had	read	his	book.123		However	his	own	 foray	 into	 the	 field	proved	particularly	 inspiring.	The	village	visits	were	a	particular	highlight,	and	convinced	him	that	 the	 time	was	right	 for	demographers	and	demographic	 research	 to	move	away	 from	collection	of	 survey	data	and	 to	 focus	on	 research	that	would	lead	to	action.124		
	
	PLANNED	PARENTHOOD	AND	POPULATION	POLICY		The	research	projects	undertaken	in	the	early	1950s,	though	highly	local	in	practice,	were	part	of	a	much	larger	international	concern	that	was	increasingly	focused	on	the	fertility	of	the	Third	World,	and	on	Indian	fertility	in	particular.	Not	only	had	many	of	the	demographers,	economists	and	other	 social	 scientists	working	on	population	 in	 India	been	 trained	abroad,	 international	organizations	such	as	the	UN	and	the	Foundations	were	actively	involving	themselves	in	these	attempts	to	understand,	and	hopefully	change,	the	rate	of	population	growth.	Research	carried	out	 in	 the	 early	 1950s	 combined	 different	 aspects	 of	 the	 debates	 over	 population,	 data	 and	society.	 The	 problem	 of	 where	 and	 how	 to	 collect	 data,	 in	 addition	 to	 what	 data	 should	 be	collected,	 shaped	 much	 of	 the	 early	 research.	 Many	 of	 the	 research	 projects	 conducted	 on	fertility	 and	 family	 planning	 combined	 an	 empiricist	 approach	 with	 an	 educational	 one	 –	seeking	 both	 to	 learn	 about	 fertility	 as	well	 as	 to	 teach	 people	 first	 to	 care	 about	 it,	 then	 to	modify	it.	
	 Others	were	also	using	population	surveys	as	a	platform	to	call	for	population	policies	and	birth	control.	Kingsley	Davis	had	published	his	wide-ranging	study,	The	Population	of	India	





one.125	Part	 of	 his	 project	 was	 to	 determine	 the	 causal	 relationships	 between	 the	 variables	affecting	 population	 and	 ‘arrive	 at	 predictive	 conclusions’.	 Applying	 social	 theory	 to	 India’s	demographic	data	would	allow	researchers	to	explore,	and	answer,	questions	about	the	social	forces	 that	 governed	 birth	 and	 death	 rates,	 how	 these	 might	 change	 in	 the	 future,	 how	demographic	trends	impacted	on	society	and	standards	of	living,	and	what	social	plans	would	be	put	in	place	to	‘avoid	undesired	consequences’.126	
	 Davis	returned	to	these	questions	at	the	end	of	his	study,	exploring	population	policy.	Population	 policies	were	 a	 necessity,	 he	 argued,	 because	 population	 growth	was	 a	 clear	 and	inescapable	detriment	to	economic	and	agricultural	development.	No	matter	how	much	those	sectors	could	be	made	to	grow,	unless	population	growth	was	controlled	it	would	outstrip	them	both.	The	question	that	needed	to	be	urgently	addressed	in	India,	he	argued,	was	whether	the	change	in	attitude	that	‘naturally	accompanied’	the	fertility	transition	from	high	to	low	fertility	could	 be	 ‘induced	more	 quickly’.127	‘If	 fertility	 is	 going	 to	 be	 lowered	 soon’,	 he	 stated,	 ‘it	will	only	be	 through	 some	strong	and	unique	policy’.128	Davis	outlined	 two	possible	methods	 that	might	 result	 in	 a	 quick	 reduction	 of	 fertility	 –	 to	 bring	 birth	 control	 to	 people,	 or	 to	‘industrialize	overnight’.129	What	was	ultimately	needed,	he	concluded,	was	a	population	policy	that	encouraged	 industrialization,	put	controls	on	emigration	(to	 limit	brain-drain	and	 loss	of	capital),	and	vigorously	promote	birth	control	through	‘films,	radio,	ambulatory	clinics,	and	free	services	 and	 materials’.130	This	 was	 all	 to	 be	 supported	 through	 research	 into	 contraceptive	technologies	and	techniques,	as	well	as	into	‘methods	of	mass	persuasion’.131	 	






	 In	November	1952,	the	FPAI	was	host	to	the	third	International	Conference	on	Planned	Parenthood,	held	in	New	Delhi.	Nearly	five	hundred	delegates	representing	fourteen	countries	were	 attending.135	Nehru’s	 message	 to	 the	 conference	 was	 relatively	 subdued	 –	 population	needed	to	be	limited,	but	by	itself	this	‘would	not	solve	social	and	economic	problems’.136	Other	responses	were	more	positive.	Harnessing	scientific	and	technological	developments	for	human	betterment	 promised	 rich	 rewards.137	The	 vice-president	 of	 India,	 Sarvepalli	 Radhakrishnan,	gave	 the	 inaugural	 speech.	 ‘It	 is	 essential’,	 he	 argued,	 ‘that	 there	 should	 be	 some	 system	 of	planning	of	 families’	–	 for	health,	 to	 lower	the	 infant	mortality	rate,	and	to	address	the	 ‘social	aspect’	of	the	problem.138	Radhakrishnan	related	the	population	problem	to	goals	of	the	welfare	state,	 arguing	 that	 while	 the	 national	 aim	 was	 for	 children	 grow	 into	 ‘healthy,	 happy,	responsible	 citizens’,	 it	was	 not	 something	 the	 state	was	 in	 a	 position	 to	 give.139	The	 answer	therefore	lay	in	population	limitation.	 ‘The	duty	which	human	individuals	have’,	he	argued,	 ‘is	to	find	out	what	the	social	needs	are,	what	the	physical	needs	are,	and	what	the	spiritual	needs	are,	and	try	to	fill	them’.140		





she	 needed	 or	 wanted	 to,142	because	 her	 quality	 of	 life	 had	 decreased,	 or	 because	 further	pregnancies	would	damage	her	health.143		Similar	questions	were	asked	of	women	who	either	wanted	 more	 children,	 or	 who	 were	 ‘indifferent’.144	The	 section	 of	 the	 greatest	 interest	 to	Chandrasekharan,	 however,	 was	 the	 one	 concerning	 family	 limitation	 practices.	 He	 was	particularly	 interested	 in	the	practices	of	women	who	desired	not	to	have	any	more	children,	but	who	were	not	practicing	any	method	of	family	limitation	–	these	women	were	questioned	about	their	choices	and	actions	 in	detail145.	 	The	value	of	 this	kind	of	study,	Chandrasekharan	explained,	was	that	it	outlined	the	‘existing	readiness	of	the	people	to	accept	the	idea	of	family	planning’.146	It	further	illustrated	where	efforts	at	family	planning	education	should	be	directed,	‘to	promote	the	idea’	of	family	limitation.	However,	if	family	planning	practices	were	going	to	be	successfully	‘introduced	into	specific	communities’,	then	more	detailed	data	was	required.		




making	 by	 establishing	 the	 links	 between	 fertility	 rates	 and	 attitudes	 to	 contraception.149	Asking	 the	 standard	 demographic	 questions	 about	 family	 characteristics,	 the	 survey	 also	requested	 information	 on	 fertility,	 asking	 about	 the	 desire	 for	 children	 and	 family	 limitation	practices.		
Presenting	his	 results,	 Chandrasekhar	 emphasized	 the	utility	 of	 this	 kind	of	 research	for	 policy-making	 and	 for	 tapping	 in	 to	 public	 opinion.	 ‘Governments	 are	 usually	 slow	 in	appraising	 the	needs	and	grasping	 the	attitudes	of	 the	public’	he	argued,	 ‘with	 the	result	 that	[they]	defer	introducing	reforms	for	which	people	are	ready’.150		The	utility	of	these	surveys	for	policy-making	had	also	been	stressed	to	the	interviewers,	as	well	as	to	those	being	surveyed	–	demographic	 facts	 gathered	 through	 research	were,	 they	were	 informed,	 the	 basis	 on	which	useful	 Government	 reforms	 were	 founded.	 It	 was	 on	 this	 basis	 that	 ‘co-operation	 with	 the	interviewer’	 was	 requested.151	Chandrasekhar	 argued	 that	 the	 solution	 to	 the	 population	problem	was	based	in	research,	which	provided	‘a	way	out	of	this	difficulty	caused	by	not	being	sure	 of	what	 the	 public	wants’.	 Surveys	 of	 attitudes	 and	measurement	 of	 public	 opinion,	 ‘on	important	 and	 sometimes	 controversial	 questions’152	were,	 he	 explained,	 part	 of	 a	 larger	tradition	 of	 attitude	polling	 that	 had	been	 carried	 out	 in	 the	Gallup	polls	 in	America	 and	 the	Mass	 Observation	 polls	 United	 Kingdom.153		 These	 surveys	 should	 not	 be	 conducted	 by	 the	state,	which	 could	 be	 interpreted	 as	 introducing	 bias.	 Instead,	 they	 should	 be	 carried	 out	 by	non-official	agencies	and	academic	institutions	which	would	provide	an	‘objective	and	impartial	view’	on	public	 issues.154	The	Conference	concluded	 in	an	air	of	hopefulness.	 ‘All	 the	clichés	–	for	instance	that	couples	‘won’t’	take	the	trouble	or	‘want’	more	and	more	children	–	are	being	disproved	 by	 actual	 contact	with	 the	 population	 on	 a	wide	 scale’,	 noted	 one	 news	 report.155	Shortly	 after,	many	 of	 the	 aims	 of	 those	 at	 the	 Conference	were	 realised	 –	 on	December	 7th,	Nehru	 unveiled	 the	 revised	 family	 planning	 policy	 of	 the	 First	 Plan	 to	 Parliament,	 and	 India	became	the	first	country	in	the	world	with	an	official	policy	promoting	family	limitation.156		





Those	 present	 included	 C.	 Chandrasekharan,	 KCKE	 Raja,	 and	 Dhanvanthi	 Rama	 Rao.	 Many	members	 of	 the	 medical	 community	 and	 representatives	 of	 family	 planning	 organizations	throughout	India	were	requested	to	attend	the	first	two	days	of	discussion,	including	observers	from	the	WHO	and	the	United	Nations	Technical	Assistance	Administration.	The	 first	meeting	opened	 with	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	 Report	 of	 the	 Planning	 Commission,	 and	 the	 specific	recommendation	that	action	should	be	taken	to	draw	up	a:	 ‘fairly	 full	and	close	picture	of	the	rapid	growth	of	population	in	India’,	to	devise	‘techniques	of	family	planning	suitable	for	Indian	conditions’	and	to	develop	‘appropriate	methods	by	which	knowledge	of	these	techniques	can	be	widely	disseminated’157.	The	overall	aim,	it	was	made	clear,	was	that	family	planning	advice	was	to	be	made	an	 ‘integral	part’	of	 the	service	provided	by	Government	hospitals	and	public	health	 agencies.158	To	 this	 end	 the	 FPRPC	 was	 to	 make	 recommendations	 on	 how	 to	 best	implement	 those	 suggestions,	 and	 particularly	 to	 ‘promote	 research	 and	 other	 experimental	studies	that	may	be	required	in	connection	with	this	programme’.159		






	[the]	 family	 planning	 programme	 is	 essentially	 an	 attempt	 to	 use	deliberately	 planned	 social	 action	 as	 a	 means	 of	 shortening	 the	 long	historical	process	which	has	been	involved	in	reducing	the	birth	rates	of	other	countries.	India	is	now	at	much	the	same	point	in	its	demographic	development	as	that	reached	by	western	countries	at	the	beginning	of	the	modern	economic	era.162		
This	understanding	of	population	trends	led	to	the	conclusion	that	the	widening	gap	between	the	 birth	 and	 death	 rates	 meant	 population	 growth	 would	 continue	 to	 rise	 (and	 even	 to	accelerate).	 ‘The	 reason	 for	 this	 lag	 (between	 birth	 and	 death	 rates)	 is	 fairly	 obvious’,	 the	Committee	 report	 argued	–	 the	 ‘survival	 instinct	 of	 society’,	 and	particularly	 a	 society	with	 a	high	death	rate,	meant	that	social	institutions	had	been	developed	to	ensure	a	high	birth	rate	to	compensate.163	These	 social	 institutions	 had	 not	 changed,	 despite	 the	 falling	 death	 rate,	 and	thus	 the	 ‘lag’.	 The	 population	 problem	 in	 large	 part	 then,	 centred	 on	 the	 ‘institutions	 and	attitudes’	that	were	keeping	birth	rates	high.		





Census…involves	 extraction	 of	 information	 which	 plays	 a	 vital	 role	 in	 the	determination	of	many	of	our	administrative	policies…In	many	matters	it	provides	a	useful	guide	for	the	effectiveness	or	otherwise	of	our	economic	policies.	The	theory	of	population	is	in	itself	an	interesting	part	of	economics.	The	census	helps	us	to	test	and	adapt	that	theory	to	facts.167		
Much	 like	 in	 the	 NSS,	 the	 census	 was	 conducted	 using	 questionnaires,	 to	 be	 filled	 out	 by	enumerators.168	In	 the	 month	 of	 February,	 the	 census	 enumerators	 visited	 644	 lakhs	 of	‘occupied	houses’,	collecting	3,569	lakhs	of	census	slips.	Each	slip	functioned	as	‘a	dossier	of	one	person’.	 Information	 held	 in	 their	 dossiers	 was	 transcribed	 into	 the	 National	 Register	 of	Citizens,	which	had	a	section	for	‘every	village	and	every	ward	of	every	town’.169	Differentiating	the	1951	census	 from	its	predecessors	was	 its	emphasis	on	economic	data.170	The	 intention	–	expressed	 in	 the	 instructions	 issued	 to	 the	 census	 superintendents	 –	was	 to	 collect	 data	 that	would	 serve	 as	 the	 ‘starting	point	 of	more	detailed	 studies	 of	 the	 interrelationships	 between	population	changes	and	economic	changes	in	the	country	as	a	whole,	as	well	as	in	the	different	states	and	natural	divisions	of	the	country’.171		




There	were	two	possible	outcomes,	‘catastrophe’	or	‘near	miracle’.173	The	catastrophe	would	be	extreme	food	shortages	leading	to	famine	and	epidemic	disease,	 ‘on	the	scale	which	prevailed	during	1891-1900’.	The	near	miracle	was	the	adoption	of	contraception	by	‘our	womenfolk’.174	To	 Gopalaswami’s	 mind,	 there	 was	 only	 one	 potential	 solution:	 ‘we	must	 count	 on	 the	 near	miracle	and	bring	it	about’.175		
		 ‘A	decade	ago’,	Chandrasekhar	observed	in	1953,	the	main	controversy	was	whether	or	not	 India	was	 overpopulated.176	Next,	 the	 question	 had	 been	 if	 birth	 control	 was	 acceptable.	‘Today’	he	argued,	 ‘the	issue	is…how	best	to	disseminate	knowledge	of	 it	among	the	people’	–	the	tide	had	turned	for	planned	parenthood.177	Planned	parenthood	had	been	endorsed	by	the	nation;	the	task	that	lay	ahead	was	to	use	this	to	lower	the	birth	rate.	The	most	important	factor	in	achieving	it	rested	on	the	attitudes	of	Indian	mothers,	he	argued.	The	majority	of	women	had	been	shown	to	favour	birth	control,178	and	the	question	that	now	had	to	be	faced	was	how	to	get	it	 to	 them.	 India,	 he	 concluded,	 had	 ‘become	 aware’	 of	 the	 population,	 and	 awareness	 had	‘induced	a	perceptible	change	in	individual	and	group	attitudes	and	motivations’.179		




where	 the	 pressure	 is	 greatest’.182	Addressing	 this	 pressure	 was	 to	 become	 the	 aim	 of	 the	Population	Council,	the	research	institute	formed	following	the	Conference.183		
	 The	Ford	Foundation,	which	was	already	working	in	India	on	community	development,	was	 beginning	 to	 turn	 to	 population	 as	well.	Writing	 to	 the	 Foundation’s	American	 offices	 in	October	1953,	Douglas	Ensminger	–	rural	sociologist	and	head	of	Ford’s	operations	 in	 India	–	reported	 that	 it	 was	 time	 to	 ‘face	 up’	 to	 the	 population	 problem.184	Ford	 was	 helping	 the	Government	address	the	immediate	problem	of	food	shortages	and	unemployment,	and	official	and	un-official	 ‘leaders	of	 India’	had	recognized	the	need	 for	a	 ‘comprehensive	programme	of	population	 research	 and	 control’. 185 	Ensminger	 painted	 a	 gloomy	 picture	 of	 the	 present	situation	–	the	rate	of	population	increase	was	likely	to	be	2	per	cent,	resulting	in	an	additional	7.3	million	people	per	year.	Population	would	have	doubled,	reaching	a	total	of	730	million,	by	1986.186	Not	only	would	this	result	in	an	‘intolerable	burden’	on	food	production,	infrastructure	and	employment,	it	was	potentially	destabilizing.	It	had	been	understood,	he	explained,	that	the	struggle	 for	 Independence	 was	 also	 a	 struggle	 for	 freedom	 from	 hunger.	 If	 the	 Indian	government	could	not	achieve	this,	there	was	a	chance	that	people	would	look	to	the	example	of	China	as	a	plausible	alternative.187	The	urgent	question	was	how	to	quickly	and	effectively	put	a	population	control	program	into	‘concrete	action’.188	The	Government,	despite	its	support	for	a	population	 policy,	 was	 not	 a	 swiftly	 moving	 organization,	 and	 it	 was	 too	 tightly	 bound	 by	‘ideological	 pressures’	 to	 ‘give	 positive	 dynamic	 leadership’	 to	 the	 program.189	What	 was	needed	was	an	agency	–	perhaps	a	 ‘Population	 Institute’	–	 that	could,	with	 the	support	of	 the	Government,	 work	 to	 coordinate	 voluntary	 and	 State	 activities,	 to	 train	 workers,	 conduct	research,	and	‘examine	and	stimulate	all	feasible	methods	of	population	and	family	planning’.190		










CHAPTER	THREE:	INSTITUTIONALIZING	DEMOGRAPHIC	RESEARCH		In	1940,	one	of	questions	most	asked	regarding	population	data	was	how	to	produce	the	right	data.	 In	 the	1950s,	 this	was	 joined	by	a	new	concern:	who	 should	produce	 it,	 and	how.	These	questions	were	 asked	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 rising	 importance	 of	 field	 studies	 and	 the	 sample	survey.	 This	 chapter	 argues	 that	 between	 1956	 and	 1960,	 as	 demography	 became	institutionalized,	so	too	did	a	particular	kind	of	research:	the	field	study.	The	significance	of	the	field	 study	 for	 policy-making	was	made	 clear	 by	 the	 end	of	 the	 Second	Five	Year	Plan,	when	data	produced	by	such	studies	became	evidence	integral	to	the	promotion	of	family	planning	in	connection	 with	 national	 economic	 planning.	 By	 adding	 an	 emphasis	 on	 the	 attitudes	 and	behaviours	of	individuals,	rather	than	the	aggregates	provided	by	the	census	and	NSS,	this	new	data	led	in	turn	to	a	new	emphasis	in	policy		-	attitude	and	motivation	towards	contraception.			
	 Between	 1951	 and	 1955	 approximately	 15	 research	 studies	 on	 demography,	 family	planning	and	contraceptives	were	carried	out.	By	the	end	of	the	Second	Five	Year	Plan	in	1960,	this	 had	more	 than	 doubled.1	Much	 of	 this	 research	 had	 been	 encouraged	 by	 the	 structural,	institutional	and	professional	support	that	was	further	developed	during	the	Second	Five	Year	Plan,	 though	 increased	 interest	 in	 population	was	 also	 emerging	 in	 the	 growing	 interest	 and	activity	of	the	UN	and	international	research	organizations	and	NGOs,	who,	like	the	Government	of	India,	were	increasingly	emphasizing	not	only	the	need	for	more	data	but	also	debated	what	data	was	required,	and	how	it	should	be	produced.		





literature.	However,	they	are	typically	discussed	in	the	context	of	the	international	population	control	movement	and	 their	 interventions	 into	contraceptive	research,	demographic	 research	and	 population	 policy	 making	 from	 the	 mid-1950s	 onwards.5	The	 Khanna	 Study	 and	 the	research	of	Coale	and	Hoover	has	received	particular	attention	in	this	regard	–	often	held	up	as,	respectively,	examples	of	research	on	contraceptive	use	and	attitudes	influencing	policy,	and	of	the	growing	importance	of	arguments	about	fertility	decline	being	necessary	for	development.6		
	 Arguing	 against	 the	 ‘diffusion’	 theory	 of	 population	 ideas,7	expertise	 and	 policy,	 this	chapter	 argues	 that	 by	 placing	 the	 interventions	 of	 the	 international	 population	 control	movement	 in	 India	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 wider	 institutionalization	 of	 demography	 as	 a	discipline,	the	formation	of	population	policy	and,	most	significantly,	of	expanding	research,	it	becomes	clear	that	they	are	part	of	an	interconnected	research	project	carried	out	by	and	with	Indian	experts,	researchers	and	policy-makers.	LAUNCHING	A	NATIONAL	PROGRAM		The	Second	Five	Year	Plan	period	(1956-1961)	saw	an	expansion	in	the	activities	undertaken	during	 the	 First	 Plan	 period	 concerning	 family	 planning	 and	 demographic	 research.	 The	‘declared	 policy	 of	 the	Government	 of	 India’	was	 to	 ‘reduce	 the	 rate	 of	 population	 growth	 in	order	to	raise	the	standard	of	living	and	to	ensure	health,	happiness	and	a	fuller	family	life’.	The	First	Five	Year	plan	–	which	was	a	‘four-fold	action-cum-research	programme’	was	followed	by	an	 expansion	 of	 activities	 in	 ‘service,	 training,	 education	 and	 research	 programmes’	 in	 the	Second	 Five	 Year	 Plan. 8 	These	 activities	 were	 supported	 by	 the	 establishment	 of	 new	Government	organizations,	including	a	Central	Family	Planning	Board,	a	Standing	Committee,	a	Demographic	Advisory	Committee	and	a	Committee	on	the	Physiology	of	Human	Reproduction.	In	addition,	a	number	of	family	planning	clinics	were	developed,	in	rural	and	urban	areas.		 	







reduce	fertility	was	needed,	alongside	and	in	support	of	efforts	to	increase	development.9		The	Plan	also	emphasized	the	importance	of	the	district	for	planning	purposes	–	‘the	district	is	the	pivot	 of	 the	 whole	 structure	 of	 planning.	 At	 this	 point	 plans	 from	 different	 sectors	 come	intimately	 into	 the	 life	of	 the	people’.10	This	had	been	determined	as	early	as	1954,	when	 the	process	 of	 planning	 for	 the	 Second	Five	 Year	 Plan	 began.	 The	 Indian	 Statistical	 Institute	was	influential	in	shaping	the	Second	Plan,	and	Mahalanobis’	recommendations	in	constructing	the	draft	 ‘plan-frame’	 were	 instrumental.11	The	 crucial	 factors	 for	 the	 Second	 Five	 Year	 Plan	 to	consider,	 according	 to	 Mahalanobis,	 were	 the	 relationships	 between	 investment,	 national	income,	and	employment.	
	 By	 1955	 the	 ‘machinery	 for	 the	 co-ordination	 of	 population	 and	 vital	 statistics	 and	demographic	 studies’	 was	 being	 reviewed.12	The	 outcome	 at	 the	 Government	 level	 was	 the	formation	of	a	Standing	Committee	to	coordinate	population	and	vital	statistics.	The	Standing	Committee	 included	 representatives	 from	 Government	 Ministries,	 and	 the	 Indian	 Statistical	Institute.	Family	Planning	Boards	were	also	established	at	the	centre	and	in	the	states,	and	the	position	of	Director	of	 Family	Planning	was	 created,	 along	with	positions	 for	 family	planning	officers	in	the	states.	 ‘Training	centres	and	centrally	financed	field	units	in	the	states	were	set	up.	 Research	 and	 training	 on	 demography,	 reproductive	 physiology,	 communications	 and	action	research	were	established.’13		
	 These	 actions,	 taken	 together,	were	 responsible	 for	 launching	what	B.L	Raina	 argues	was	the	first	‘national	program’.	The	four	principle	components	of	this	national	program	were:	to	create,	through	education,	the	framework	for	contraceptive	acceptance;	to	provide	services	–	including	 sterilization	 services	 –	 in	 rural	 and	 urban	 areas;	 to	 train	 more	 personnel;	 and,	research.	 A	 large	 amount	 of	 activity	 followed.	 As	 well	 as	 a	 large	 variety	 of	 informational	material,	including	‘posters,	pamphlets	and	folders,	films,	film	strips,	slides	and	exhibits’,	public	officials	were	appointed	honorary	family	planning	positions,	grants	were	provided	to	research	and	voluntary	organizations,	 the	staffs	of	a	 large	number	of	hospitals	were	strengthened,	and	medical	and	health	centres	were	used	for	the	distribution	of	contraceptives.14			






insufficient	 capital	 goods,	 the	 issue	of	 ‘model	building’	 to	 try	 and	understand	planning	 in	 the	long	term	was	also	of	great	interest,	which	in	turn	required	understanding	population	growth:	‘As	 population	 in	 India	 is	 growing	 steadily	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 create	 enough	 new	 work	 and	employment	 every	 year	 to	 absorb	 new	 entrants	 into	 the	 labour	 force.	 That	 is,	 in	 India	unemployment	 must	 expand	 at	 least	 as	 fast	 as	 population	 which	 requires	 that	 the	 national	economy	must	also	expand,	at	least	equally	fast’.15	The	basis	for	this	lay	in	the	way	Mahalanobis	calculated	the	economic	model.	Using	the	 formula	xβ-p,	where	x	=	rate	of	net	 investment,	β	=	the	ratio	of	increase	in	net	national	income	per	unit	of	time	to	net	investments	associated	with	additional	 income,	and	p	=	 rate	of	growth	of	 the	population,	which	he	 took	 to	be	 ‘a	 little	 less	than	1%	per	year’.16		
	 The	 Second	 Five	 Year	 Plan	 was	 intended	 to	 ‘lay	 the	 foundations	 on	 which	 a	 more	progressive	 and	 diversified	 economy	 could	 be	 built	 up’.17	Effectively,	 as	 the	 report	 argued,	 it	was	 ‘intended	 essentially	 as	 a	 preparation	 for	 more	 rapid	 advance	 in	 the	 future’. 18 	In	establishing	 the	 framework	 for	 the	 Second	 Five	 Year	 Plan,	 Mahalanobis	 drew	 on	 another	research	 methodology	 that	 had	 been	 popularized	 during	 the	 war,	 Operational	 Research,	arguing	 that	 poverty,	 along	 with	 underemployment,	 were	 the	 greatest	 problems	 that	 India	faced	and,	that	with	the	proper	application	of	research	and	statistics,	could	be	solved.19	Doing	so	 would	 involve	 research	 ‘at	 various	 levels’,	 as	 well	 as	 scientific	 and	 technical	 knowledge.	However,	as	he	noted,	while	research	was	important,	it	was	not	the	goal	in	and	of	itself	–	‘In	my	view	our	studies	also	have	the	primary	aim	of	solving	a	particular	problem	(and	not	doing	any	theoretical	research	for	its	own	sake)…We	are	speaking	of	India	and	suggesting	methods	which	we	think	are	practicable	under	Indian	conditions’.20	The	problem	to	be	solved	–	and	for	which	research	 could	 be	 put	 to	 work	 –	 had	 been	 determined	 by	 the	 Planning	 Commission	 as	 the	problem	of	whether	it	was	possible	to	lower	unemployment	and	raise	the	national	income	over	a	ten-year	period.		





organizations	to	open	family	planning	clinics,	as	well	as	greater	provisions	for	training,	public	education	 and	 for	 research	 –	 both	 on	 fertility	 and	 in	 demography.	 Research	 in	 fertility	 and	demography	was	 intended	 to	 pursue	 certain	 lines	 of	 inquiry,	 in	 particular	 fertility	 limitation	and,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 demographic	 research,	 ‘the	 study	 of	 inter-relationships	 between	 social,	economic,	 and	 population	 changes,	 reproductive	 patterns	 and	 attitudes	 and	 motivations	affecting	the	size	of	the	family	and	suitable	procedures	for	the	rapid	education	of	the	people’.21	RESEARCHING	INDIA’S	POPULATION:	WHO	SHOULD	DO	IT,	HOW,	AND	WHERE?	The	emphasis	on	motivation	and	clear	linkage	between	family	planning,	demographic	research	and	policy	was	echoed	in	the	debates	and	plans	made	during	the	early	Second	Five	Year	Plan	period	at	both	the	Central	and	State	levels,	as	well	as	in	the	research	projects	being	undertaken	between	1956-1960.	The	 issues	of	putting	existing	knowledge	to	use	–	and	the	 importance	of	research	into	attitudes	and	motivations	–	had	been	noted	by	the	Family	Planning	Research	and	Programmes	 Committee	 (FPRPC)	 when	 it	 had	 been	 established	 in	 1953.	 The	 FPRPC	 had	maintained	 that	 one	 of	 the	 main	 problems	 connected	 to	 population	 growth	 were	 the	‘institutions	 and	 attitudes’	 the	 kept	 the	 birth	 rate	 high.	 By	 1954,	 the	 FPRPC	 was	 actively	reviewing	the	question	of	demographic	research,	particularly	with	regards	to	how	it	should	be	conducted,	and	who	should	be	conducting	it.		
	 At	 the	 second	meeting	of	 the	FPRPC	 in	1954,	P.C	Mahalanobis	and	VKRV	Rao	argued	that	 ‘it	 was	 essential	 to	 review	 the	 whole	 problem	with	 a	 view	 to	 determining	 the	 lines	 on	which	 research	 should	 be	 undertaken,	 the	 institutions	 or	 individuals	 that	 could	 take	 up	 the	studies,	 the	 representative	 regions	 and	 populations	 to	 be	 selected	 for	 study,	 the	 nature	 and	extent	 of	 assistance	 that	 should	 be	 made	 available	 and	 the	 machinery	 necessary	 for	coordinating	research’.22	They	maintained	that	while	the	population	problem	could	be	viewed	both	as	a	quantitative	and	a	qualitative	one,	the	‘ultimate	purpose’	was	to	improve	the	quality	of	the	population,	and	that	limiting	the	total	number	of	people	was	one	of	the	means	by	which	to	achieve	 that.	The	kinds	of	 studies	 that	were	needed	were	 those	 that	could	 take	an	 integrated	approach,	 and	 examine	 how	 economic,	 social	 and	 population	 factors	 affected	 growth	 in	different	areas,	and	among	different	groups	of	people.	A	significant	part	of	this	research	would	be	an	exploration	of	people’s	motivation	towards	using	 family	planning	–	 in	particular,	 it	was	argued,	‘studies	directed	towards	throwing	light	on	motivations	and	attitudes	are	necessary’.23		





scale	 population	 control	 programs	 to	 consider	 the	 effects	 on	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 population,	arguing	 that	 ‘the	possibility	of	dysgenic	effects	 resulting	 from	such	birth	control	could	not	be	ignored’.	As	a	result,	two	programmes	of	research	were	suggested	–	the	first	on	‘demographic	or	 socio-economic	 and	 cultural’	 factors,	 and	 the	 second	 on	 ‘population	 quality’. 24 		 The	demographic	 research	 programme	 was	 to	 follow	 three	 suggestions:	 1)	 ‘to	 draw	 up	 a	programme	of	 research	on	 the	high	birth	 and	death	 rates	 in	 the	 country,	 especially	 from	 the	point	 of	 view	 of	 the	 economic,	 social,	 cultural	 and	 allied	 factors	 involved’;	 2)	 ‘to	 select	institutions	 and	 individuals	 for	 carrying	 out	 this	 research	 and	 to	 recommend	 sanction	 of	 the	expenditure	 involved	 within	 the	 limits	 of	 the	 overall	 provision	 for	 the	 purpose’,	 and	 3)	 ‘to	arrange	 for	 the	 co-ordination	 of	 these	 investigations	 and	 of	 the	 results	 obtained’.25	The	 sub-committee	 in	 charge	 of	 this	 research	 included,	 as	 convenor,	 VKRV	 Rao,	 as	 well	 as	 P.C	Mahalanobis	and	D.R	Gadgil,	among	others.		
	 The	 third	 meeting	 of	 the	 FRPRC	 raised,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 question	 of	 demographic	research,	the	problem	of	demographic	training.	The	discussions	over	demographic	training	and	demographic	 research	 in	 the	 mid-1950s	 demonstrate	 the	 growing	 internationalism	 of	population	research	at	the	time.	Present	at	the	Committee	on	Demographic	Studies	held	at	third	meeting	of	the	FPRPC,	in	addition	to	VKRV	Rao,	PC	Mahalanobis,	KCKE	Raja,	and	K.M	Dandekar	(who	was	standing	in	for	D.R	Gadgil),	were	P.K	Whelpton	and	M.C	Balfour.	One	of	the	principle	issues	discussed	at	the	meeting	was	the	recommendation	that	a	Council	of	Population	Studies	should	be	created.	It	was	argued	that	the	Council	of	Population	should	be	composed	of	‘selected	non-official	 representatives	 of	 Ministries	 and	 other	 offices	 of	 the	 Central	 Government	interested	in	population	research’,	as	well	as	select	experts	on	the	population	problem.	Such	a	body	 would	 function	 autonomously	 from	 the	 Government,	 and	 would	 not	 only	 promote	demographic	 research,	but	also	education	and	 training	 in	demography	and	on	 the	population	problem.26	This	was	considered	alongside	a	call	to	create	a	Standing	Committee	of	Statisticians,	who	would	work	independently	from	the	Demographic	Committee,	and	review	all	proposals	for	demographic	research.		






	 By	 1954,	 the	 issue	 of	 field	 studies	was	 becoming	 increasingly	 central	 to	 debate.	 The	Demographic	 Sub-Committee	 meeting	 held	 in	 May	 focused	 closely	 on	 the	 programmes	 of	research	 that	 should	 be	 supported.	 Studies	 that	 examined	 high	 fertility	 levels	 and	 their	determinants	 were	 suggested,	 as	 were	 suggestions	 that	 research	 should	 focus	 on	 both	 the	analysis	of	available	data	–	primarily	census	data	and	maternity	statistics	 -	and	the	collection	through	field	studies,	of	the	demographic	data	of	different	regional	areas	in	India,	for	example	tribal	areas,	high	rainfall	areas,	areas	with	specific	agricultural	production	and	so	on.	The	Sub-Committee	 members	 all	 agreed	 that	 the	 chief	 demographic	 problem	 was	 that	 of	 collecting	‘correct	 basic	 data’,	 and	 that	 ‘the	 obtaining	 of	 such	 data	 would	 be	 the	 primary	 object	 of	extensive	field	studies	now	envisaged’29.		







consequences’,	 but	 also	 trustworthy	 researchers.	 The	 question	 of	who	 could	 be	 trusted	with	conducting	 the	 research,	 be	 they	 institutions	 or	 individuals,	 was	 up	 for	 discussion.	 Many	options,	 including	 ‘universities,	 colleges,	 research	 institutes,	 family	welfare	 centres,	 hospitals,	doctors,	 health	 officers,	 community	 project	 administrators,	 rural	 extension	 units…social	services	agencies…individual	social	works	and	research	scholars’	had	all	been	suggested.32	Also	being	 suggested	 were	 the	 kinds	 of	 demographic	 research	 that	 should	 be	 conducted.	 It	 was	argued	that	research	should	be	grouped	into	two	categories	–	those	on	published	data,	and	field	studies	 aiming	 to	 collect	 new	 data.	 Field	 studies,	 the	 Sub-Committee	 argued,	 should	 aim	 at	collecting	data	on	 the	 family	 (size	and	composition),	 age	at	marriage	and	number	of	 children	born,	practice	of	family	planning,	economic	status,	occupation,	caste,	education	and	attitudes	on	a	wide	range	of	social,	cultural,	and	economic	factors.33		
	 By	 1955	 the	Research	 and	Programmes	Committee	 (RPC)	was	 strongly	 stressing	 the	need	 for	 a	 two-pronged	 approach	 to	 demography:	 to	 create	 a	 suitable	 plan	 for	 conducting	demographic	research,	and	also	 to	help	create	a	body	of	demographic	researchers.	VKRV	Rao	was	responsible	for	composing	a	plan	of	demographic	research	for	the	RPC,	argued	that	studies	should	be	 conducted	 ‘in	different	parts	of	 India	on	a	 somewhat	uniform	pattern’.	They	noted	that	 ‘ten	or	 twenty	such	ad	hoc	studies’	 could	produce	 in	a	 reasonable	amount	of	 time	 ‘a	 fair	idea’	 of	 the	 ‘determinants	 of	 fertility	 and	 mortality’.34	These	 studies,	 which	 would	 provide	‘reliable	 data’	 on	 fertility	 and	mortality	 in	 rural	 and	 urban	 areas,	were	 to	 be	 conducted	 on	 a	sample	 survey	basis,	with	 the	household	 –	using	 the	definition	 from	 the	1951	 census-	 as	 the	unit	for	sampling.	Fertility	and	mortality	data	was	to	be	collected	in	general	(for	fertility	only)	and	 with	 reference	 to	 a	 specified	 time	 period,	 and	 would	 be	 taken	 from	 all	 women	 of	childbearing	 age	 in	 a	 given	 household.	 The	 studies	 could	 also	 include	 an	 attitude	 survey	 on	family	planning,	age	of	marriage	and	widow-remarriage,	and	family	size.35	The	Committee	was	also	keen	to	establish	a	more	unified	group	of	demographic	researchers,	whose	interest	could	be	 encouraged	 through	 the	 establishment	 of	 centres	 of	 research	 in	 universities	 and	 other	institutions	that	would	‘promote	interest	in	population	studies	on	a	wide	basis’.		To	this	end,	it	was	 recommended	 that	 four	 centres	 be	 established	 at	 the	 Indian	 Statistical	 Institute,	 the	 All	India	 Institute	 of	Hygiene	 and	 Public	Health,	 the	Delhi	 School	 of	 Economics	 and	 the	 Gokhale	
																																																																				





Institute	of	Politics	and	Economics	to	which	research	students	could	be	sent	to	receive	training,	supported	by	scholarships.36	THE	INTERNATIONAL	APPEAL	OF	INDIAN	DEMOGRAPHY	By	 the	mid-1950s	 demographers	 and	 population	 experts	 had	 begun	 to	 establish	 frameworks	for	 their	 research	 and	were	 increasingly	 turning	 towards	 the	 problem	 of	 policy	 relevance.37	While	 the	 Government	 of	 India	 had	 been	 searching	 for	 ways	 to	 generate	 more	 accurate	population	data,	the	demographic	 institutes	were	increasingly	concerned	with	producing	data	that	was	‘actionable’	on	a	policy	level.	This	involved	questioning	not	only	what	the	population	problem	in	India	was,	but	where	it	was	–	if	it	was	India-wide,	regional,	or	in	the	family.	
	 International	 organizations	 had	 become	 involved	 in	 funding	 demographic	 research	during	 the	 1950s	 to	 develop	 networks	 of	 demographers	 and	 population	 professionals	 who	would	 provide	 ‘authoritative	 guidance’	 to	 Governments	 and	 the	 public	 on	 the	 population	problem.	 The	 Demographic	 Division	 of	 the	 Population	 Council	 was	 established	 in	 1953	 to	facilitate	this	process.	In	particular,	the	Demographic	Division	sought	to	train	and	support	the	skills	 needed	 to	 study	 population	 trends,	 by	 helping	 to	 create	 what	 the	 Population	 Council	argued	 was	 then	 a	 practically	 non-existent	 demographic	 ‘infrastructure’	 of	 training	 centres,	schools,	and	fellowships	throughout	the	developing	world.	This	would,	they	hoped,	‘accelerate’	the	growth	of	the	discipline	and	produce	skilled	personnel	and	high	quality	research.		




determine	 the	 course	 of	 future	 research,	 and	 applying	 those	 results,	would	 help	 to	 solve	 the	problem	of	‘informing,	motivating	and	assisting	the	Asian	peasant	villager	and	his	counterpart	in	other	parts	of	the	world,	in	family	planning’.39		
	 In	 1955	 John	 Durand,	 the	 Assistant	 Director	 of	 the	 Population	 Branch	 at	 the	 United	Nations	 remarked	 that	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 regional	 training	 centre	 in	 the	 Far	 East	 was	 a	 top	priority.	 ‘It	 is	hoped’,	he	noted,	 ‘that	such	a	regional	centre	can	be	established	in	1956	that	its	impact	can	be	 felt	 in	time	to	 improve	the	quality	of	 the	1960	Census,	which	will	 take	place	 in	most	 Asian	 countries’.	 The	major	 problem	 for	 the	UN	was	 in	where	 such	 a	 centre	 should	 be	located	–	while	India	was	the	obvious	choice	due	to	the	high	availability	of	qualified	personnel	and	good	universities	it	was	also,	Durand	argued,	plagued	by	‘jealously	and	a	lack	of	reasonable	cooperation’.40	The	exclusion	of	Pakistan	from	a	centre	in	India	was	‘seriously	unfortunate’	and	while	Ceylon	presented	a	possible	alternative	the	lack	of	a	strong	University	system	or	network	of	population	specialists	made	it	otherwise	highly	impractical.		






problems	of	data	collection,	and	the	difficulties	 inherent	 in	 fieldwork	–	 tended	to	concentrate	either	on	the	national,	or	on	one	particular	location,	the	village.		
	 The	 village	 had	 emerged	 as	 a	 category	 of	 interest	 for	 demographers	 and	 others	interested	 in	 collecting	 population	 data	 prior	 to	 the	 1950s,	 and	 had	 featured	 in	many	 of	 the	debates	of	the	1940s	and	early	1950s	about	population	data,	both	within	India	and	in	the	work	of	influential	scholars	like	Kingsley	Davis.	By	the	mid-1950s,	the	growing	importance	placed	on	demographic	 research	 and	 particularly	 on	 field	 studies	 had	 again	 cast	 attention	 towards	 the	particular	 locations	 data	 was	 collected	 from,	 the	 methods	 by	 which	 it	 was	 collected	 and	crucially,	 the	 reliability	 of	 the	 answers	 that	 were	 being	 provided	 to	 the	 investigators.	 These	issues	were	tied	up	with	many	of	the	other	problems	connected	to	demographic	research	and	field	 studies	 that	 had	 been	 raised	 during	 the	 Government	 and	 UN	 deliberations	 over	demographic	 training,	 particularly	 why	 the	 research	 should	 be	 done,	 what	 should	 be	 being	researched,	and	who	should	be	doing	it.	The	support	given	to	research	by	the	Second	Five	Year	Plan	 and	 other	 Government	 and	 international	 bodies	 encouraged	 more	 research	 to	 be	undertaken.	 This	 expansion	 in	 Government	 interest	 and	 the	 need	 for	 research	 and	 data	 that	grew	with	 the	economic	and	 family	planning	programmes	 created	opportunities	 for	 research	organizations	and	individuals	that	had,	until	the	mid-1950s,	struggled	to	make	real	headway	in	gaining	 support	 for	 their	 projects.	 It	 also	 opened	 up	 opportunities,	 for	 field	 studies	 to	 be	conducted	by	international	researchers.		
	 The	call	to	the	villages	had	been	made	in	connection	with	research	in	demography	and	family	 planning	 in	 the	 early	 1950s.	 Underscoring	 the	 links	 between	 high	 fertility,	 economic	development	and	family	planning,	Chandrasekhar	argued	in	1953	that	the	movement	to	include	birth	 control	 in	 national	 planning	 should	 ‘start	 in	 the	 villages	 –	 the	 base	 of	 India’s	 socio-economic	structure’,	though	he	noted	that	the	practice	of	birth	control	had	already	begun	at	the	‘apex’	 –	 in	 the	 cities.42	However,	 ‘taking	 birth	 control	 to	 the	 villages’	 had	 its	 own	 set	 of	problems;	 ‘not	only	are	the	villages	deficient	 in	basic	health	and	medical	 facilities’,	he	argued,	‘they	are	plagued	by	unhygienic	conditions,	insufficient	running	water,	lack	of	privacy,	illiteracy,	ignorance	 and	 above	 all	 poverty’. 43 	They	 also	 provided	 researchers	 with	 another	 set	 of	problems,	not	only	were	they	often	difficult	to	reach	–	as	had	been	emphasized	in	the	1940s	–	there	 were	 concerns	 about	 the	 quality	 and	 reliability	 of	 data	 that	 were	 collected	 in	 them.	Nevertheless,	 as	 a	 category,	 the	 village	 held	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 sway	 over	 demographers	 and	population	researchers.		




him	that	 the	time	was	right	 for	demographers	and	demographic	research	to	move	away	from	collecting	survey	data	and	to	focus	instead	on	research	that	would	lead	to	action.44	Action	also	featured	 prominently	 in	 Chandrasekhar’s	 assessment	 of	 other	 projects	 that	were	working	 in	India’s	villages	during	the	early	1950s,	particularly	the	Community	Development	Projects	being	undertaken	by	the	Government	of	India	and	the	Ford	Foundation.	Emphasizing	that	the	need	to	raise	 the	 standard	 of	 living	 was	 key	 to	 the	 population	 problem	 as	 well	 as	 to	 economic	development,	 Chandrasekhar	 argued	 that	 the	 neglect	 of	 population	 in	 the	 early	 Community	Development	projects	was	a	significant	problem.45	The	 ‘reconstruction	of	 the	rural	scene’	and	the	 ‘rehabilitation	 of	 rural	 man’	 meant	 consideration	 –	 as	 the	 Government	 of	 India	 were	unwilling	to	do	–	‘the	explosive	population	question	in	the	villages’.	What	was	required	was	the	‘preaching’	 of	 planned	 parenthood	 in	 the	 villages.	 Drawing	 from	 the	 arguments	made	 in	 the	1951	Census	Report,	Chandrasekhar	argued	that	if	the	‘if	the	village	level	worker	can	only	tell	people	that	it	is	patriotic	to	have	only	three	children	it	is	quite	possible	that	our	villagers	might	respond	sooner	than	we	 imagine	and	this	gospel	of	 three	children	per	couple	might	solve	the	unhappy	problem	of	 improvident	maternity’.46	This	was	completely	possible	 in	 the	context	of	the	 Community	 Development	 Projects	 because,	 while	 the	 village	 workers	 may	 have	 lacked	specific	 training	 in	 family	planning	 they	were,	Chandrasekhar	 insisted,	 ‘multi-purpose	agents’	capable	of	carrying	out	the	work	of	telling	people	about	family	planning.		





ranging,	 intending	 to	 address	 a	 variety	 of	 questions	 including	 whether	 contraception	 would	reduce	 the	 birth	 rate	 of	 the	 rural	 population,	 what	 the	 underlying	 factors	 (physical,	geographical,	 biological,	 psychological,	 cultural,	 and	 economic)	 affecting	 birth	 rate	were.	 The	real	 benefit	 of	 the	 study,	 however,	 was	 going	 to	 be	 its	 focus	 not	 on	 individuals	 but	 on	‘populations’,	which	were	key	the	investigators	argued,	to	grasping	and	solving	the	population	problem.47		
	 Studying	 populations	 and	 the	 population	 problem	 required	 uncovering	 the	 ‘relevant	facts’,	a	cry	that	had	been	raised	by	the	Government	and	population	experts	in	India	throughout	the	1940s	and	early	1950s.	The	 ‘relevant	 facts’	 that	 the	Khanna	Study	sought	were	much	 like	those	 being	 researched	 in	 other	 investigations,	 emphasizing	 vital	 statistics,	 and	 particularly	fertility	 rates,	 mortality	 rates,	 and	 contraceptive	 acceptance.	 These	 facts	 were	 to	 found,	 and	accessed,	through	field	studies	investigating	contraceptive	methods.	John	Gordon,	Professor	of	Epidemiology	 at	 Harvard,	 was	 the	 head	 of	 the	 study,	 and	 he	 argued	 forcefully	 for	 it.	 The	measurement	 of	 success	 Gordon	 provided	 reflected	 the	 aims	 of	 the	 study	 –	 ‘if	 at	 the	 end	 of	observation	 a	 significant	 decline	 in	 births	 per	 100	 woman	 years	 of	 village	 population	 is	demonstrated	as	the	resulted	of	 induced	contraceptive	measures,	and	that	significant	changes	towards	improved	health	and	social	status	exist	in	experimental;	villages	coupled	with	control’	then	the	Study	would	have	achieved	it	aims.		





	 The	 role	of	 the	village,	 and	of	 rural	 India	 in	general,	was	key	 to	how	 the	project	was	conceived,	 and	 how	 it	was	 promoted	 to	 influential	 backers	 in	 the	 USA	 and	 India.	 One	 of	 the	main	selling	points	of	the	study	when	it	was	first	proposed	was	the	familiarity	of	one	of	the	lead	investigators	 –	 Dr	 Carl	 Taylor	 –	 with	 ‘local	 conditions’.	 Taylor,	 from	 the	 Christian	 Medical	College	in	Ludhiana,	was	it	was	noted,	‘born	in	India,	has	a	sound	knowledge	of	Indian	life	and	customs	 and	 speaks	 the	 language	 of	 the	 Punjab’.	 In	 addition,	 he	was	 ‘familiar	with	 the	 local	conditions	and	with	the	Hindi	language,	since	he	lived	for	three	years	near	an	Indian	village’.53	The	 emphasis	 placed	 on	 Taylor’s	 local	 expertise	 contrasted	 with	 the	 wide	 definition	 of	‘population	problem’	the	study	was	working	with.	 ‘The	problem	is	one	of	communities,	of	 the	general	population’,	it	was	argued,	‘and	not	one	of	individuals’.54	Nevertheless	the	communities	and	general	population	were	both	believed	 to	be	represented	by	 the	 lives	and	experiences	of	those	 in	 rural	 villages,	 and	 their	 responses,	 particular	 towards	 the	 ‘acceptability’	 of	contraceptive	methods,	were	highly	sought	after.	‘Acceptability	by	a	general	population’,	it	was	acknowledged,	 ‘involves	 something	more	 than	 acceptability	 by	 those	 persons	who	 come	 to	 a	clinic	from	a	recognized	need	for	help’	–	and	it	was	that	‘something	else’	that	the	study	would	determine,	by	observing	a	group	of	villagers	believed	to	be	representative	of	the	Punjab	area.55		





actively	 sought	 the	 support	 of	 many	 other	 researchers	 –	 including	 N.V	 Sovani	 –	 who	 were	already	 known	 to	 the	 Rockefeller	 Foundation	 and	 the	 Government	 through	 their	 existing	research	and	Institutional	connections.			
	 Khanna	 was	 chosen	 in	 1953	 as	 the	 site	 for	 the	 study.	 Gordon	 and	 Taylor,	 prior	 to	making	 their	 choice,	 and	 in	 an	 effort	 to	 better	 understand	 village	 life,	 had	 camped	 out	 in	 a	village	for	four	days.	Their	aim	was	to	‘observe	village	life,	morning	noon	and	night’.57	Gordon	and	Taylor	 visited	 houses	 in	 the	 village	 to	 see	 how	people	 lived	 and	where	 they	 slept.	 Their	time	 there,	 Balfour	 noted,	 though	 short,	 was	 still	 much	 more	 than	 many	 surveyors	 or	government	 visitors	were	 allowed.58	This	 experience	 brought	 home	 to	 Gordon	 the	 ‘primitive	conditions’	 of	 the	 villages’	 as	well	 as	 the	 difficulties	 inherent	 in	 conducting	 village	 study.	 He	concluded	 that	 ‘general	 motivations	 and	 certainly	 the	 sex	 behaviour	 of	 villagers	 are	 little	known’.59	The	choice	of	Khanna,	which	was	located	between	Ludhiana	and	Delhi	on	the	Grand	Trunk	Road	was	motivated	by	 several	 factors,	 including	 the	belief	 of	Gordon	and	Taylor	 that	villagers	in	the	area	were	receptive	to	the	experiment	and	to	the	doctrine	of	family	planning.60		




study	were	also	already	in	difficulty,	 in	particular	the	aim	to	study	the	socio-economic	factors	related	 to	 the	 population	 problem.	 Gordon	 argued	 that	 the	 study	 was	 not	 long	 enough	 to	measure	socio-economic	change,	or	change	in	health	status,	as	had	originally	been	intended.	In	particular,	 it	 was	 noted	 that	 measuring	 socio-economic	 status	 would	 be	 particularly	problematic.	However,	N.V	Sovani	offered	a	potential	solution	–	it	would	be	possible,	he	argued,	to	 study	 socio-economic	 change	 by	 comparing	 the	 number	 of	 families	 above	 and	 below	 the	poverty	 line,	 according	 to	 the	 size	 of	 the	 family.	 This	 could	be	done	 as	 part	 of	 the	 visits	 that	were	 already	 being	 conducted	 during	 the	 experiment.	 ‘No	 other	 type	 of	 survey’,	 he	 argued,	‘would	 show	 the	 effect	 of	 a	 contraceptive	 programme’.	 Once	 the	 data	was	 collected,	 families	could	 be	 assessed	 according	 to	 ‘acceptors	 and	 non-acceptors’	 of	 contraceptives.	 This	 would	could,	 in	addition,	by	 supported	by	 the	units	of	 the	Food	and	Agricultural	Ministry	 that	were	intended	to	undertake	studies	of	rural	change.64		





THE	IIPS		The	 Khanna	 study	 and	 its	 relationship	 to	 the	 village	 –	 both	 as	 a	 concept	 in	 the	 larger	understanding	of	the	population	problem,	but	also	as	a	location	to	investigation,	reflected	and	developed	 many	 of	 the	 ideas	 and	 problems	 that	 had	 been	 discussed	 regarding	 conducting	demographic	research	in	India	throughout	the	1940s	and	1950s.	The	need	to	produce	reliable	data	and	to	understand	the	relationship	between	contraceptive	practices	and	birth	rates,	socio-economic	 factors	and	other	questions	were	being	explored	by	a	wide	 range	of	 researchers	 in	the	 early	 and	 mid-1950s.	 While	 the	 Khanna	 Study	 had	 the	 financial	 luxury	 of	 being	 able	 to	undertake	 a	 long	 term	 study,	 other	 research	 organizations	were	 looking	 to	 conduct	 smaller,	faster	investigations,	which	they	argued	were	both	cheaper	but	also	produced	up	to	date	data	for	policy	making.		
	 Though	 Chandrasekhar	 had	 been	 relatively	 unsuccessful	 in	 garnering	 Government	support	 for	 the	 IIPS	 in	 the	early	1950s,	he	continued	to	 try.	Writing	to	V.T	Krishnamachariar,	Deputy	Chairman	of	the	Planning	Commission,	in	October	1954,	Chandrasekhar	elaborated	on	the	work	the	work	he	was	doing	in	the	UK,	and	requested	assistance	for	the	IIPS.	He	linked	this	request	directly	to	the	plans	for	supporting	demographic	research	in	the	Second	Five	Year	Plan,	and	 specifically	 to	 the	 rumours	 that	 the	 Planning	 Commission	was	 looking	 to	 create	 its	 own	Institute	of	Population	Studies	to	carry	out	research.	‘If	this	project	is	going	to	take	some	years	to	materialize’,	he	wrote,	 ‘I	hope	you	will	 find	it	possible	to	give	such	assistance	as	you	can	to	my	institute	because	I	would	like	to	begin	work	soon	on	several	research	projects	with	special	reference	 to	 India’.68	The	 question	 of	 Government	 support	 for	 population	 research	 institutes	was	also	addressed	by	 John	Mathhai,	who	wrote	 to	Chandrasekhar	 in	April	1955	stating	 that	‘The	question	of	starting	a	school	of	Population	studies,	under	the	auspices	of	the	Government	of	 India	 is	 still,	 I	 understand,	 under	 consideration’.	 However,	 he	 did	 note	 that	 the	 Planning	Commission	was	keen	for	such	an	organization	to	be	started	as	soon	as	possible,	and	that,	if	the	opportunity	presented	itself,	he	would	recommend	Chandrasekhar	to	any	available	post.69		





	 By	 1955	 the	 IIPS	 had	 incorporated	 into	 its	 constitution	many	 of	 the	 concerns	 about	India’s	population	being	expressed	by	the	Government	as	well	as	at	international	events	like	the	1954	 World	 Population	 Conference	 or	 the	 International	 Planned	 Parenthood	 Federation	meeting.	 In	 particular,	 the	 IIPS’s	 constitution	 acknowledged,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 problem	 of	population,	 famine	and	standards	of	 living,	vital	 statistics	and	 field	studies,	 the	 importance	of	work	 to	be	done	on	 ‘the	 attitude	of	 Indian	people	 towards	 family	 size	 and	planning’71.	These	were,	 the	 constitution	 made	 clear,	 needed	 to	 formulate	 a	 democratic,	 ‘positive’	 population	policy.	The	importance	of	academic	organizations	to	assist	the	Government	–	and	their	relative	dearth	in	India	–	was	also	emphasized.	What	was	needed,	the	IIPS	argued,	were	institutions	that	were	‘entirely	devoted	to	population	research’	that	could	provide	data	both	for	the	government	and	for	public.72		





primary	 obstacles,	 he	 argued	 but	 rather	 whether	 people	 knew	 about	 family	 planning	 and	desired	to	apply	this	knowledge.	In	this,	he	argued,	‘motivation	is	all	supreme’.75		
	 Putting	the	plans	outlined	in	the	Second	Five	Year	Plan	into	action,	the	State	of	Madras	created	a	plan	of	action	 to	determine	how	to	best	 implement	programmes	and	propagate	 the	uptake,	and	understanding	of,	family	planning.	The	goals	of	the	Second	Five	Year	Plan	–	which	the	 Family	 Planning	 Board	 in	 Madras	 summarized	 as	 ‘the	 problem	 of	 regulating	 India’s	population	from	the	dual	standpoint	of	size	and	quality’	for	national	welfare	and	planning,	were	to	 be	 achieved	 through	 a	 four-point	 strategy.	 This	 included	 determining	 what	 factors	 were	contributing	to	rapid	population	growth,	to	develop	better	understanding	of	fertility	and	how	it	could	 be	 regulated,	 to	 develop	 better	 and	 faster	 ways	 to	 educate	 the	 public	 about	 family	planning	 and	 population,	 and	 finally,	 to	 better	 integrate	 family	 planning	 into	 hospitals	 and	health	 centres.76	Part	of	 this	programme	of	action,	 it	was	noted,	was	 the	effort	undertaken	 to	help	 foster	 ‘active	 public	 opinion’	 in	 support	 of	 family	 planning,	 as	 well	 as	 to	 support	demographic	and	biological	studies.	This	had	been	begun	during	the	First	Five	Year	Plan,	and	was	 to	 be	 further	 extended	 in	 the	 Second	 Plan	 period,	 particularly	 through	 the	 extension	 of	family	 planning	 provision,	 training	 and	 research.	 The	 programme	 of	 demographic	 research	envisaged	by	the	Family	Planning	Board	was	largely	focused	on	the	questions	of	motivation	and	communication.	 The	Government	 of	Madras,	 keen	 to	 cooperate	with	 the	Central	Government	regarding	 the	 execution	 of	 the	 Second	Five	Year	 Plan,	 planned	 to	 establish	 a	 family	 planning	Board.	






	 The	first	meeting	of	the	Family	Planning	Board	had	discussed	in	the	detail	the	creation	of	 a	Family	Planning	Manual,	 and	what	methods	 should	be	 recommended	by	 it.	 In	particular,	the	‘husband	careful	method’	was	debated,	though	vasectomy	–	particularly	whether	it	could	be	performed	 by	 private	 medical	 practitioners,	 and	 the	 amount	 they	 could	 be	 paid	 in	compensation	 –	 was	 also	 raised.	 It	 was	 decided	 that	 a	 Sub-Committee	 should	 be	 formed	 to	discuss	these	issues,	and	consider	the	creation	and	distribution	of	the	family	planning	manual	as	well	as	the	launching	of	family	planning	pilot	projects	in	Madras	City.79		 	By	 1956	 the	 IIPS	was	engaged	in	research	on	many	of	these	issues.	Having	received	funding	from	the	Canadian	Kaufman	 Fund,	 the	 Hopkins	 Trust	 of	 America	 and	 the	 Government	 of	 Madras,	 the	 IIPS	 was	conducted	 three	projects:	 a	demographic	 survey	of	Mangadu	village,	 a	 survey	of	 the	 ‘cultural	and	material	obstacles	 to	 the	dissemination	of	 family	planning	 in	 rural	areas’,	 and	a	 research	project	on	published	data	for	a	demographic	survey	of	Asia.80	Chandrasekhar	was	keen	to	align	this	 research	 to	 the	 new	 demographic	 aims	 of	 the	 state,	 though	 he	 had	 long	 been	 a	 vocal	supporter	of	the	policy	relevance	of	demographic	research.	‘May	I	point	out’,	he	noted,	‘that	this	work	is	of	an	all-India	interest,	in	fact,	of	an	all-Asia	interest…I	am	confident	that	the	results	of	such	work	will	be	useful	not	just	to	the	general	public	but	to	the	Governments	in	the	Centre	as	well	as	the	States’.81		





family	 planning’.83	As	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 demographic	 survey	 of	 Mangadu,	 the	 research	 was	linked	 explicitly	 to	Government	 policy	making	 and	 family	 planning	 that	 had	 been	 enacted	 as	part	of	the	Second	Five	Year	Plan.		
	 Mangadu	 Village	 was	 chosen	 partly	 due	 to	 its	 convenient	 location	 –	 being	 within	travelling	distance	of	Madras	–	but	also	because	the	village	had	a	 ‘record	of	cooperation’	with	Government	officials,	 as	well	 as	a	 familiarity	with	 foreign	 researchers.84	The	 study	 included	a	census	of	the	village,	taken	using	a	modified	version	of	the	1951	census	questionnaire,	collected	on	 the	 basis	 of	 households.	 Data	 was	 collected	 on	 the	 village	 over	 the	 course	 of	 one	 year	(January	to	December	1956),	during	which	investigators	attempted	to	follow-up	on	every	major	demographic	 event	 –	 births,	 deaths,	 marriages,	 and	 migration.	 The	 goal	 was	 ‘the	 complete	registration	of	vital	statistics’	 for	the	village,	and	to	observe	in	close	detail	the	daily	life	of	the	village,	including	the	beliefs	and	behaviour	of	the	villagers,	including	social	structure,	economic	situation,	inter-personal	relationships,	‘marriage	patterns	and	morals’	and	politics.85	
	 The	Mangadu	Survey	is	a	good	indicator	of	what	–	and	where	–	the	population	problem	was	 believed	 to	 be	 by	 the	 late	 1950s.	 Chandrasekhar	 argued	 that	 the	 key	 work	 for	demographers	with	 regards	 to	 population	 and	 family	 planning	was	 the	 sociological	 aspect	 of	convincing	people	to	make	use	of	available	family	planning	techniques,	and	that	the	solution	to	this	 problem	 lay	 in	 the	 villages.	 Ignoring	 the	 villages	 in	 favour	 of	 cities	 and	 urban	 locations	would,	he	argued,	only	exacerbate	the	existing	problem	of	different	fertility	between	rural	and	urban	areas.	The	problem	was	not	only	about	what	contraceptives	should	be	used,	but	was	also	–	and	he	argued	primarily	–	about	knowledge	and	motivation.	The	aim	ultimately	was	to	change	culture	‘from	within…by	persuasion’,	and	demographic	studies	were	needed	as	a	pre-requisite	for	Governments	on	which	 to	base	 their	 social	and	economic	policies	 that	would	drive	social,	cultural	 and	economic	 change.86	This	 argument	was	 at	 the	 core	of	 the	 IIPS’s	Mangadu	Village	Survey.	Field	studies,	the	report	argued,	conducted	on	a	census	or	sample	basis,	were	urgently	required	 given	 the	 poor	 state	 of	 India’s	 ‘defective’	 vital	 statistics.	 It	 was	 argued	 also	 that	knowledge,	attitude	and	practice	surveys	in	particular	were	required	–	and	this	was	one	of	the	main	reasons	why	the	Mangadu	Survey	was	carried	out.87		





Writing	 to	 R.A	 Gopalaswami	 in	 April	 1958	 Chandrasekhar	 proposed	 to	 conduct	 an	 attitude	survey	in	the	City	of	Madras	‘in	connection	with	the	proposed	scheme	of	promoting	vasectomy	operations…as	 an	 experimental	 method	 for	 one	 year’.88	The	 attitude	 survey	 would	 provide	some	 indication	 of	 how	 fathers	 in	 low-income	 groups	 felt	 about	 family	 size	 and	 family	limitation,	 particularly	 how	 and	 why	 people	 were	 practicing	 contraception,	 ‘and	 what	 their	reaction	 is	 to	 a	 simple	 surgical	 but	 permanent	method	 of	 contraception	 control’.89	The	 study	was,	like	the	Mangadu	Survey,	to	be	conducted	through	a	questionnaire,	addressed	primarily	to	men	between	the	ages	of	25	and	50,	who	had	at	least	three	living	children.	The	survey	intended	to	look	only	at	low-income	families,	and	capped	the	monthly	income	of	respondents	at	Rs.200/	month	 or	 below.	 Conducted	with	 four	 interviewers	 on	 a	 random	 stratified	 sample	 basis,	 the	survey	would	take	only	2	months	and	cost	Rs.1000.		THE	GOKHALE	INSTITUTE		The	Gokhale	Institute	had	been	in	receipt	of	international	and	Government	assistance	–	as	well	as	an	active	participant	 in	shaping	Government	policy	on	data	collection	and	research	–	since	the	1940s.	The	research	conducted	by	the	Institute	in	demography	during	the	mid-1950s	was	done	 in	direct	 response	 to	 the	schemes	 laid	down	by	 the	Demographic	Sub-Committee	of	 the	FPRPC	in	1954.	Responding	to	the	call	for	investigations	into	the	demographic	data	needed	to	calculate	 fertility	 and	mortality	 rates	 in	 rural	 areas;	 attitudes	 to,	 and	 acceptability	 of,	 family	planning	and	contraception;	and	the	socio-economic	determinants	of	fertility	and	mortality.		





	 The	 geographical	 area	 covered	 by	 the	 Survey	 consisted	 of	 six	 rural	 centres,	 each	 of	which	was	 comprised	 of	 ‘a	 nuclear	 large	 village	 together	with	 neighbouring	 small	 villages’.91	These	were	 the	same	centres	under	 investigation	by	 the	Agricultural	Economic	Section	of	 the	Gokhale	Institute,	and	had	been	chosen	because	they	represented	different	economics	types,	as	well	as	being	 ‘suitable’	 for	demographic	investigation.	Crucially,	 linking	the	two	investigations	through	 their	 locations	 made	 it	 possible	 to	 ‘plan	 the	 socio-economic	 and	 the	 demographic	investigations	on	a	complementary	basis’.92	In	total,	from	the	six	centres,	26	villages	and	37,935	people	were	studied	in	1,200-1,500	households.	Like	the	Khanna	Study	and	the	Mangadu	Study,	the	 Demographic	 Survey	 was	 investigating	 knowledge	 of,	 attitudes	 towards,	 and	 practice	 of	contraception.	 To	 do	 this	 effectively,	 the	 Gokhale	 Institute	 had	 employed	 a	 different	investigative	technique	–	they	trained	‘lady	investigators’.	Lady	investigators	were	nurses	and	health	visitors	who	had	been	specially	recruited	for	the	survey.	They	had	received	two	months	of	 training	 in	 investigational	 methods	 and	 two	 weeks	 of	 training	 in	 family	 planning.93	The	purpose	 of	 the	 lady	 investigator	 was	 to	 help	 establish	 good	 will	 in	 the	 field,	 making	 their	inquiries	about	marriages,	family	planning	and	family	limitation	easier.	The	lady	investigators	spent	one	year	in	the	field,	supported	by	the	male	investigators	from	the	Agricultural	unit.	They	were	 also	 assigned	 local	 assistants,	 whose	 role	 was	 to	 help	 established	 local	 contacts,	accompany	 the	 investigators	 on	 household	 visits	 and	 to	 neighbouring	 villages,	 and	 with	 the	filling-out	of	questionnaires.		
	 Crucially,	 the	 survey’s	 results	 on	 factors	 affecting	 fertility	 concluded	 that	 neither	biological	 nor	 socio-economic	 factors	 had	 any	 significant	 impact	 on	 fertility.	 The	 survey	analysed	 five	 factors	 –	 age	 at	 present	 marriage;	 age	 difference	 between	 husband	 and	 wife;	number	of	 children;	 income,	 and;	 caste	 –	 and	 found	 that	none	of	 these	 factors	had	a	positive	effect	on	fertility.94	In	the	discussion	of	family	planning,	the	report	noted	that	investigators	had	first	 inquired	 about	 women’s	 attitudes	 towards	 pregnancy,	 and	 found	 that	 ‘On	 the	 whole,	women	 looked	 upon	 the	 delivery	 as	 a	 normal	 matter	 and	 certainly	 no	 great	 hardship.	 Few	complained	of	a	lack	of	helping	hands	or	of	the	expenses	involved’.95	Approximately	40%	of	the	women	 questioned	were	 in	 favour	 of	 family	 planning,	 with	 another	 40%	 opposed,	 and	 15%	refusing	to	discuss.		





it	 is	possible	that	there	was	something	in	the	 local	circumstances…which	conditioned	responses…However	we	are	inclined	to	believe	that	more	than	anything	else	it	was	the	personality	 and	 prejudice	 of	 the	 investigator	 and	 the	 accident	 of	 village	 leadership	taking	one	or	the	other	view	that	mattered	most.96		
The	 survey	 noted	 that	 while	 attitudes	 were	 not	 set	 one	 way	 or	 the	 other,	 this	 was	 overall	positive	–	 ‘the	population	has	 little	prejudice	and	a	virtually	open	mind’.	However,	 the	report	went	 further,	arguing	 that	while	a	 ‘neutral’	or	passive	 investigation	 tended	towards	generally	positive	but	 ‘passive’	responses,	 ‘a	more	active	or	action-oriented	investigation	does	not	seem	to	meet	with	active	resistance,	but	in	fact	seems	to	bring	more	active	responses’.97		






who	 had	 been	 given	 access	 to	 their	 predictions	 ‘some	 years’	 before	 their	 study	 was	published101.	 	 The	 Population	 Growth	 Study	 was	 the	 second	 major	 population	 study	 to	 be	produced	 by	 the	 OPR,	 following	 on	 from	 Kingsley	 Davis’	 1951	 The	 Population	 of	 India	 and	
Pakistan.	 Like	Davis,	 Coale	 and	Hoover	 took	 India	 to	 be	 a	 good	 case	 study	 for	 all	 developing	countries.	India,	Notestein	explained	in	the	foreword,	was	the	perfect	case	study	for	the	study	because	it	was	the	best	representative	of	all	low-income	countries	of	the	problems	population	growth	produced	for	economic	development.102		
	 However,	 the	 late	 publication	 date	 of	 the	 Study	masks	 the	mid-1950s	 origins	 of	 the	research	 on	 which	 the	 study	 was	 based.	 Begun	 late	 in	 1954,	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 study	 was	conceived	 to	 be	 to	 assess	 the	 relationship	 between	 population	 growth	 and	 economic	development.	India	was	chosen	as	the	principle	case	study	‘party	because	its	demographic	data	are	 relatively	 plentiful	 and	 partly	 because	 from	 the	 analytical	 point	 of	 view,	 the	 relationship	between	economic	development	and	population	change	in	India	seems	comparatively	clear’.103	India’s	large	population,	particularly	relative	to	resources,	and	‘large	potential	for	rapid	further	growth’	 combined	 with	 the	 driving	 need	 to	 find	 a	 solution	 ‘within	 its	 own	 boarders’	 to	 its	economic	 and	 demographic	 problems	made	 it	 a	 good	 case	 study	 –	 the	 ‘internality’	 of	 India’s	economic	and	demographic	situation	 ‘means	that	analysis	of	demographic	effects	 in	economic	terms	 can	 appropriately	 concentrate	 on	 internal	 problems	 to	 a	 greater	 extent	 in	 India’s	 case	than	in	most	other	countries’.104		
	 Discussing	 general	 patterns	 of	 fertility	 and	 mortality	 decline	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	theory	of	demographic	transition,	Coale	and	Hoover	noted	that,	while	it	had	been	expected	that	urbanization	would	lead	naturally	to	falling	fertility,	this	had	not	occurred	in	all	cases.	Likewise,	while	declining	death	 rates	had	previously	occurred	only	after	economic	development,	 in	 the	post-war	 world,	 cheap	 advances	 in	 sanitation,	 health	 and	 pesticides	 meant	 that	 death	 rates	were	 declining	 without	 a	 corresponding	 rise	 in	 economic	 development.	 These	 were	 factors	were	particularly	prominent	 in	Egypt	and	India,	and	Coale	and	Hoover	questioned	wither	 the	efforts	 to	 create	 economic	 and	 social	 change	 over	 the	 next	 two	 decades	 would	 have	 any	noticeable	effect	on	fertility.105		





reach	any	given	 level	 of	per	 capita	output,	 there	was	no	 reason	 to	believe	 that	 faster	 growth	rates	would	also	produce	a	greater	 supply	of	 resources.106	Discussing	 India	 specifically,	Coale	and	Hoover	 first	 identified	 the	 ‘noteworthy’	 characteristics	 of	 the	 Indian	 population,	 namely,	the	 high	 absolute	 number	 of	 people,	 the	 density,	 birth	 and	 death	 rate,	 and	 age	 distribution.	They	 argued	 that	 India	 had	 ‘every	 reason’	 to	 expect	 a	 ‘pronounced	 and	 rapid	 decline	 in	mortality’	 over	 the	 next	 three	 decades.107	Expectation	 of	 life	 span	 at	 birth	 was	 also	 due	 to	increase,	 they	 argued,	 from	32	 in	 1951	 to	 52	 by	 the	 1986.	 Fertility,	 however,	was	 subject	 to	more	variety	 in	 its	prediction.	Coale	and	Hoover	made	three	estimates:	1)	 that	 fertility	would	remain	unchanged	between	1951	and	1986,	2)	that	it	would	remain	the	same	until	1956,	when	it	 would	 begin	 a	 decline,	 halving	 by	 1981	 and	 thereafter	 remaining	 consistent,	 and	 3)	 that	decline	would	be	‘postponed’	until	1966,	when	it	would	fall	more	rapidly	than	in	scenario	(2),	again	halving	by	1981.108		
	 Assessing	 fertility	 and	 mortality	 trends	 was	 problematic,	 Coale	 and	 Hoover	 argued,	because	–	in	the	standard	refrain	of	population	experts	working	in	and	on	India	-	vital	statistics	were	deficient.	They	argued	that	 ‘contrary	 to	most	widely	published	estimates,	 that	birth	and	fertility	 rates	 have	 not	 declined	 to	 any	 important	 degree	 in	 recent	 years’.109	Such	 a	 decline	would	have	been	represented,	according	 to	 the	application	of	Lotka’s	method,	by	a	 change	 in	age	structure,	which	would	have	been	recorded	by	 the	census.	The	absence	of	such	a	change,	and	 indeed	 the	 near	 identically	 of	 the	 recorded	 1951	 age	 structure	 to	 that	 from	 1931	 –	suggested	that	no	decline	in	fertility	had	occurred	during	that	period.110	Coale	and	Hoover	went	further,	arguing	that	that	there	was	in	addition	no	evidence	to	support	the	idea	that	there	had	been	significant	changes	in	the	Indian	social	or	cultural	structures	preceding	1951	that	would	have	led	to	a	drop	in	fertility.	Likewise,	they	denied	that	any	large	uptake	of	birth	control	had	occurred	–	even	among	the	‘higher	classes’	as	had	arguably	been	the	case	in	the	West–	because	there	was	very	slender	evidence	showing	an	appreciable	change	in	differential	 fertility	across	class.	




Government	program	to	be	deployed,	only	simple	predictions	could	be	made.	Coale	and	Hoover	argued	that	that	‘with	a	minimum	program	of	family	limitation,	or	with	an	ineffectual	program,	fertility	 might	 remain	 unchanged	 for	 the	 next	 twenty	 five	 or	 thirty	 years’.	 Justifying	 their	arguments,	they	maintained	that	it	was	necessary	to	test	the	contrasting	position,	namely	that	a	‘well-defined	and	well-executed	program	of	 family	 limitation	 could	 reduce	 fertility	by	half’	 in	the	same	time	period.112	Unchanging	fertility	was	an	assumption	they	justified	by	looking	at	the	arguments	 typically	made	to	 forward	the	 idea	 that	 fertility	had	already	declined;	 that	 fertility	was	 low	 in	 high	 socio-economic	 groups	 and	 would	 spread;	 that	 rising	 trends	 in	 the	 age	 of	marriage	would	 lead	to	 lower	fertility;	and	that	the	Five	Year	Plans	of	economic	development	would	 lead	 to	 lower	 fertility	 as	populations	urbanized	and	national	 incomes	 rose;	 and	 finally	that	 decreasing	 child	 and	 infant	 mortality	 would	 lower	 fertility	 because	 people	 would	 not	require	such	large	families.113		The	firth	three	points	were	soundly	dismissed	as	not	being	based	in	 evidence.	The	 fourth	point,	 it	was	 conceded,	 ‘required	more	 extended	 examination’.114	The	question	was	how	far	the	change	from	agrarian	to	industrial	the	economy	had	to	go	before	high	fertility	 would	 be	 reduced.	 Either	 way,	 they	 contended	 that	 it	 was	 unlikely	 that	 this	 would	happen	 within	 a	 twenty	 or	 thirty	 year	 period.	 As	 Mahalanobis	 had	 done,	 Coale	 and	 Hoover	relied	on	the	data	from	Japan	to	make	this	comparison.		
	 ‘On	balance’,	they	argued,	‘there	is	little	justification	for	a	belief	that	fertility	in	India	is	in	 the	 incipient	 stages	 of	 a	more	 or	 less	 inevitable	 decline’.	 However,	 they	 accepted	 that	 the	basis	for	the	most	pessimistic	projection	on	fertility	decline	could	be	taken	as	being	‘somewhat	conjectural’,	and	allowed	that	a	‘major	decline	may	be	assumed	only	if	the	Government	takes	an	unprecedented,	 nationwide	 program	 deigned	 to	 introduce	 family	 limitation	 into	 every	village’.115	Problems	 were	 anticipated,	 particularly	 with	 regards	 to	 communication,	 not	 only	about	family	limitation	but	also	about	the	physiology	of	sex	and	reproduction,	as	well	as	finding	methods	of	birth	control	that	would	be	‘acceptable’	to	use.116		




contrasted	rural	villages	in	Mysore	State	with	an	urban	housing	unit	in	New	Delhi,	showed	that	over	75%	of	couples	wanted	to	learn	about	family	planning.	Sovani	and	Dandekar’s	study	had	likewise	 demonstrated	 a	 high	 desire	 on	 the	 part	 of	 couples	 to	 learn	 about	 family	 planning.	These	were	also	the	tentative	results	being	presented	in	the	early	investigations	of	the	Khanna	Study,	which	showed	between	30	and	40%	of	couples	wanting	information	about	birth	control.	This	was	backed	up,	Coale	and	Hoover	argued,	by	the	experiences	of	centres	throughout	India	who	reported	that	their	patients,	especially	fathers,	were	seeking	sterilization.	‘These	scattered	indications’,	 they	maintained,	 ‘can	be	taken	to	show,	not	that	significant	reductions	 in	fertility	will	occur	spontaneously,	but	that	there	might	be	popular	acceptance	of	effective	birth	control	if	the	right	methods	of	education,	manufacture,	distribution	etc.	etc.	are	discovered’.118		DEMOGRAPHIC	TRAINING	AND	RESEARCH	CENTER		By	 the	 late	 1950s	 the	 links	 between	 demography,	 family	 planning	 and	 government	 policy-making	 were	 becoming	 more	 firmly	 established.	 The	 establishment	 of	 demography	 as	 a	professional	discipline	in	Asia,	which	had	capitalized	on	and	encouraged	international	ties,	was	one	 way	 that	 these	 processes	 were	 occurring.	 As	 institutes	 and	 organizations	 were	 being	established,	the	explicit	aim	that	demographic	research	would	support	government	policy	was	being	 absorbed	 into	 the	 demographic	 institutes	 themselves.	 The	 establishment	 of	 the	Demographic	 Training	 and	 Research	 Institute	 in	 1957	 illustrates	 the	 combined	 activities	 of	professional	 demographers,	 the	 Government	 of	 India,	 and	 NGO’s	 in	 establishing	 a	 research	institute	and	training	hub	that	was	intended	to	provide	training	and	produce	demographers	not	only	for	India	but	the	whole	of	Asia.		





desire	 for	 a	 similar	 development	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 Government	 of	 India,	 the	 UN,	 Indian	Government,	and	Tata	Trust	agreed	to	act;	 the	UN	was	to	pool	 its	resources	with	those	of	 the	Bombay	Centre	to	create	the	DTRC.	The	role	of	the	UN	was	primarily	‘technical’	–	they	supplied	experts,	consultants	and	 fellowships	 for	 trainees	(from	India	and	throughout	Asia),	as	well	as	providing	 books	 and	 equipment.	 Demographers	 present	 at	 the	 Conference	 –	 notably	 Halvor	Gille,	who	worked	out	of	the	ECAFE	headquarters	–	drew	attention	towards	the	importance	of	international	 networks	 in	 establishing	 demography	 and	 the	 study	 of	 population	 problems	 in	Asia.	Gille	noted	how	the	programmes	of	 the	UN	had	been	 ‘reoriented	to	provide	more	direct	assistance	 to	 [Asian	 and	 Far	 Eastern]	 countries’.120	The	 DTRC,	 Gille	 hoped,	 would	 be	 able	 to	produce	 trained	 demographers	 who	 could	 work	 throughout	 the	 region	 conducting	 research	that	was	of	‘direct	interest	to	various	countries	of	the	region’.121	
	 Matthai’s	 inaugural	 speech	 at	 the	 DTRC	 in	 1957	 stressed	 the	 economic	 and	 social	consequences	 of	 population.	 They	 constituted	what	 he	 saw	 to	 be	 the	 primary	 concern	 of	 the	DTRC,	particularly	as	India	was	undertaking	programs	of	economic	development.	These	points	were	 closely	 linked	 to	 family	 planning,	 through	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	 ‘social’	 dimension	 of	 the	population	 problem	 and	 its	 links	 particularly	 to	 women. 122 	The	 Minister	 of	 Health	 D.P	Karmakar,	in	his	speech,	made	clear	the	links	between	demography,	population	and	the	aims	of	the	Government.	Echoing	arguments	made	throughout	the	1950s,	he	claimed	that	the	problem	was	not	a	lack	of	desire	to	act,	but	rather	a	lack	of	accurate	information	on	demography,	and	a	lack	 of	 trained	 personnel	who	 could	 carry	 out	 the	 needed	 demographic	 research.123	Thus,	 in	addition	to	the	DTRC,	the	Government	of	India	was	also	supporting	demographic	training	and	research	at	the	Indian	Statistical	 Institute	and	the	Delhi	School	of	Economics,	with	plans	for	a	fourth	centre	in	South	India.	The	DTRC,	Karmakar	explained,	was	intended	to	train	students	in	demography,	and	to	assist	in	conducting	research	throughout	Asia.124	It	would	act	to	‘build	up	a	nucleus	of	persons	in	each	country	of	the	region	with	a	sufficient	knowledge	of	demography	to	plan	and	carry	out	such	population	studies	as	the	Governments	and	universities	might	wish	to	sponsor.	 In	 turn…they	 should	 train	 other	 persons	 to	 undertake	 research	 for	 providing	information	on	population	questions	of	interest	to	the	various	Governments	in	connexion	with	their	development	programmes	and	policies’.125		









family	 planning	 programmes	 developed,	 but	 also	 how	demographic	 research	was	 conducted.	Over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 1950s	 and	 into	 the	 1960s,	 as	 the	 infrastructure	 for	 demographic	research	and	family	planning	became	more	established,	and	more	intertwined,	the	emphasis	on	the	demographic	arguments	being	made	about	the	population	problem	changed.	The	research	conducted	 in	 the	early	1950s	demonstrates	 the	 initial	 stages	of	 this,	moving	 towards	 fertility	studies,	 socio-economic	 research	 and	 attitude	 and	practice	 surveys.	By	 the	 end	of	 the	1950s,	these	 had	 become	 firmly	 entrenched	 as	 the	 main	 concerns	 of	 demography,	 eclipsing	 the	arguments	 made	 in	 the	 1930s	 and	 1940s	 that	 primarily	 related	 the	 population	 problem	 to	resource,	 and	 especially	 food,	 availability.	 This	 change	 is	 clearly	 demonstrated	 in	 the	 kind	 of	research	that	comes	to	dominate	demography	in	India	by	the	1960s	–	the	knowledge,	attitude	and	practice	survey.		





The	concern	raised	by	demographers	and	other	population	experts	about	the	rate	of	population	growth	by	the	end	of	the	1950s	was	echoed	in	a	number	of	significant	developments	that,	taken	together,	 helped	 produce	 a	 radical	 shift	 in	 how	 the	 Government	 of	 India	 envisaged	 and	implemented	its	population	policy	over	the	course	of	the	1960s.	The	1960s	were	believed	to	be	a	 crucial	 period	 for	 securing	 India’s	 development,	 economic	 and	welfare	 goals.	 The	 ‘crushing	liability’	of	population	growth	for	development	was	being	increasingly	emphasized	towards	the	end	of	the	Second	Plan.	While	many	acknowledged	that	the	Government	had	thrown	its	support	behind	family	planning,	the	program	was	argued	to	be	‘too	small	and	experimental’.1	The	need	and	desirability	of	 foreign	aid,	and	the	role	of	population	in	national	planning	were	becoming	far	more	closely	bound	together	in	the	1960s.		
	 The	First	and	Second	plans	oversaw	the	limited	expansion	of	the	programme	to	1,800	clinics	 by	 the	 end	 of	 1961,	 a	 six-fold	 increase	 in	 contraceptive	 sales,	 as	 well	 as	 rise	 in	sterilization	acceptance	and	general	family	planning	awareness.2	In	total	it	was	estimated	that	2.1	million	people	had	received	information	on	contraception	and	family	planning	by	the	start	of	the	Third	Five	Year	Plan.3	While	early	demographic	research	had	focused	on	the	importance	of	demographic	data	for	policymaking,	by	the	end	of	the	Second	Five	Year	Plan	demographers	and	population	 experts	were	 increasingly	 arguing	 for	 the	 state	 to	 take	 a	 stronger	 role	 in	 the	implementation	of	 the	 family	planning	program	 in	 support	of	development	goals.	The	 role	of	the	state	in	family	planning,	and	the	role	of	demography	in	supporting	the	state	had	become	a	significant	concern.	





understood.	 Matthew	 Connelly	 argues	 that	 this	 shift	 was	 part	 of	 the	 changing	 tactic	 of	 the	Government,	derived	from	the	methods	of	the	Khanna	study,	to	‘find	people	where	they	live	and	breed’.5		 Emphasizing	 the	 links	 between	 the	 changing	 approach	 and	 the	 rising	 popularity	 of	sterilization,	Connelly	argues	that	 the	1960s	witnessed	not	only	 the	rising	 importance	of	new	methods	 of	 family	 planning,	 but	 also	 the	 consolidation	 of	 the	 population	 control	movement.6	Nilanjana	 Chaterjee	 and	 Nancy	 Riley,	 who	 otherwise	 emphasize	 the	 importance	 of	 the	Government’s	strategy	of	‘convincing	people	small	families	are	desirable’,	do	not	discuss	family	planning	education	in	the	context	of	the	Third	Plan.7	
	 This	 chapter	 argues	 that	 the	 changing	 approaches	 to	 family	planning	 and	population	control	 that	 occurred	 during	 the	 Third	 Plan	 reflected	 a	 broader	 contest	 between	 competing	models	 of	 social	 change	 and	 development.	 Though	 emphasis	 is	 typically	 placed	 on	understanding	 the	 period	 through	 the	 changing	 family	 planning	 technologies	 and	 their	relationship	 to	 policy,	 recent	 work	 by	 Corinna	 Unger	 has	 highlighted	 the	 importance	 of	 the	short-lived	extension	approach.	She	links	the	practice	of	identifying	‘natural	leaders’	employed	in	 the	 extension	 education	 approach	 to	 the	 growing	 importance	 of	 behaviouralist	 ideas	 in	family	 planning	 in	 the	 early	 1960s,	 and	 the	 belief	 that	 it	 was	 possible	 to	 ‘govern	 people’s	behaviour	in	a	democratic	way’.8			







THE	CHANGING	EMPHASIS	OF	POPULATION	DISCUSSIONS	The	 logic	driving	the	 inclusion	of	a	population	policy	 in	 the	First	Five	Year	Plan	had	been	the	need	 to	 regulate	 population	 growth	 according	 to	 the	 main	 aims	 of	 development:	 to	 raise	standards	of	living.	Population	increase	was	acknowledged	to	be	potentially	problematic	in	the	fulfilment	of	this	aim,	and	so	family	planning	was	cautiously	advocated	–	 ‘the	reduction	of	the	birth	 rate	 to	 the	 extent	 necessary	 to	 stabilize	 the	 population	 at	 a	 level	 consistent	 with	 the	requirements	 of	 national	 economy’.9	The	 First	 Plan	 recognized	 that	 a	 large	 part	 of	 success	would	 derive	 from	 creating	 a	 ‘sufficiently	 strong	motivation’,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 provision	 of	contraceptives	 and	 clinics.	 The	 same	 logic	 –	 of	 development	 objectives	 supported	 by	 family	planning	 –	 had	 shaped	 the	 early	 research	 conducted	 during	 the	 1950s,	 which	 was	 largely	devoted	between	1951-1956	to	studying	the	rhythm	method,	and	to	establishing	the	utility	of	demographic	 data	 –	 particularly	 on	 fertility	 growth	 –	 for	 policy	 making.	 By	 the	 end	 of	 the	Second	Plan	period,	however,	the	emphasis	among	population	experts	was	beginning	to	change,	particularly	regarding	the	role	of	the	state	in	implementing	family	planning.	The	idea	that	‘the	first	step’	in	the	family	planning	program	‘was	awareness’	had	characterised	the	research	and	program	efforts	of	 the	1950s.10	By	 the	1960s	 the	program	and	research	were	moving	beyond	awareness	 to	action,	but	action	was	not	unguided.	People	were	aware	of	 family	planning,	 the	research	had	shown,	but	needed	to	be	more	educated	about	their	options,	and	they	had	to	have	access	to	those	options.		 	






noted,	were	largely	unknown,	and	particularly	in	rural	areas	contraception	was	not	generally	a	topic	 of	 discussion	 among	 couples.13		 Educational	 projects,	 it	was	noted,	 could	help	persuade	couples	–	especially	women	–	to	be	more	open	about	their	contraceptive	preferences.	All	of	this	was,	however,	in	vain	if	simple	contraceptives	were	not	easily	available	to	people.	 ‘The	village	folk	 can	 be	won	 to	 contraception’,	 Agarwala	 argued,	 ‘provided	 a	 well	 thought	 out	 education	program	is	launched	to	overcome	their	prejudices’.14		
	 Addressing	 the	 Sixth	 International	 Conference	 on	 Planned	 Parenthood,	 held	 in	 New	Delhi	in	1959,	Jawaharlal	Nehru	presented	a	cautionary	argument	to	the	assembled	Indian	and	international	 delegates.	 The	 ‘tremendous	 crisis’	 of	 India’s	 population	 growth	 was,	 he	 noted,	predominantly	an	American	and	European	fear.	‘They	are	frightened	of	the	vast	masses	of	Asia	becoming	vaster	and	vaster,	 of	 the	populations	of	 India,	China	and	South	East	Asia	 somehow	swarming	 all	 over	 the	 place’.15	In	 Asia,	 he	 argued,	 a	 different	 approach	 was	 needed	 than	arguments	based	in	fear.	Referring	directly	to	India,	Nehru	noted	the	role	of	population	in	the	process	 of	 National	 Planning.	 ‘The	 first	 thing	we	 have	 to	 consider,	 in	 planning	 for	 the	 Third	Plan,	is	what	will	be	the	population	for	which	we	are	planning’.16	This	involved	coming	to	grips	with	 the	 future,	 and	 population	 as	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 that	 future,	 not	 as	 an	 abstract	 or	theoretical	concept,	but	as	‘the	actual	figure	for	which	we	have	to	plan	in	terms	of	food,	clothing,	housing,	 education,	 health,	 work	 etc.’17	Only	 when	 this	 ‘actual	 figure’	 had	 been	 ascertained	would	 the	 scale	 of	 the	 potential	 problem	 be	 realized,	 and	 the	 necessity	 and	 urgency	 of	controlling	population	growth	fully	felt.		





have	 arrived	 at	 the	 stage	 of	 advocating	 family	 planning	 because…in	 our	 thinking	 of	 national	planning	it	has	become	inevitable	in	that	context’.20		
	 Much	of	the	work	to	generate	the	strong	links	between	the	need	for	family	planning	to	ensure	 development	 being	 criticized	 by	 Nehru	 had	 emerged	 out	 of	 the	 research	 work	 done	during	the	1950s,	most	famously	expressed	by	Coale	and	Hoover	the	year	previously.	Many	of	those	 present	 at	 the	 conference	 were	 continuing	 to	 develop	 their	 arguments,	 often	 to	 more	radical	ends.	Julian	Huxley	argued	that	Coale	and	Hoover’s	study	had	shown	the	pressing	need	for	birth	control	to	ensure	India	would	‘break	free’	from	underdevelopment	–	without	this,	and	faced	with	an	unchecked	birth	rate,	 India	would	always	lack	the	necessary	capital	to	properly	finance	 industrialization	 and	 development. 21 	Given	 this,	 Huxley	 argued,	 the	 ‘disparity	 in	expenditure’	on	birth	control	and	death	control	was	counter-productive:	‘The	Second	Five	Year	Plan	 allocated	 $10	 million	 for	 population	 planning	 but	 over	 $50	 million	 for	 medical	 health	programmes,	which	will	inevitably	help	to	unplan	population’.22	Instead,	what	was	needed	was	the	‘balancing	of	death	control	by	birth	control’	as	a	matter	of	‘utmost	urgency’.23		
	 Other	 research	 and	 training	 organizations	 had	 been	 formed	by	 the	 late	 1950s	 in	 the	wake	 of	 the	 increased	 Government	 interest	 in	 demographic	 research	 and	 population	 policy	making.	The	Institute	of	Economic	Growth,	established	with	the	assistance	of	a	substantial	Ford	Foundation	grant	at	the	University	of	Delhi,	was	intended	to	investigate	 ‘problems	of	growth’,	as	well	as	serve	as	a	centre	for	training	and	research	methodology.24	One	of	the	functions	of	the	Institute	was	to	host	seminars	to	provide	a	venue	for	social	scientists	and	researchers	to	come	together,	and	the	early	efforts	of	the	Institute	in	doing	this	were	realised	as	two	seminars	-		the	first	 on	 industrialization,	 and	 the	 second	 on	 population	 growth	 and	 economic	 development.	Taking	 stock	 of	 the	 developments	 throughout	 the	 late	 1940s	 and	 early	 1950s,	 and	 looking	ahead	to	the	1960s,	four	main	themes	were	discussed	at	the	population	seminar:	future	growth,	employment,	population	policy,	and	the	problem	of	demographic	research.		






of	 the	most	prominent	members	of	 the	demographic	and	population	community,	 including	C.	Chandrasekharan,	S.N	Agarwala,	S.P	Jain,	KCKE	Raja,	VKRV	Rao,	Gyan	Chand,	B.L	Raina,	Frank	Notestein,	Malshall	Balfour,	 and	Moye	Freeman.	The	 research	 conducted	over	 the	1950s,	 and	particularly	Coale	and	Hoover’s	study,	had	caused	considerable	concern	over	how	to	accurately	project	 future	 growth	 in	 the	 context	 of	 economic	 planning.	 Looking	 back	 to	 the	 projections	made	in	the	early	1950s	by	R.A	Gopalaswami	in	the	1951	census	and	by	Kingsley	Davis	in	his	demographic	 survey,	 the	 problem	 of	 the	 rate	 of	 growth	 of	 the	 Indian	 population	 was	emphasized.	Both	Gopalaswami	and	Davis	had	predicted,	as	 the	 ‘high’	rate	of	growth,	rates	of	1.2	 or	 1.3%	per	 year.	 The	 Planning	 Commission	 had	worked	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 growth	would	remain	at	1.2%	per	year	for	1951-61,	and	1.3%	for	1961-71.26	Coale	and	Hoover’s	study	had	challenged	these	estimates,	and	their	research	appeared	to	be	supported	by	 the	research	conducted	at	a	number	of	the	research	institutes	throughout	India.27		
	 The	reliability	of	demographic	projections,	and	the	assumptions	inherent	in	them	were	key	points	of	concern	being	discussed,	particularly	for	the	period	after	1966.	The	problem	was	twofold	–	gauging	the	effect	of	the	birth	control	programme	on	birth	rates,	as	well	as	predicting,	as	Coale	and	Hoover	had	tried	to	do,	the	probable	rate	of	decline	in	mortality	rates	after	1966.	This	 was	 particularly	 important	 given	 the	 emphasis	 being	 placed	 on	 the	 ‘quantitative’	population	problem.	The	Seminar	agreed	that	 ‘clearly	India	cannot	afford	the	luxury	of	having	such	 a	 large	 population’,	 and	 emphasized	 the	 ‘necessity	 of	 adopting	 measures	 for	 a	 rapid	control	of	India’s	population’.28		





perfect	contraceptives	will	probably	have	little	effect’.29	In	addition	it	was	argued	that	existing	policies	 needed	 to	 be	 advanced	 on	 a	 more	 serious	 basis.	 The	 First	 and	 Second	 Plans	 had	promoted	 family	planning	as	part	of	 their	health	policies;	but	 the	Seminar	argued	 that	 family	planning	should	be	included	as	part	of	the	Community	Development	projects	being	undertaken	by	 the	 Government,	 as	 this	would	 be	 particularly	 helpful	 for	 taking	 family	 planning	 into	 the	rural	areas.	Recruiting	village	teachers,	midwives,	and	village	post	offices	to	spread	the	message	–	and	to	stock	and	sell	contraceptives	–	were	all	options	being	discussed.30		
	 The	role	of	population	and	family	planning	in	national	planning	was	being	considered	during	 the	 planning	 process	 for	 the	 Third	 Five	 Year	 Plan.	 Demographers	 had	 been	 strongly	advocating	for	the	more	serious	implementation	of	the	population	policies	since	the	mid-1950s.	The	 inaugural	 conference	 of	 the	 DTRC	 in	 1957	 and	 of	 the	 IEG	 Seminar	 in	 1959	 had	 seen	numerous	 calls	 to	 action	 and	 the	 more	 effective	 implementation	 of	 the	 family	 planning	program.	Demographers	were	increasingly	calling	for	family	planning	to	be	tied	to	Community	Development	and	Agricultural	extension	programs,	in	an	effort	to	reach	deeper	into	rural	areas.		 		NATIONAL	PLANNING,	INTERNATIONAL	AGENCIES		International	 agencies	 like	 the	 Rockefeller	 Foundation	 and	 the	 Population	 Council	 had	 been	involved	 in	population	research,	and	population	policy	making	 in	 India	since	 its	 inception.	As	these	 programs	 continued	 to	 develop	 throughout	 the	 1950s	 and	 into	 the	 early	 1960s	 the	Foundation	 scene,	 particularly	 in	 America,	was	 starting	 to	 shift.	 The	 Ford	 Foundation,	which	had	 been	 largely	 eclipsed	 in	 its	 support	 by	 other	 organizations	 –	 Rockefeller,	 Milbank	 and	Scripps	 in	 particular	 –	was	 emerging	 in	 the	 1960s	 as	 one	 of	 the	main	 sources	 of	 funding	 for	population	 control	 and	 demographic	 research. 31 	Ford	 had	 originally	 sought	 to	 support	population	 research	 through	 the	 short-lived	Behavioural	 Sciences	 Program	 at	 the	 Population	Council,	which	was	shut	down	in	1957.	By	1959,	however	the	Ford	Foundation	was	organizing	seminars	 on	 population.	 In	 close	 consultation	 with	 Ansley	 Coale,	 who	 had	 taken	 over	 from	Frank	Notestein	 at	 the	OPR,	 three	meetings	on	vital	 statistics,	 fertility	 limitation	 and	medical	and	biological	research	and	the	population	problem	were	held.32		





was	 the	 utility	 and	 necessity	 of	 data	 for	 governance	 –	 a	 necessary	 process	 that	 could	 be	rendered	 faster	 and	more	 accurate,	 it	was	 argued,	 if	 the	 development	 of	 sample	 registration	systems	 was	 supported	 in	 underdeveloped	 countries.	 In	 particular,	 the	 need	 to	 support	 the	development	of	demographic	and	statistical	training	in	developing	countries	was	made	clear.33	The	 seminar	 on	 fertility	 limitation	 focused	 on	 what	 was	 argued	 to	 be	 the	 most	 ‘promising	approach’	 –	 communication	 and	 education.	 The	 seminar	 looked	 to	 the	 research	 being	conducted	 in	 India,	 Japan	and	 the	Caribbean,	and	argued	 that	more	of	 this	 type	needed	 to	be	supported.34		







	 Marshal	 C.	 Balfour	 recorded	 some	 of	 the	 early	 confusion	 that	 accompanied	 Ford’s	project.	Douglas	Ensminger	had	 reported	 that	 the	project	was	 to	be	 attached	 to	 the	All-India	Medical	Institute,	that	it	had	Health	Minister	Rajkumari	Amrit	Kaur’s	and	Nehru’s	approval,	and	that	 it	 could	 nevertheless	 still	 face	 difficulties	 in	 the	 Ministry.	 Moye	 p,	 one	 of	 Ford’s	 senior	consultants	 in	 India	who	was	keen	 to	work	on	 communication	and	 family	planning,	 reported	that	Raina	intended	to	establish	two	committees	–	one	educational	and	technical	and	the	other	administrative	that	would	have	similar	standing	to	the	Family	Planning	Board.	Under	this	plan,	there	would	 be	 a	 Communications	Bureau	under	 the	 control	 of	 the	Central	Health	Education	Bureau,	with	Ford	financed	staff	and	as	well	as	‘research-cum-action	functions’,	to	be	developed	and	 controlled	 by	 the	 Government.40	Balfour	was	 suspicious	 of	 this	 arrangement,	 noting	 that	the	Ministry	 was	 ‘determined	 to	 control	 the	 operation	 and	 funds’	 and	 ‘hence	 there	 is	 a	 dim	outlook!’41		
	 The	differing	views	on	research	and	the	role	it	should	play	in	forming	population	policy	were	 being	 contested	 by	 the	 early	 1960s,	 and	 an	 often	 heated	 site	 of	 this	 contestation	 was	between	the	aims	of	the	Foundations	and	the	goals	of	the	Government	of	India.	While	many	of	the	NGOs	–	and	particularly	the	Foundations	–	were	encouraging	greater	emphasis	on	research	projects,	 the	Ministry	of	Family	Planning	was	 turning	away	 from	 these	 suggestions.	This	was	highlighted	 in	1959.	Writing	 to	B.L	Raina,	 the	Director	of	Family	Planning,	Notestein	stressed	the	 importance	 of	 conducting	 research,	 and	 in	 particular	 pilot	 projects,	 to	 investigate	 the	variables	 associated	 with	 the	 implementation	 of	 family	 planning	 programs	 and	 the	 use	 of	contraceptives.42	B.L	 Raina,	 however,	 had	 come	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 the	 research	 thus	 far	conducted	 in	 India	 had	 been	 largely	 useless.	 The	 Harvard-Ludhiana	 project	 in	 particular,	 he	noted,	had	been	a	 long	 research	project	 that	had	 ‘not	produced	any	useful	 results’.	Research,	Raina	argued,	 should	be	a	process	of	 trialling	programs	 in	 the	 field,	 and	 then	pressing	ahead	with	their	implementation.43		





	 Raina’s	 programmatic	 emphasis	 and	 keenness	 for	 action	 was	 indicated	 in	 his	endorsement	of	certain	lines	of	research.	The	Population	Council	Units	could	test	and	research	the	health	education	materials	and	then	extend	that	research	into	other	areas.	This	was	not	the	project	 that	 the	 two	 Population	 Council	 researchers	 had	 proposed,	 or	 that	 they	 wanted	 to	conduct	–	they	wanted	to	investigate	the	utilization	of	personnel,	the	existing	personnel	in	the	field,	and	conduct	an	‘analytical	study	of	educational	materials’.	Raina’s	reply	to	their	objections	to	 this	 effect	 was	 simple,	 and	 indicated	 how	 approaches	 to	 family	 planning	 in	 India	 were	beginning	to	change:	‘In	the	past,	we	have	concentrated	on	the	personnel	approach	because	we	have	 realized	 the	 matter	 of	 control	 of	 family	 size	 is	 an	 individual	 problem.	 But	 even	 if	 this	approach	is	good,	it	can’t	be	carried	out	because	of	the	large	population	in	India.	Therefore,	we	want	to	try	a	small	group	approach’.45	An	approach,	he	noted,	that	had	already	been	trailed	at	Singur.		
	 The	relationship	between	economics,	 social	 characteristics	and	 their	 correlation	with	family	size	was	already	being	studied	by	the	demographic	institutes,	Raina	noted.	They	would	likewise	 study	 the	effect	of	migration	on	 fertility	and	population	growth.	With	 this	data,	 they	had	 the	 general	 skeleton:	 ‘we	 started	 out	 by	 talking	 about	 man	 and	 his	 relationship	 to	 the	external	world.	It	is	for	you	to	put	flesh	on	this’.46	All	kinds	of	ideas,	he	said,	needed	to	be	tried	in	the	field.	The	films	of	health	educators,	different	channels	of	communication,	and	so	on.	The	program	needed	to	move	quickly,	and	to	get	results	quickly.	Population	Council	Units,	he	said,	could	 be	 part	 of	 this	 vision	 by	 testing	 media.	 The	 Population	 Council	 researchers	 again	challenged	 Raina	 over	 the	 utility	 of	 research	 programs	 over	 action	 programs.	 ‘You	 are	interested’,	 they	 argued,	 ‘in	 finding	 out	 ways	 to	 carry	 out	 a	 program.	 We	 are	 interested	 in	working	in	such	a	program	but	underlying	the	action	program	should	be	a	research	program’.47	The	result,	however,	was	 that	 the	pressure	of	 time	was	 too	great.	 ‘My	 feeling	 is	 that	we	have	sufficient	data	to	go	ahead’,	Raina	maintained.48		




research’.	The	 ‘action-orientation’	of	 the	Ministry	was	one	 that	had	 the	potential	 to	 ‘close	 the	door’	 on	 the	 research-led	 relationship	 between	 the	 Government	 of	 India	 and	 the	 Population	Council.	 Moye	 Freymann	 had	 also	 been	 worried,	 Mauldin	 noted,	 and	 had	 begun	 to	 consider	moving	his	project	away	from	the	Government	into	another	Institution.49		PUTTING	FLESH	ON	THE	SKELETON		The	 first	 meeting	 of	 the	 Family	 Planning	 Communication	 and	 Motivation	 Action	 Research	Committee	 in	 1960	 addressed	 the	 dual	 role	 of	 research	 and	 action,	 and	 the	 need	 for	 both	 –	though	 emphasis	 on	 action	 was	 again	 highlighted.	 ‘Research-cum-action’	 was	 the	 traditional	term,	 Health	 Minister	 D.P	 Karmakar	 noted	 in	 his	 welcome	 speech,	 but	 the	 tendency	 of	 the	researcher	 to	 hesitate,	 and	 often	 to	 promote	 ever	 more	 research	 was	 problematic.	 Action	research,	on	the	other	hand,	changed	the	emphasis	–	‘Research	is	important	and	imperative,	but	I	would	like	to	urge	that	the	problem	is	now	so	urgent	that	concurrent	vigorous	action	should	not	be	prevented	because	all	 the	 information	we	want	 is	unavailable’.50	There	needed	 to	be	a	better	 understanding	 of	 the	 ‘basic	 factors’	 that	 impacted	 on	 family	 planning	 acceptance,	 and	more	 investigation	 into	 the	 ‘social,	 economic	 and	 physiological	 factors’	 which	 influenced	decisions	 about	 family	 size,	 as	 well	 as	 about	 how	 people	 acquired	 their	 family	 planning	knowledge.	A	 variety	of	 ‘mental	 studies’	 in	 additional	 to	 operational	 research	were	 therefore	needed,	Karmakar	argued.51		
	 The	proposed	Communication	Action	Motivation	Programme	that	had	been	suggested	was,	he	pointed	out,	the	first	of	its	kind.	It	was	the	result,	in	part,	of	the	proposal	from	the	Ford	Foundation	to	 ‘assist	in	developing	research	in	the	communication	aspects	of	the	Government	programme’.	 To	 this	 effect,	 they	 noted,	 Ford	 had	 offered	 a	 grant	 of	 $330,000.52	It	 had	 been	determined	 that	 all	 amounts	 of	money	made	 available	 by	 the	 grant	would	be	 used	 for	 solely	educational	purposes.	The	Ford	representative	would	be	kept	appraised	by	the	Government	of	program	progress.	The	Government	also	agreed	that	a	portion	of	the	grant	would	be	kept	aside	to	fund	fellowships	for	selected	candidates.53		






patterns	 of	 behaviour	 of	 individual	 parents’. 54 	The	 goals	 of	 the	 Communication	 Action	Motivation	 Research	 program	 were	 to	 provide	 a	 clearer	 understanding	 of	 family	 planning	acceptance,	and	to	use	this	 to	develop	more	effective	 family	planning	programs’.55	The	 ‘action	and	research	activities’	were	to	be	undertaken	in	both	urban	and	rural	areas,	from	a	number	of	regional	centres.	The	primary	goals	of	these	centres	would	be	to	conduct	background	studies	of	factors	 influencing	 family	 planning,	 to	 study	 the	 ‘specific	 programs’,	 and	 to	 explore	 specific	educational	 techniques.	 The	 emphasis	 on	 specific	 approaches	 was	 crucial,	 as	 they	 were	intended	 to	 address	 the	 factors	 ‘hindering	 programme	 progress’,	 though	 there	 was	 also	provision	for	longer-term	research	‘for	the	purpose	of	building	effective	programmes’.56		
	 Moye	 Freymann	 had	 been	 present	 at	 the	 Family	 Planning	 Communication	 and	Motivation	Action	Research	Committee	Meeting	as	a	representative	of	the	Ford	Foundation.	A	Ford	Consultant	working	Delhi,	Freymann	had	been	 involved	 in	 research	programs	exploring	the	 spread	 of	 latrine	 use	 throughout	 India.	 Freymann	 understood,	 in	 line	 with	 prevailing	opinion,	 that	 the	 population	 of	 India	 if	 left	 to	 grow	unabated	would	 threaten	developmental,	economic	and	social	progress.	‘Forces	favoring	the	adopting	of	the	norm	of	smaller	family	size’,	such	as	urbanization,	industrialization	and	education,	were	proceeding	too	slowly.	The	national	family	planning	program,	however,	could	help	to	change	that.57	Freymann	argued	that	fertility	was	high	 in	 India	because,	while	 there	had	been	a	general	 (albeit	 slight)	decline	 in	 the	crude	birth	rate,	declining	mortality	had	reduced	widowhood,	and	increased	prosperity	had	likewise	increased	family	size.58	Cultural	factors,	and	especially	the	desire	for	sons,	also	encouraged	high	birth	rates.	In	addition,	social	legislation	had	acted	to	encourage	rather	than	to	discourage	high	fertility.	 Women	 had	 not	 yet	 entered	 the	 labour	 force	 in	 a	 significant	 way,	 and	 while	 some	States	 were	 offering	 incentives	 for	 sterilization,	 none	 were	 offering	 incentives	 for	 smaller	families,	or	to	significantly	raise	the	age	of	marriage.59				




model.	Freymann	saw	the	family	planning	movement	 in	India	a	progression	through	different	stages	 of	 ‘acceptance’.	 During	 the	 immediate	 post-war	 period,	 and	 during	 the	 First	 Plan,	 the	work	 of	 Indian	 intellectuals	 and	 social	 reformers	 had	 convinced	 the	 Government	 of	 India	 to	accept	that	family	planning	was	needed	on	a	national-scale,	and	that	such	a	program	would	be	both	 ‘politically	 and	 technically	 feasible’.	 The	 Second	 Plan,	 he	 argued,	 had	 been	 a	 period	 of	intensified	educational	work	through	mass	media,	combined	with	the	expansions	of	clinics	and	of	research.	The	stage	was	set,	however,	 for	a	shift,	and	research	–	particularly	programmatic	‘action	research’	held	the	answer.	The	role	of	 the	 ‘social	researcher’,	he	argued,	was	to	clarify	the	‘problem	of	program	development	through…’diagnostic’	studies	and	assessment	of	the	total	impact	of	the	program	on	the	target	population’.61		
	 Action	research,	then,	was	one	of	the	most	pressing	and	promising	avenues	for	family	planning	–	and	the	problem	of	‘finding	ways	of	bringing	people	to	change	and	adapt	their	family	behavior’	was	of	great	interest	to	him.62	Action	research	and	the	research	on	the	introduction	of	new	 behaviors	 and	 practices	 was	 not	 unknown	 in	 India.	 Agricultural	 researchers	 had	 been	investigating	these	problems	for	a	number	of	years,	pioneering	the	research-cum-action	project	in	Environmental	Sanitation.63	While	 there	were	 few	overt	similarities,	Freymann	argued	 that	the	principles	at	work,	and	the	ability	to	change	‘deep	rooted	patterns	of	behavior’	were	closely	related	 to	 the	aims	and	goals	of	 the	 family	planning	project.	Action	research	 in	 the	context	of	family	planning	‘would	have	the	goal’,	he	explained,	‘of	evolving	methods	whereby	populations	can	 be	 educated	 to	 accept	 contraceptive	 practices’.64	This	 was	 no	 different	 to	 other	 projects	being	carried	out	 to	convince	people	 to	build	and	use	 latrines,	he	noted.65	Research	design	 in	such	 projects	 was	 long-term	 and	 highly	 controlled,	 to	 establish	 comparability.	 There	 were,	however,	 some	 problems	 associated	 with	 this	 kind	 of	 research	 he	 admitted,	 which	 included	high-cost,	rigidity,	and	the	intensive	effort	required,	which	had	to	be	sorted	out.		




methods	and	channels	of	communication,	within	 families	and	on	a	 larger	scale,	as	well	as	 the	‘feasibility’	of	family	planning	all	had	to	be	considered.	All	of	these	investigative	efforts	had	to	be	accompanied	by	a	reliable	way	to	measure	success;	be	this	knowledge	of	family	planning	or	of	 contraceptive	methods,	 or	 ‘acceptance’	 of	 contraception,	 backed	up	by	 statements	 that	 the	contraceptives	 were	 ‘actually	 being	 used’.	 Other	measures	 could	 include	 the	 duration	 of	 the	pregnancies,	length	of	time	between	births,	and	pregnancy	and	birth	rates.67	Freymann	and	the	Government	 of	 India	 were	 thus	 ideologically	 and	 methodologically	 in-line.	 A	 great	 deal	 of	research	 into	 family	 planning	 communication	 and	 action	 was	 undertaken	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	formation	of	the	program,	and	of	the	emphasis	laid	on	education	in	the	Third	Plan.			
	 In	the	discussions	being	held	by	the	Family	Planning	Action	Research	Committee,	and	among	Government	and	Foundation	officials	emphasis	was	placed	on	the	relationship	between	planning,	 research,	 and	 the	 ability	 to	 change	 people’s	 social	 practices	 –	 particularly	 their	reproductive	 practices.	 The	 report	 of	 the	 Mudaliar	 Committee	 and	 the	 1961	 Census	 Report	helped	 to	 cement	 in	 policy	 the	 shift	 that	 had	 already	 begun	 in	 thinking	 of	 population	professionals	–	adding	that	family	planning	policy	had	to	be	divested	of	its	emphasis	on	health,	and	 reoriented	 towards	 the	 economy.	 The	Health	 Survey	 and	 Planning	 Committee	 (Mudaliar	Committee),	was	established	in	1959	by	the	Ministry	of	Health	to	review	the	developments	that	had	 occurred	 throughout	 India	 since	 the	 Bhore	 Report	 had	 been	 published	 in	 1946.	 The	Committee	was	 also	 to	 help	with	 formulating	 the	 health	 programmes	 for	 the	Third	 Plan	 and	was	 charged	with	 suggesting	 how	 the	 family	 planning	 program	 should	 be	 implemented.	 The	Report	 made	 note	 of	 the	 implications	 of	 population	 growth	 for	 India.	 Working	 from	 the	projections	made	by	Coale	and	Hoover	–	 that	population	growth	would,	without	an	adequate	‘check’,	 increase	 by	 102%	 over	 25	 years	 while	 income	 grew	 only	 by	 13.5%68	-	 the	 Report	highlighted	 the	severity	of	 the	population	problem	 for	 India,	arguing	 that	while	 there	was	no	question	therefore	of	the	necessity	for	family	planning	to	be	implemented	on	a	national	scale,	the	effects	of	the	program	would	still	take	time	to	be	felt.		






the	 people’.69	What	 therefore	 had	 to	 be	 done	 was	 to	 undertake	 the	 unprecedented	 task	 of	creating	 a	mass-movement	 to	 facilitate	 those	 social	 changes	 –	 including	 the	 uptake	 of	 family	planning	practices	–	leading	to	a	significant	demographic	change.	This	was	not	only	important	for	India’s	economic	development	and	‘social	well	being’	but	could	also	serve	as	an	example	to	other	countries	in	the	world	that	were	facing	similar	problems.70		
	 The	 Family	 Planning	 Research	 and	 Programme	 Committee	 had,	 as	 part	 of	 the	 first	recommendations	 in	 1953,	 suggested	 that	 mass	 communication	 needed	 to	 be	 explored,	 ‘to	create	 overall	 attitudes	 favourable	 to	 the	 idea	 of	 family	 planning’.71	The	 Report	 envisaged	 a	particular	 role	 for	 demography	 with	 regards	 to	 family	 planning	 in	 the	 1960s.	 Noting	 that	 a	national	 programme	 had	 been	 created,	 the	 problem	 of	 the	 specificity	 of	 local	 conditions	pertaining	 to	 the	 States	 had	 been	 raised:	 ‘A	 State	 where	 the	 problem	 is	 of	 a	 very	 serious	dimension	tends	to	be	treated	 in	 the	same	way	as	another	where	the	situation	may	not	be	as	serious’.	What	was	needed,	it	was	argued,	was	a	demographic,	sociological	and	anthropological	study	 on	 a	 larger	 scale,	 to	 determine	 the	 ‘methods	 best	 suited	 to	 each	 area’.72	The	 Report	argued	further	that		
the	 application	 of	 a	 uniform	 pattern	 of	 population	 control	measures	 throughout	 the	country	is	in	our	view	not	likely	to	produce	the	optimum	results	on	the	one	hand	and	on	 the	 other	may	 result	 in	 undesirable	 repercussions	 which	may	 not	 be	 discovered	until	 it	 is	too	late.	It	 is	understood	that	a	National	Council	on	Population	has	been	set	up	 under	 the	 Chairmanship	 of	 the	 Home	 Minister.	 We	 feel	 that	 the	 Demographic	Advisory	 Committee	 should	 function	 under	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Health,	 so	 that	 all	population	problems	may	 come	under	 one	Ministry	 and	be	dealt	with	 on	 a	 national-wide	scale.73		







These	suggestions	were:	1)	‘A	graded	scale	of	taxation	from	the	fourth	confinement	onwards’	–	this	would	act	as	a	deterrent	and	would	be	a	progressive	 tax	depending	on	 family	 income.	 ‘It	may	be	objected’,	 it	was	noted,	 that	 those	who	contribute	most	 to	population	growth	are	 the	people	at	low	levels	of	family	income,	that	their	ability	to	pay	the	suggested	tax…is	doubtful	and	that	the	imposition	of	this	penalty…may	result	in	such	an	inroad	into	their	meagre	incomes	as	to	reduce	further	the	existing	low	standards	of	life	of	such	families’.75	The	report	did	not	deny	the	 force	of	 these	arguments,	but	countered	 that	all	 lines	of	 inquiry	needed	 to	be	explored.	A	second	suggestion	was	to	offer	sterilization	to	mothers	of	two	healthy	children,	and	that	‘apart	from	the	operation	being	offered	to	her	free	of	charge,	she	would	be	given	a	prescribed	amount	as	honorarium	for	the	performance	of	what	is	deemed	to	be	a	national	service’.76	Only	women	who	 refused	 to	 accept	 this	 ‘national	 service’	 would	 be	 charged	 the	 tax	 after	 their	 fourth	pregnancy.		






	 The	 guidelines	 for	 the	 Third	 Five	 Year	 Plan	 laid	 out	 the	 general	 arguments	underpinning	 it.	 The	 main	 emphasis	 was	 on	 monetary	 discipline	 and	 closer	 control	 of	consumption,	 as	 well	 as	 stronger	 support	 for	 more	 intensive	 agricultural	 production.	Agricultural	 experimentation,	 increased	 fertilizer	 production,	 and	 the	 agreement	 over	 the	import	 of	 surplus	 wheat	 and	 rice	 from	 the	 United	 States	 solidified	 the	 importance	 of	 food	production	 in	the	Plan.81	The	Plan’s	main	thrust	-	supported	by	the	 lion’s	share	of	 the	budget,	was	in	agricultural,	community,	and	industrial	development.	Population	policy	in	the	Plan	was	oriented	 towards	 helping	 to	 achieve	 these	 goals.	 The	 economic	 arguments	 about	 population	that	had	been	made	during	the	1950s	found	full	expression	in	the	Plan,	which	stated	firmly	that	‘the	objective	of	stabilizing	population	growth	over	a	reasonable	period	of	time	must…be	at	the	very	centre	of	planned	development’.82		





which	 embodies	 a	 basic	 attitude	 toward	 a	 better	 life	 for	 the	 individual,	 the	 family	 and	 the	community’.85		
	 Many	of	the	suggestions	made	in	the	Third	Plan	had	come	been	recommended	by	the	Central	Family	Planning	Board,	which	had	advocated	 in	1960	that	a	strong	priority	should	be	placed	on	family	planning.	Instrumental	to	this	had	been	the	work	of	Lady	Rama	Rao,	head	of	the	 Family	 Planning	 Organization,	who	 had	 been	 appointed	 to	 the	 Committee	 to	 Review	 the	Working	 of	 Family	 Planning	 Schemes	 in	 1959	 by	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Health.	 In	 this	 post,	 she	reviewed	the	progress	of	the	Second	Plan,	and	looked	forward	to	future	policies.	Rama	Rao	sent	a	questionnaire	to	4,801	people	in	the	Government,	Voluntary	Organizations,	Medical	workers,	and	 Academic	 Institutes	 to	 gather	 data	 for	 her	 recommendations.	 The	 results	 from	 the	questionnaires	 indicated	 a	 number	 of	 significant	 trends	 regarding	 attitudes	 towards	 family	planning	and	how	it	should	be	implemented	in	the	future.		
	 The	majority	of	 the	 respondents	 agreed	 that	 the	primary	aim	of	 the	Family	Planning	Programme	 should	 be	 to	 slow	 population	 growth	 in	 order	 to	meet	 the	 ultimate	 objective	 of	higher	 standards	 of	 living	within	 India.86	Rama	Rao	 solicited	 information	 on	many	 aspects	 of	the	 ideal	population	 that	was	envisioned,	 and	 the	 results	 indicated	 that	 the	majority	 saw	 the	ideal	 family	size	as	 five	or	 less	–	husband,	wife,	and	 three	children.	Respondents	advocated	a	range	 of	 contraceptive	 strategies	 to	 achieve	 this	 –	 including	 the	 use	 of	 many	 kinds	 of	contraceptives	 and	 sterilization,	 but	 were	 not	 in	 favour	 of	 either	 the	 rhythm	 method	 or	abortion.	 A	 minority	 of	 the	 respondent’s	 indicated	 that	 they	 were	 in	 favour	 of	 compulsory	sterilization,	 though	 the	 majority	 (79%)	 were	 in	 favour	 of	 voluntary	 sterilization,	 the	 main	basis	of	which	was	considered	to	be	family	size,	such	that	‘willing	persons	having	three	or	more	children	 should	 be	 considered	 eligible	 for	 sterilization’,87	and	 that	 free	 facilities	 should	 be	provided	to	assist	with	this.		





supported	 a	move	 towards	 greater	 administrative	 autonomy	 for	 Family	 Planning	 within	 the	Department	 of	 Health.	 While	 the	 Committee	 also	 rejected	 the	 suggestion	 of	 the	 ‘no	 birth’	subsidy	 suggested	 by	 Rama	 Rao,	 it	 did	 offer	 its	 support	 towards	 increasing	 voluntary	sterilization,	suggesting	that	mobile	units	should	be	developed	to	carry	out	the	programme.88		
	 These	recommendations	were	largely	building	on	the	family	planning	framework	that	had	 been	 established	 during	 the	 1950s.	 The	 Plan	 however	 also	 referenced	 much	 of	 the	demographic	 research	 that	 had	 been	 conducted.	 In	 particular,	 it	 referred	 to	 the	 field	investigations	 that	had	been	 carried	out	 as	part	of	 the	Khanna	Study,	 as	well	 as	 the	 research	conducted	for	the	Mysore	and	Singur	Studies.	The	impact	of	these	studies	is	clearly	reflected	in	the	 arguments	 made	 by	 the	 Plan	 regarding	 the	 specific	 implementation	 of	 particular	 policy	measures.	Most	significantly,	the	Plan	highlighted	–	as	the	Khanna,	Singur	and	Mysore	studies	had	done	–	the	‘considerable	awareness	of	the	need	for	family	limitation	and	desire	for	practical	help	and	guidance’	believed	to	be	latent	 in	the	population	at	 large.89	The	Plan	emphasized	the	need	 to	 further	 develop	 strategies	 to	 meet	 the	 need	 for	 communication	 and	 motivation,	particularly	in	rural	areas.	It	also	proposed	a	break	from	the	clinic	centred	approach	of	the	First	and	 Second	 Plans,	 by	 integrating	 family	 planning	with	 Primary	Health	 Centres,	 and	 allowing	voluntary	agencies,	mobile	units	and	‘industrial	and	other	establishments’	to	also	take	an	active	role	 in	 providing	 family	 planning	 services,	 particularly	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 distribution	 of	‘simple	contraceptives	and	general	advice’.90		





THE	SMALL	FAMILY,	AND	OTHER	SOCIAL	NORMS		By	1962	the	educational	program	outlined	in	the	Third	Plan	and	envisaged	by	the	Department	of	Family	Planning	and	Action	Research	Committee	had	begun	 to	get	off	 the	ground.	193,500	posters,	361,000	folders,	595,000	pamphlets	and	three	films	on	family	planning	in	English	and	regional	 languages	had	been	produced.93	‘Leaders	camps’	were	being	held,	and	 the	scheme	of	Honorary	 Family	 Education	 Leaders	 begun	 to	 be	 enacted.	 This	 scheme	 funded	 the	Honorary	Leaders	 –	 giving	 them	 Rs.	 4000/month	 –	 to	 help	 ‘identify	 natural	 groups	 and	 natural	 group	leaders	and	use	them	as	channels	of	communication’.94	Leaders	had	to	cover	between	four	and	five	districts,	disseminate	family	planning	information,	and	‘mobilize	public	opinion	in	favour	of	family	planning’.95	Communication	action	research	was	taking	place	at	a	number	of	 Institutes,	Raina	noted	in	his	Report,	and	was	providing	a	source	of	‘objective	observation	and	fresh	ideas	about	different	problems	of	programme	implementation’,	as	well	as	‘field	laboratories’	in	which	to	work	out	improved	education	methods.96		







	 That	this	goal	could	be	achieved	had	been	made	clear	by	the	experience	and	research	already	 conducted	 –	 everything,	 Raina	 argued,	 pointed	 to	 people	 having	 awareness	 of	 the	problem	 and	 wanting	 to	 learn	 more.	 Furthermore,	 there	 was	 no	 real	 opposition	 to	 family	planning,	which	suggested	the	principle	problem	was	organizational–	as	the	Third	Plan	had	also	stated	–	as	well	as	being	a	problem	of	scale.	The	program	needed	to	be	strong	enough,	and	big	enough,	 to	 ‘accelerate	 the	normal	processes	where	 the	 strong	 latent	 interest	of	 individuals	 is	converted	into	new	social	norms	and	group	action’.102	Raina	had	set	three	‘operation	goals’.	The	overarching	 goal	 was	 to	 instil	 in	 90%	 of	 the	 married	 adult	 population	 the	 ‘three	 basic	conditions’	 needed	 to	 ‘accelerate	 the	 adoption	 of	 family	 planning’	 –	 group	 acceptance,	knowledge,	and	contraceptive	supplies.103		





education	 and	 the	 distribution	 of	 contraceptives.108	Male	 personnel	 were	 essential	 to	 the	extension	 approach	 –	 they	 could	 read	 the	 leadership	 groups	 in	 the	 population,	 and	 helped	rapidly	strengthen	the	existing	family	planning	structure.109		
	 The	 contraceptive	 supplies	were	 included	 as	 a	 principle	 as	well	 –	 ‘the	 use	 of	 family	planning	methods	 is	 a	 social	 process’,	 Raina	 argued,	 and	 contraceptive	 use	 was	 part	 of	 that	process.110	By	introducing	contraceptives	into	the	 ‘normal	supply	chain’	–	those	used	by	other	goods	 –	 contraceptives	 would	 become	 normalized.	 The	 commercial	 distribution	 of	contraception	 was	 of	 ‘extreme	 importance’	 and	 mass	 manufacture	 of	 contraceptives,	particularly	condoms,	needed	to	be	urgently	stepped	up.111		All	of	these	factors,	goals	and	aims	were	 combined	 into	 a	 revised	 family	 planning	 program,	 known	 as	 the	 ‘extension	 approach’.	Raina	outlined	how	 the	 revised	plan	would	work	 at	 each	 level,	 from	 the	Block	 to	 the	Centre,	stressing	the	need	to	take	family	planning	out	of	the	clinic	and	into	the	community.		THE	EXTENSION	APPROACH		The	family	planning	program	of	the	Third	Plan	was	reviewed	in	1963.	After	its	reorganization,	it	was	re-launched	as	an	extended	program	that	October.	The	extended	program	had	as	its	basis	the	 idea	 that	 there	 were	 three	 conditions	 that	 had	 to	 be	 met	 for	 fertility	 to	 be	 lowered.	Individuals	 had	 to	 agree	 that	 a	 small	 family	 was	 of	 immediate	 benefit	 to	 their	 community;	individuals	should	believe	that	the	small	family	was	personally	valuable,	and	know	how	it	could	be	 achieved	 through	 contraception;	 and	 finally,	 individuals	 should	 have	 access	 to	 those	contraceptive	methods.112	Family	planning	had	been	moved	out	of	the	clinic	and	was	to	be	put	into	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 village,	 and	 the	 individual.	 As	 Freymann	 put	 it,	 ‘it	 is	 now	 officially	emphasized	 that	 adoption	 of	 family	 planning	 nominally	 requires	 no	 clinic	 visit,	 and	 that	 the	clinic	should	be	viewed	only	as	a	resource	for	referral	of	special	problems’.113		





case	 when	 motivation	 was	 considered;	 it	 was	 there	 that	 the	 significance	 of	 the	 individual	became	clear.	Motivation,	he	maintained,	‘cannot	be	thought	of	in	collective	terms’.114	This	line	of	thinking	formed	the	basis	of	the	extension	approach	being	implemented	in	1963.	The	focus	was	 intended	 to	 grow	 family	 planning	 acceptance	 from	 the	 ground	 up,	 and	 a	 high	 level	 of	emphasis	was	placed	on	making	use	of	local	channels	to	educate,	supply	and	support	people	in	planning	 their	 families.	 These	 efforts	were	 being	 bolstered	 by	 reorganization	 at	 the	National	level	–	with	a	Cabinet	Committee,	Central	Family	Planning	Council,	and	Commission	of	Family	Planning	forming	the	apex,	supported	by	three	expert	committees;	the	Demographic	Advisory	Committee;	 the	Communications	 and	Action	Research	Advisory	Committee,	 and	 the	Advisory	Committee	on	Bio-Medical	Aspects	of	Family	Planning.115		





available	 to	 provide	 help	 if	 it	 was	 needed,	 and	 the	 Gandhigram	 Institute	 organized	 reunion	events,	to	give	them	recognition	and	an	outlet	to	meet	and	exchange	ideas.119		






individual	and	national	needs.	From	the	national	program	viewpoint,	the	growth	of	population	had	researched	worrying	 levels	–	population	growth	needed	to	be	quickly	reduced,	hence	the	adoption	of	a	target	for	reducing	birth	rates.	However,	the	extension	approach	also	opened	up	the	 ‘why’	of	 family	planning	 to	 the	 individual,	who	was	encouraged	 through	schemes	 like	 the	Village	Leader	approach	 to	make	 their	own	 links	between	 family	planning	and	 their	personal	circumstances	–	with	the	help	of	knowledge,	education	and	contraceptives.	
	 Between	 1964	 and	 1967	 the	 family	 planning	 program	 underwent	 another	 period	 of	‘intensive	program	organization’.	The	UN	Advisory	Mission	to	India	in	1965	had	noted	that	the	extension	 approach,	 which	 required	 a	 huge	 injection	 of	 staff	 (and	 associated	 education,	training,	transport,	new	facilities,	and	so	on),	would	make	the	plan	slow	to	be	implemented	and	slow	 to	 generate	 results.126	‘Unless	 an	 attack	 on	 fertility	 is	 made	 at	 once	 through	 family	planning’,	 the	 Report	 argued,	 ‘the	 rate	 of	 growth	 will	 not	 be	 reduced’	 and	 the	 Government	would	 find	 it	 impossible	 to	 ‘create	 demographic	 conditions	 more	 favourable	 for	development’.127	By	1965	 there	was	a	growing	sense	of	disenchantment	about	 the	population	program.	Both	 Indian	 and	American	 officials,	 it	was	 reported	 felt	 that	 the	 program	had	 gone	wrong.	There	was	a	lack	of	‘long	term	vision’,	Reuben	Hill	(a	Ford	consultant)	reported,	with	no	concrete	sense	of	what	things	would	look	like	five	or	ten	years	down	the	line.128	Still,	Hill	noted,	it	was	undeniable	 that	by	1965	 ‘population	was	everywhere’	 –	posters	about	 family	planning	were	 in	 medical	 centres,	 editorials	 and	 advertisements	 were	 spreading	 the	 family	 planning	message,	 and	 there	 were	 debates	 in	 the	 State	 and	 Central	 legislatures	 as	 well	 as	 a	 general	willingness	 to	 discuss	 population	 issues,	 both	 inside	 and	 outside	 of	 the	 Government.129	The	seriousness	with	which	the	Government	was	taking	the	program,	Hill	noted,	was	such	that	even	the	 Sino-Indian	 war	 and	 the	 Indo-Pakistani	 war	 had	 not	 delayed	 or	 diminished	 the	 budget	allowance	to	family	planning.		




inspectors	and	family	planning	educators	so	they	would	work	more	effectively	with	the	villager	leaders	 chosen	 in	 the	 scheme.	 They	 had	 also	 begun	 to	 incorporate	 local	 depot	 holders,	 who	could	 act	 as	 contraceptive	 suppliers.130	Significantly,	 Hill	 notes,	 ‘in	 these	 two	 field	 programs,	there	 is	 none	 of	 the	 disenchantment	 found	 in	 the	 central	 planning	 institutes	 or	 among	 the	consultants….the	 mood	 is	 high	 and	 the	 staff	 is	 certain	 of	 eventual	 success’.131	The	 wider	problem,	 argued	 Hill,	 was	 that	 outside	 these	 ‘show	 pieces’,	 ‘professional	 manpower	 is	distributed	too	thinly…trained	personnel	are	too	 few	to	bring	an	 impact	 to	bear	at	 the	village	level’.132	Likewise,	much	 of	 the	 research,	 particularly	 the	KAP	 research	 being	 conducted,	was	‘useless	 repetition	 of	 studies	 on	 family	 size	 attitudes’.	 Others,	 like	 S.N	 Agarwala,	 who	 were	investigating	the	links	between	nuptuality	and	fertility	needed	to	be	further	supported	so	their	research	could	be	use	 ‘programmatically’.	Adding	to	 the	problem	was	the	 lack	of	an	adequate	means	 to	 evaluate	 progress	 and	 success,	 with	 no	 significant	 work	 being	 done	 on	 ‘use-behaviour’,	and	out-of-date	evaluation	technology	that	had	not	appreciably	developed	since	the	mid-1950s.133		






In	1967,	when	he	was	made	Minister	of	Health	and	Family	Planning,	Chandrasekhar	embarked	on	massively	extended	program	of	family	planning,	promoting	mass	communications	and	mass	education	 campaigns	 in	 an	 attempt	 not	 only	 to	 make	 people	 change	 their	 reproductive	behaviours,	but	also	 to	 change	 their	minds	about	 family	 size.	To	provide	a	way	 to	measure	–	and	 encourage	 –	 progress,	 he	 instituted	 the	 time-bound	 and	 target-oriented	 approach	 to	 the	programme	 that,	 alongside	 the	 aggressive	 promotion	 and	 incentivisation	 of	 sterilization	 and	IUCD	acceptance,	is	often	considered	to	foreshadow	the	policies	undertaken	in	the	Emergency.	This	 chapter	 argues	 that	 while	 the	 consolidation	 of	 incentives,	 the	 ‘small	 family	 norm’,	 and	time-bound	 target	 oriented	 policies	 in	 the	 Fourth	 Plan	 is	 significant,	 understanding	 these	changes	 requires	 contextualizing	 family	 planning	 policy	 in	 the	 demographic	 and	 population	thought	of	the	late-1960s	and	early	1970s.		
	 By	1968	India	had	embarked	on	what	was	considered	‘a	frontal	attack	on	fertility…one	of	 the	most	 fantastic	 feats	 of	 social	 engineering	 on	 record,	 virtually	without	 precedent’.1	The	late	1960s	and	early	1970s	were	the	height	of	the	technocratic	approach	to	family	planning	and	demography.2	Infused	 by	 the	 belief	 that	 technology	 –	 particularly	 contraception	 but	 also	communications	technology	like	radio	and	television	–	could	revolutionize	the	family	planning	effort,	 the	 Fourth	 Plan’s	 rhetoric	 relied	 on	 the	 significance	 and	 potential	 impact	 of	 new	approaches	 to	 solve	 the	population	problem	once	 and	 for	 all.	Many	of	 the	policies,	 like	mass	communication,	drew	on	ideas	that	were	emerging	out	of	the	‘sociological	turn’	in	demography	that	 had	 begun	 to	 take	 hold	 during	 the	 early	 1960s.	 Others,	 like	 the	 Nirodh	 Marketing	Campaign,	which	was	officially	started	in	1967-68,	made	use	of	innovative	ideas	combining	the	Government’s	 family	 planning	 programme	 with	 private-sector	 commercial	 supply	 chains,	drawing	 on	 of	 research	 and	 ideas	 originating	 in	 the	 1960s	 concerned	with	marketing,	 social	change,	and	demography.		





foundations	 for	 the	 approaches	 to	population	 that	were	undertaken	between	1975-1977.3	By	contrast,	older	accounts	of	 the	period	have	 tended	 to	 largely	pass	 it	over,	 attributing	 the	 late	1960s	 and	early	1970s	 little	 significance	 as	 anything	other	 than	 an	 extension	of	 policies	 that	had	been	begun	in	the	Third	Plan	period.4		







country’.6	C.P	 Blacker	 also	 sent	 his	 congratulations,	 adding	 that	 he	 hoped	 the	 Parliamentary	platform	 would	 ‘widen	 your	 influence’.7 	‘Democracy’,	 wrote	 another	 well-wisher,	 ‘will	 be	demographic’.8	
	 By	the	time	Chandrasekhar	was	made	Minister	of	Health	and	Family	Planning	the	mood	towards	 economic	 development	 had	 shifted.	 Nearly	 sixteen	 years	 of	 economic	 planning	 had	wrung	a	great	transformation	in	India	–	 ‘hope	has	given	way	to	despair;	enthusiasm	has	been	turned	into	frustration	and	cynicism’.9	The	current	situation	was	one	of	‘unmitigated	gloom	and	unrelieved	distress’.10	The	 “rot”,	 it	was	 argued,	 had	 set	 in	with	 the	 Second	Plan;	 a	 conclusion	that	 the	 UN,	 the	World	 Bank,	 and	 Ford	 Foundation	 appeared	 to	 broadly	 agree	 with.	 Noting	consistent	 ‘failures	 of	 implementation’,	 the	 UN	 Technical	 Advisory	 Mission	 had	 advised	 the	Government	of	 India	 in	1965	 to	reorganize	 the	 family	planning	program	and	 to	prioritize	 the	distribution	of	the	IUD.	The	Government’s	compliance	with	these	requests	–	rolling	out	the	IUD	and	 re-organizing	 the	 administrative	 structure	 of	 the	 program	 in	 1966	 -	 had	 sent	 a	 clear	message	that	the	program	was	backed	by	strong	political	will	and	would	not	be	hampered	by	further	 implementation	 failures.11	American	 technical	 assistance,	 particularly	 from	 the	 Ford	Foundation,	had	become	entrenched	in	the	 ‘routine	administration’	of	the	program,	facilitated	by	 the	creation	of	 semi-Governmental	agencies	 like	 the	Central	Family	Planning	 Institute	and	the	 National	 Institute	 of	 Health	 Administration	 Education,	 and	 through	 their	 involvement	 in	programs	of	mass	communication	which	they	had	been	instrumental	in	starting.		






	 Chandrasekar’s	appointment	to	Minister	of	Health	and	Family	Planning	in	1967	was	an	extension	of	the	desire	to	press	ahead	with	family	planning	and	an	indication	of	the	seriousness	with	 which	 it	 was	 being	 treated.	 Indira	 Gandhi	 was	 herself	 a	 long-time	 supporter	 of	 family	planning,	 and	 as	Minister	 of	 Information	 she	 had	 ‘pressed	 a	 plan	 to	 distributed	 hundreds	 of	thousands	 of	 radios	 across	 India	 to	 disseminate	 family	 planning	 information’.	 Along	 with	Dhanvanthi	 Rama	 Rau,	 she	 had	 been	 a	 significant	 source	 of	 pressure	 on	 Sushila	 Nayar	 to	implement	 incentive	 payments	 for	 IUD	 acceptance.13	Chandrasekhar’s	 appointment	 was	 a	continuation	 of	 these	 ideals.	 Widely	 known	 by	 1967	 for	 being	 an	 enthusiastic	 –	 sometimes	overenthusiastic	 –	 supporter	 of	 population	 control,	 he	 had	 the	 ‘real	 enthusiasm’	 for	 family	planning	that	many	believed	Nayar	had	lacked.14		During	his	tenure	as	Minister	Chandrasekhar	implemented	a	“crash	program”,	begun	in	1967,	to	try	and	dramatically	low	the	birth	rate	from	41	per	1000	to	25	or	20	per	1000	“as	soon	as	possible”.15	He	launched	the	“cafeteria	approach”,	expanding	 the	 existing	 IUD	 and	 sterilization	 programs,	 and	 making	 available	 all	 “scientific”	contraceptive	methods,	including	oral	contraceptive	pills.		





‘MASTERS	OF	FATE’:	SOCIAL	SCIENCE	AND	DEMOGRAPHY		The	 Behavioural	 Sciences	 and	 Family	 Planning	 Conference	 was	 held	 the	 same	 year	Chandrasekhar	 was	made	Minister.	 The	 Conference	 proceedings,	 which	 include	 debates	 and	papers	 by	 leading	 social	 scientists	 in	 the	 population	 field,	 provide	 an	 overview	 of	 how	population	 thought	had	expanded	since	 the	1950s	and	early	1960s.	Many	of	 those	assembled	were	interested	in	population	for	a	variety	of	reasons,	but	all	shared	Ronald	Freedman’s	view	that	‘the	field	is	too	important	to	be	left	to	the	demographers’.18	Thrown	open	to	a	wide	variety	of	 disciplines,	 family	 planning	 and	 population	 was	 being	 investigated	 and	 explored	 from	 a	number	 of	 angles.	 Many	 had	 already	 begun	 to	 be	 incorporated	 into	 India’s	 family	 planning	program	-	communications	had	been	included	in	family	planning	plans	since	1963	-	but	other	approaches	 were	 promising	 new	 solutions	 to	 the	 population	 problem.	 While	 many	 of	 the	“typical”	problems,	such	as	data	validity	and	 the	problem	of	 interpreting	 interview	responses	were	 raised	 by	 “old	 hands”	 such	 as	 Philip	 Hauser,	 new	 approaches	 to	 understanding	motivation,	social	change,	decision	making,	and	choice	in	the	family	and	society	that	were	being	explored	by	psychologists,	sociologists	and	in	family	studies,	presented	an	optimistic	vision	of	the	potential	success	of	a	voluntary	program.19	Many	saw	family	planning	as	a	‘strategic	wedge’	that	could	be	used	to	‘gain	greater	autonomy’,	allowing	people	to	‘become	masters	of	their	own	fate’.20		





with	 technological	 advancements	 that	 had	 given	 man	 greater	 control	 over	 his	 environment,	including	 over	 forces	 previously	 relegated	 to	 “fate”	 by	 traditional	 demographers.	 Now	 that	individuals	could	exert	more	control	over	demographic	variables,	using	medicine	to	overcome	disease,	controlling	fertility	through	contraception,	and	having	greater	choice	over	marriage,	it	had	become	possible	 to	measure	the	 factors	 that	 influenced	these	choices	–	 to	 ‘determine	the	amount	 of	motivation,	 of	 information,	 and	 of	 absence	 of	 inner	 compulsion’	 that	 shaped	 how	people	 made	 decisions	 that	 had	 ‘demographic	 consequences’.24	Individual	 decisions,	 in	 the	context	 of	 the	 larger	 social	 framework,	 could	 now	 be	 seen	 to	 “matter”,	 demographically	speaking.		
	 This	line	of	thinking	had	been	applied	to	family	planning	programs,	where	its	potential	was	considered	to	be	immense.	The	ethical	problems	usually	faced	by	researchers	studying	and	attempting	 to	 manipulate	 social	 change	 were,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 family	 planning,	 “minimal”	because	‘in	many	relevant	places	there	is	consensus	in	the	population,	in	the	political	authority	and	 among	 the	 scientific	 workers.	 Significant	 parts	 of	 the	 population	 say	 they	 want	 to	 limit	family	growth,	the	political	leaders	say	they	should,	and	the	investigators	share	these	values’.25	The	problem	was	less	one	of	if	it	should	be	attempted,	than	of	how	to	go	about	it.		







	 Many,	 including	 Chandrasekhar,	 saw	 technology	 as	 a	 crucial	 part	 of	 these	developments.	Not	 only	 did	 social	 scientists	 need	 to	 be	more	 engaged	 in	 the	development	 of	particular	 technologies,	 some	 argued,	 they	 also	 needed	 to	 pay	 more	 attention	 to	 how	innovation	spread	throughout	society.30	The	final	consideration	was	administrative	–	the	need	to	 solve	 the	 problems	 created	 by	 excessive	 bureaucratization,	 over-specialization	 and	 the	ethnocentrism	 of	 (frequently	 American)	 technical	 advisors	 in	 developing	 countries.31	That	social	values	could	be	understood	and	manipulated	was	a	line	of	thinking	that	had	emerged	in	the	 post-war	 period	 with	 the	 rise	 of	 social	 psychology	 and	 behaviouralism.32	The	 belief	 that	people’s	behaviour	could	be	controlled	‘in	a	democratic	way’	formed	the	basis	for	research	on	group	behaviour	conducted	in	the	post-war	period.	The	importance	of	community	development	and	‘democratic	patterns	of	communication’	underpinned	arguments	about	how	to	‘provide	the	basis	for	a	politically	stable	path	to	development’	–	a	path	that	the	Ford	Foundation	had	begun	to	tread	in	the	1950s	in	its	early	communications	projects	in	India	to	help,	among	other	things,	‘promote	participatory	forms	of	individual	and	group	behaviour’.33		





everyone	would	have.	A	key	part	of	the	“people’s	programme”	was	the	mass	motivation	scheme.	One	 of	 the	 central	 questions	 of	 the	 scheme	 was	 how	 to	 motivate	 people	 –	 individuals	 and	couples	–	to	adopt	the	small	family:	mother,	father	and	two	or	three	children.	The	key	getting	people	 to	have	small	 families	was	believed	 to	be	motivation,	a	phenomenon	 little	understood	and	 which	 was	 made	 more	 complicated,	 it	 was	 argued,	 by	 the	 intensely	 personal	 nature	 of	family	planning.			




sociological	methods	and	model	 in	demography	and	 family	planning	 that	 appeared	 to	offer	 a	solution	 –	 by	 arguing	 that	 people’s	 ideas	 about	 small	 family	 size	 were	 not	 economically	determined,	but	malleable	and	capable	of	being	changed.		Changing	the	realization	of	the	small	family	norm	into	action,	and	 facilitating	control	over	 ‘fate’	was	what	Chandrasekhar	hoped	to	achieve.	To	‘motivate	people’,	he	explained,	he	wanted	to	make	them	aware	that	their	personal	desires	for	a	large	family	was	incompatible	with	the	goal	of	higher	standards	of	living,	and	that	control	over	fertility	was	possible	through	contraception.	The	key,	he	stressed,	was	to	approach	“total	man”	in	his	“total	environment”,	addressing	concerns	through	health,	medical,	and	social	welfare	services,	and	by	convincing	people	that	not	only	was	change	in	their	personal	interest,	it	was	also	‘accepted	and	approved	by	their	peers	and	is	generally	socially	acceptable’.43	To	do	this,	it	would	necessary	to	take	this	message	to	the	90	million	eligible	couples	–	couples	in	their	“reproductive	years”	–	and	motivate	them	to	change	their	ideas	about	family	size.		
	 The	guidelines	Chandrasekhar	laid	out	for	motivating	people	to	adopt	the	small	family	norm	were:	 	 to	highlight	 ‘dissatisfaction	with	poverty	and	 low	 levels	of	consumption’	and	the	incompatibility	 of	 the	 large	 family	with	 a	 desire	 for	 a	 high	 standard	 of	 living	 ‘in	 the	 present	economic	 context’.44	Creating	 a	 ‘felt	 need’	 for	 family	 planning,	 providing	 family	 planning	services	 to	 people’s	 doorsteps,	 and	 approaching	 people	 through	media	 they	 respected,	 were	familiar	 with,	 and	 that	 they	 trusted	 were	 key.	 ‘A	 change	 in	 attitudes	 can	 be	 brought	 about	effectively	only	if	the	people	are	convinced	such	a	change	is	in	their	personal	interest,	accepted	and	approved	by	 their	peers	and	 is	generally	socially	acceptable’,	he	noted.45	but	creating	 the	program	to	make	the	change	happen	was	a	massive	undertaking.		





brought	to	bear,	he	argued,	then	it	was	to	be	hoped	that	‘apart	from	the	availability	of	various	methods	of	 family	planning,	 it	will	be	 the	social	climate	which	will	be	a	determining	 factor	 in	helping	people	to	have	small	families’.48		
	 The	 efforts	 of	 the	 Government	 and	 voluntary	 organizations	 in	 creating	 the	 “climate”	were	to	be	directed	primarily	 towards	halving	the	birth	rate.	To	achieve	this,	 the	Fourth	Plan	melded	 aspects	 from	 the	 Third	 Plan	with	 Chandrasekhar’s	 earlier	 experience	 on	 the	Madras	State	 Family	 Planning	 Board	 –	 the	 plan	 set	 targets	 and	 operational	 goals	which,	 for	 the	 first	time,	were	 to	be	 time-bound.	The	 target	was	a	birth-rate	of	24	per	1000,	and	the	operational	goal	was	to	give	90%	of	the	married	population	of	India	–	90	million	couples	–	the	“facilities	to	adopt	 family	 planning”	 by	 ‘promoting	 group	 acceptance	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 small	 family	norm’,	 through	 ‘importing	personal	knowledge	about	family	planning	methods	to	 individuals’,	and	by	‘making	supplies	readily	available’.49		




achieve	it	to	a	population	primarily	located	in	rural	areas	and	who	were	largely	illiterate.	This	meant	 re-examining	 traditional	 media	 as	 well	 as	 finding	 new	 ways	 to	 communication	 with	people.50	The	 program	 combined	 ‘standard’	 media	 –	 the	 press,	 radio,	 cinema	 and	 printed	materials	–	with	‘traditional’	media	–	folk	dance,	songs	and	plays.51			
	 The	two	principle	architects	of	the	program,	Frank	Wilder	and	D.K	Tyagi,	argued	that	the	truly	revolutionary	aspect	lay	in	the	message	and	in	the	symbol.	In	crafting	the	message	for	the	campaign	 the	program	designers	 ignored	specialist	professional	advice	 to	have	a	 “phased	campaign”	with	a	changing	message.	They	decided	instead	to	have	a	single,	simple	message	that	would	 be	 a	 ‘direct	 exhortation	 to	 have	 a	 specific	 number	 of	 children’,	 and	 to	 present	 this	message	in	a	uniform	way	across	all	forms	of	media.	The	idea	was	that	the	message	should	be	understandable,	and	 that	 the	campaign	should	stay	 its	course	until	 ‘everyone	knows,	 through	this	message,	that	family	planning	is	legitimate	and	what	it	means’.52	This	was	significant,	they	argued,	 because	 while	 “the	 small	 family	 is	 a	 happy	 family”	 concept	 made	 sense	 to	 family	planners	 and	 administrators,	 it	 did	 not	 align	 with	 the	 aims	 or	 experience	 of	 many	 people,	particularly	in	rural	areas.	Clarity	and	a	call	to	action	were	more	important	than	abstract	links	between	family	size	and	familial	happiness,	thus	the	message	was	‘two	or	three	children…stop’,	accompanied	by	the	depiction	of	the	happy	family,	the	“four	faces”,	a	song	by	famous	singer,	and	the	symbol	of	the	red	equilateral	triangle,	with	its	tip	faced	downwards.53		













‘image	 of	 authority	 and	 permanence’.63	The	 media	 campaign	 was	 bolstered	 by	 the	 work	 of	75,000	extension	educators	who	were	tasking	with	‘directly	motivating’	people.		
	 One	of	the	technologies	heralded	as	having	the	greatest	potential	for	mass	motivation	was	the	radio.	Plans	had	been	made	 for	20,000	transistor	radios	to	be	given	to	 field	workers.	The	All	India	Radio	was	transmitting	family	planning	on	22	of	its	36	stations,	discussing	family	planning	 and	women’s	 programs,	 as	 well	 as	 featuring	 ‘frank	 and	 incisive	 discussions	 among	leaders	 with	 varying	 shades	 of	 opinion’.64	The	 point,	 Wilder	 made	 clear,	 was	 that	 family	planners	and	program	administrators	thought	in	terms	of	the	goals	and	targets	they	needed	to	meet,	and	kinds	of	program	organization	and	administration	that	were	needed	to	be	effective.	This,	 however,	 obscured	 the	 fact	 that	 for	 the	 targets	 of	 the	 program	 –	 the	 ‘customers’	 and	‘eligible	mothers	and	 fathers’	–	all	 that	matters	was	 the	 information	being	given	to	 them,	and	the	 motivation	 it	 instilled	 in	 them	 to	 practice	 family	 planning.	 ‘No	 parent	 adopts	 a	 method	without	at	 least	knowing	what	he	or	 she	 is	doing	 (if	not	also	why	he	 is	 going	 it	 and	how	 the	method	works),	Wilder	argued.	 It	was	clear	that,	 for	Wilder	and	the	Ford	Foundation	at	 least,	mass	 communications	 offered	 the	 last	 great	 hope	 for	 a	 voluntary	 solution	 to	 the	 problem	 -	‘There	must	be	a	flow	of	convincing	positive	information	to	the	eligible	public,	if	there	is	to	be	willing	adoption	of	contraception	by	them.	The	only	alternative	to	such	a	flow	of	information	is	the	 enforced	 imposition	 of	 some	 imposable	 contraceptive	 method	 on	 unwilling	 millions	 of	couples	arbitrarily	termed	‘eligible’.65		THE	NIRODH	MARKETING	PROGRAM		One	 aspect	 of	 the	 mass	 communications	 campaign	 that	 combined	 communications	 with	contraceptive	distribution	was	the	Nirodh	Marketing	Program.		The	program	was	based	on	the	idea	that	the	problems	identified	in	the	Fourth	Plan	could	be	overcome	by	using	a	conventional,	non-controversial	and	cheap	contraceptive	method	–	the	condom	–	and	distributing	it	through	existing	 commercial	 networks,	 backed	 by	 an	 aggressive	 advertising	 campaign.	 Rather	 than	trying	 to	 implement	 the	 distribution	 and	 acceptance	 of	 newer	 methods	 like	 the	 IUD,	 which	relied	 on	 training	 new	 medical	 personnel	 and	 further	 expansion	 of	 the	 medical	 and	administrative	machinery	of	family	planning,	conventional	contraceptives	could	be	easily	added	to	pre-existing	and	effective	distribution	chains.		





suggestions	 for	 improvement,	which	would	be	 incorporated	 into	 the	Fourth	Plan.66	As	part	of	the	evaluation	process	a	subcommittee	on	contraceptives	had	been	formed	which	included	K.T	Chandy,	Director	of	the	Indian	Institute	of	Management	in	Calcutta.	Chandy	was	asked	to	draw	together	‘members	of	private	industry’	to	find	ways	to	‘extend	the	distribution	of	contraceptive	services,	 especially	 the	 condom’	 through	 commercial	 channels.	The	 study	group	 investigating	this	 proposal	 included	 a	 sociologist-demographer,	 an	 advertising	 executive	 and	 a	 social	psychologist67,	 and	 worked	 closely	 with	 the	 Ford	 Foundation	 consultants,	 particularly	 Peter	King.68	Their	purpose	was	to	find	ways	to	use	the	marketing	resources	of	the	private	sector	to	help	advance	family	planning	in	India.	They	set	a	target	group	–	70.6	million	married	couples,	whose	 “wife	 age”	 ranged	 between	 15	 and	 44,	 and	who	were	 fecund.	 The	 group	 proposed	 to	devise	an	effort	that	would	reach	the	entire	target	group,	‘indeed,	the	entire	population’.69		
	 Urban,	 middle-class	 and	 employed	 couples	 with	 three	 or	 more	 children	 were	 the	Program’s	main	targets.	Urban	areas,	which	were	“retail	dense”,	provided	a	good	base	for	the	distribution	 network.	 The	 aim	 was	 that	 condoms	 would	 become	 as	 readily	 available	 as	 any	other	 product.	 Cities	 with	 populations	 over	 50,000	 were	 the	 primary	 targets,	 followed	 by	smaller	 cities,	 villages	with	 “urban	 characteristics”	 and	 finally	 rural	 villages.	 The	 342	million	people	who	 lived	 in	 insufficiently	 urban	 areas	would	 still	 be	 exposed	 to	 the	 Program,	 it	was	argued,	 when	 they	 visited	 larger	 towns	 or	 cities.70	When	 the	 project	 began	 in	 1963,	 total	condom	consumption	was	30	million	units	per	year,	accounting	 for	only	0.7%	of	 the	 targeted	70.6	million	target	couples.	While	the	condom	use	rates	had	shot	up	between	1956	and	1963	–	increasing	over	100	 times	 the	original	amount	–	 the	aim	was	 to	 further	develop	condom	use.	‘Contrary	 to	public	 opinion’,	 the	 report	 argued,	 ‘husbands	 are	 almost	 as	 eager	 to	 limit	 family	size	as	wives’.71		





gross	profit	margins.72	It	was	crucial	that	the	program	be	providing	a	high	quality	product,	well	packaged,	with	‘maximum	user	acceptance’.	Condoms	would	be	sold	at	prices	85%	lower	than	standard	 retail	 price,	 and	 the	 ‘most	 expert	 professional	 personnel	 in	 the	 nation’	 would	 be	enlisted	to	‘design,	coordinate	and	execute’	the	program.73		
	 The	public-private	enterprise	was	only	one	aspect	of	the	proposal.	Success	also	relied	on	 the	 promotion	 of	 a	 massive	 advertising	 campaign	 to	 promote	 family	 planning.	 A	 well-designed	program,	it	was	argued,	had	the	potential	to	produce	a	‘highly	beneficial	result’.	They	recommended	 focusing	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 efforts	 on	 promoting	 family	 planning	 in	 general,	with	 only	 10%	 of	 the	 total	 budget	 going	 towards	 directly	 advertising	 condom	 use.	 ‘In	 other	words’,	they	argued,	‘we	view	the	main	task	of	advertising	the	program	as	the	stimulation	of	the	practice	of	 family	planning.	Technically	 this	 is	known	as	primary	demand	creation’.74	The	aim	was	to	create	social	attitudes	that	were	favourable	to	contraceptives	making	them	as	easily	and	naturally	accepted	as	other	commodities.	The	product	–	the	condoms	–	should	be	sold	openly,	in	 the	 same	 commercial	 channels	 as	 other	 products,	 literature	 should	 be	 widely	 available	alongside	advertising,	and	retailers	convinced	to	actively	promote	sales.	Such	a	program,	it	was	concluded,	had	 ‘high	social	value’	as	well	as	 the	possibility	 for	a	 ‘spectacularly	high’	potential	pay-off.	The	social	value	was	measured	as	the	‘economic	value	to	the	nation	of	preventing	one	birth’,	 which	 was	 weighted	 against	 the	 cost	 to	 the	 Government	 of	 preventing	 the	 birth.	 A	conservative,	but	still	reasonable	estimate,	the	report	concluded,	was	that	the	program	would	return	 results	 at	 a	 rate	 of	 at	 least	 75	 times	 the	 amount	 of	 subsidy	 –	 ‘the	 potential	 return	 on	investment…is	unquestionably	enormous’.75			




INCENTIVES,	DISINCENTIVES,	CONTRACEPTIVES	By	the	late	1960s,	Chandrasekhar	argued,	the	political	tide	could	be	seen	to	have	turned.	No	one	would	have	believed	that	twenty	years	previously	India	would	have	embarked	on	a	program	to	control	its	fertility,	or	that	people	would	have	been	so	swift	in	changing	from	condemnation	to	approval	 of	 ‘welcome	 innovations’	 in	 birth	 control	 to	 provide	 better	 health	 and	 more	prosperity.	 India	 had	 ‘more	 mental	 freedom’	 than	 even	 many	 developed	 countries,	 and	 the	work	 started	 in	 1951	was	 gathering	momentum.	 The	 program	 had	 escaped	 the	 Government	clinics	and	was	being	promoted	by	a	wide	range	of	participants,	including	indigenous	doctors,	voluntary	organizations,	 and	 leaders	of	business	 and	 industry	An	 ‘army’	of	 civil	 servants	 and	family	planning	workers	were	carrying	the	program	to	the	villages	 in	a	show	of	 ‘real	national	support’.78	There	was	a	perceptible	decline	in	birth	rate,	he	maintained.	4.2	million	people	had	been	 sterilized,	 preventing	 10-12	 million	 births	 through	 sterilization	 alone.	 The	 Loop	 had	prevented	a	further	15	million.	There	was	a	strong	determination	to	reach	the	target	birth	rate	of	25	per	thousand	by	1975-76.79		





part	 of	 a	 larger	 trope	 not	 only	 in	 demographic	 arguments	 but	 also	 in	 popular	 culture	 and	science	fiction	by	the	late	1960s.83	
	 ‘The	technology	of	health	and	hygiene’	Chandrasekhar	argued,	spread	far	more	quickly	throughout	 India	 than	 ‘the	 technology	 of	 production	 and	 economic	 growth’. 84 	The	 goal	therefore	was	to	reduce	growth,	and	while	changing	attitudes	was	a	 ‘major	problem’,	and	one	being	tackled	through	the	mass	communications	program,	the	other	problem	was	in	finding	a	‘suitable’	 contraceptive.	The	surveys	and	experiments	conducted	 in	 the	1950s	and	1960s	had	made	 clear	 how	 many	 conventional	 contraceptives,	 such	 as	 foam	 tablets,	 jellies,	 and	diaphragms,	were	unpractical	for	many	people.	Not	only	were	they	expensive,	and	hard	to	get	hold	of		-	particularly	for	methods	like	the	diaphragm,	which	required	a	fitting	by	a	doctor	-	they	could	 be	 generally	 unpleasant	 to	 use,	 particularly	 in	 villages	 where	 there	 could	 be	 limited	access	 to	 running	 water,	 electricity,	 and	 privacy.85	Among	 all	 of	 these	 problems,	 however,	Chandrasekhar	 argued	 the	most	 significant	 barrier	 to	 use	was	motivation.	This	was	 the	 logic	behind	the	cafeteria	approach,	he	explained,	which	would	help	overcome	motivation	problems	by	offering	people	a	 range	of	 “scientifically	approved”	methods,	 from	which	 they	could	chose	the	 one	 that	 suited	 them	 best.	 There	 were	 four	 methods	 available:	 sterilization,	 the	 IUCD,	condoms,	 and	oral	 contraceptive	pills,	 though	 for	most	 people	 the	Pill	was	not	 an	option.	All	services	for	sterilization	were	provided	for	free,	and	patients	were	also	given	a	small	incentive.	IUCD’s	 were	 provided,	 though	 their	 lack	 of	 popularity	 by	 1968	 was	 widely	 acknowledged.	Condoms	 were	 being	 aggressively	 promoted	 through	 projects	 like	 the	 Nirodh	 Marketing	Program,	and	the	Pill	–	which	had	only	recently	approved	for	use	in	India	–	was	being	trialled	with	American	support.86	 	












Over	 1	 million	 IUD	 insertions	 and	 2.3	 million	 sterilizations	 had	 been	 performed.88	However,	while	 production	 of	 IUCDs	 could	 keep	 up	 with	 demand,	 there	 was	 a	 shortage	 of	 doctors,	especially	 female	 doctors,	 which	 was	 a	 ‘major	 set-back’	 to	 the	 sterilization	 program.	Compounded	 by	 a	 shortage	 of	 hospitals	 beds	 available	 for	 those	 who	 had	 undergone	sterilization	of	 IUCD	 insertion,	 the	Government	had	attempted	 to	 increase	bed	availability	by	5000,	and	was	offering	inducements	to	doctors	to	increase	training,	recruitment,	and	postings	to	 rural	 areas.	 There	 was	 also	 a	 problem	 of	 availability	 of	 surgical	 supplies.	 The	 Surgical	Instruments	Plant	 in	Madras	manufactured	 instruments	 for	 IUCD	and	vasectomy	procedures,	with	 the	 approval	 of	 the	 Government.	 1650	 kits	 for	 ICUD	 and	 vasectomy	 had	 been	 supplied	mid-1969,	which	left	several	states	under-supplied.89		




IUD	manufacturing	plant,	also	granted	aid	for	fellowships.	Sweden	had	been	offering	aid	since	1968,	primarily	in	form	of	equipment	–	150,000	condoms,	20	printing	units,	250	tons	of	paper,	500	tons	of	newsprint,	an	‘electric	testing	machine’	and	a	packing	machine,	as	well	as	100,000	Swedish	 Crowns	 as	 a	 contingency	 fund.91 	Denmark	 and	 Japan	 had	 both	 offered	 aid	 for	contraceptives;	Japan	extended	a	line	of	credit	for	their	purchase,	while	Denmark	sent	10,000	of	the	“Antigon”	IUD	for	testing	and	possible	use.92		
	 By	far	the	largest	donor,	however,	was	USAID.	USAID	was	created	in	1961	during	the	Kennedy	 Administration	 during	 a	 period	 when	 the	 US	 was	 increasingly	 coming	 to	 see	population	growth	around	the	world	as	a	legitimate	cause	for	intervention.93	The	first	head	of	USAID,	David	Bell,	was	an	economist	who	believed	that	high	rates	of	population	growth	had	a	negative	 effect	 on	 economic	 development.	 However,	 while	 the	 general	 atmosphere	 was	becoming	more	supportive	of	intervention,	USAID	was	not	officially	allowed	to	donate	funds	for	population	 control	 and	 family	 planning	 until	 1965.	 The	 change	 had	 been	 fought	 for	 on	 two	fronts:	 the	 evidence	 of	 KAP	 studies	 from	 the	 developing	 countries	 that	 appeared	 to	demonstrate	 that	 women	 wanted	 to	 control	 and	 lower	 their	 fertility;	 and	 that	 high	 rates	 of	growth	slowed	economic	development	which	was	a	 ‘barrier	 to	modernization	and	a	 threat	 to	international	 social	 order’.94	Under	 Lyndon	 Johnson,	 who	 had	 ‘added	 the	 birth-rate	 of	 the	world’s	poor	to	his	agenda	of	social	conditions	that	had	to	be	changed’,	 the	tide	had	begun	to	turn.95	Johnson	had	announced	in	his	1965	State	of	the	Union	address	that	the	US	could	seek	to	address	 and	 “deal	 with”	 the	 “explosion	 in	 world	 population”.	 USAID	 funding	 for	 technical	assistance	in	family	planning	was	made	available	for	Governments,	if	they	requested	it.96		





	 While	Draper	was	arguing	for	a	temperate	US	involvement	in	family	planning,	Reimart	Ravenholt	–	the	head	of	USAID	since	1966	–	took	the	opposite	approach.	A	firm	advocate	that	‘contraceptive	availability	was	all	important’,	Ravenholt	believed	that	supplying	contraceptives	to	 meet	 demand	 in	 developing	 countries	 was	 the	 ‘most	 effective	 way	 to	 reduce	 fertility’.98	Ravenholt’s	 strong	 advocacy	 for	 ‘supply-side’	 fertility	 control	 aligned	 with	 Chandrasekhar’s	aims	and	needs	during	the	Fourth	Plan.	Chandrasekhar	had	long	been	in	favour	of	American	aid	to	 India,	 noting	 in	 1965	 that	 ‘American	 aid	 has	 given	 a	much-needed	 shot	 in	 the	 arm	 to	 the	Indian	 economy,	 boosted	 its	 morale,	 promoting	 its	 stability	 and	 enhanced	 its	 productive	capacity…without	 interfering	 with	 Indian	 thinking	 and	 planning’. 99 	In	 January	 1968	Chandrasekhar	had	travelled	to	America	on	the	orders	of	Indira	Gandhi	to	meet	with	Johnson	about	funding	for	family	planning	in	India.	Their	meeting	lasted	‘for	most	of	the	afternoon’,	and	Chandrasekhar	was	 flown	 to	 Johnson’s	private	ranch	so	 they	could	continue	discussions	over	the	 weekend.100	The	 outcome	 was	 favourable	 –	 Johnson	 pledged	 $435	 million	 in	 “loans	 and	credits”	 to	 India.	 USAID	 had	 authorized	 a	 total	 of	 $5.5	 million	 between	 1967	 and	 1969,	 the	majority	of	it	for	‘commodities’	as	well	as	training	and	research	development.101	USAID	agreed	to	 supply	 India	with	 1	million	 cycles	 of	 oral	 contraceptive	 pills	 to	 be	 trialled,	 as	well	 as	 150	million	 condoms	 to	 be	 used	 as	 part	 of	 the	 Nirodh	 Marketing	 Program,	 two	 film	 units,	 tape	recorders	and	radio	support,	equipment	to	assist	with	a	mailing	system	(to	be	used	as	part	of	the	mass	communication	direct	mailing	campaign),	and	support	 for	 training,	research	and	 for	an	 Intensive	 Districts	 Program.102 		 The	 benefit	 of	 aid	 went	 beyond	 its	 monetary	 value,	Chandrasekhar	argued	–	 ‘this	wide	 international	support	 implied	a	common	concern	over	the	population…and	the	sharing	of	the	available	scientific	knowledge	towards	its	solution’.103	




it	 was	 the	 IUCD	 and	 sterilization	 that	 he	 believed	 were	 the	 solution	 to	 India’s	 population	problem.	 From	 the	 beginning	 of	 his	 appointment,	 Chandrasekhar	 moved	 easily	 between	arguing	that	the	foundational	basis	of	the	family	planning	program	was	voluntary	acceptance,	and	 advocating	 for	 compulsory	 sterilization.	 He	 raised	 the	 issue	 of	 compulsory	 sterilization	mid-year	in	1967,	arguing	that	it	should	be	put	into	law	as	part	of	a	‘national	campaign	to	win	support	 for	 compulsory	 sterilization	 of	men	with	 three	 or	more	 children’.	 He	 acknowledged	that	introducing	an	element	of	compulsion	would	radically	change	the	program,	but	argued	that	‘a	drastic	 situation	requires	a	drastic	 response’.	He	was,	he	claimed,	a	 “recent	convert”	 to	 the	idea	 of	 compulsory	 sterilization,	 a	 transformation	 brought	 on	 by	 his	 promotion	 to	 Minister.	Compulsory	sterilization	had	been	raised	in	Parliament,	he	said,	and	there	had	been	no	hue	and	cry.	What	he	believed	to	be	inadmissible	on	the	grounds	of	political	feasibility	seemed	actually	to	be	possible,	particularly	when	Maharashtra	declared	its	support	for	the	idea.	Presenting	the	idea	 to	 17	 Chief	 Ministers,	 he	 secured	 the	 agreement	 of	 15.104	Sterilization	 was	 needed,	 he	argued,	 because	 it	 was	 an	 effective	 method	 to	 encourage	 –	 and	 potentially	 enforce	 –	 the	adoption	 of	 India’s	 visions	 for	 progress.	 ‘If	 you	 have	 ten	 children	 and	 sleep	 on	 the	pavement…you	are	obstructing	traffic,	posing	a	menace	to	public	health,	and	making	a	mockery	of	India’s	aspirations	to	a	welfare	state’,	he	explained.	‘There	is	no	doubt	about	it	–	sterilization	is	the	only	answer	for	India!’.105		





	 The	 issues	 of	 the	 small	 family	 norm,	 education,	 communication,	 incentives,	 target	setting	 and	 contraceptives	 were	 are	 eagerly	 taken	 up	 at	 the	 Sixth	 All-India	 Conference	 on	Family	 Planning	 held	 in	 1968.	 The	 tension	 between	 the	 individual	 and	 the	 nation	 in	 family	planning	 was	 evident.	 In	 her	 inaugural	 speech,	 Indira	 Gandhi	 stressed	 that	 the	 ‘people’s	programme’	of	 family	planning	was	paramount,	noting	that	the	 ‘entire	official	machinery’	had	been	bent	to	the	task	of	creating	the	program	and	making	 it	work,	 though	voluntary	agencies	were	also	urgently	needed.	However,	the	‘people’s	programme’	was	increasingly	being	focused	on	the	actions	of	the	individual.	The	agricultural	programs	had	demonstrated	that	the	promise	of	higher	profit	was	enough	to	induce	people	to	change	their	agricultural	practices;	this	is	what	the	family	planning	program	also	needed	to	capitalize	on.	Targets	–	while	necessary	and	useful	–	 too	 often	 subordinated	 the	 ‘desirable’	 to	 the	 ‘practical’.	 However,	 while	 the	 “people’s	programme”	 was	 intended	 to	 help	 the	 national	 realize	 higher	 standards	 of	 living	 and	 faster	development,	the	biggest	drawback	was	individuals	-	 ‘The	biggest	enemy	of	family	planning	is	the	 lassitude	 of	 our	 people’,	 she	 argued.	 Not	 only	 was	 enthusiasm	 low,	 people	 make	 ‘little	attempt	to	exert	themselves’.	Here	technology	offered	a	solution	–	a	contraceptive	device	with	a	‘long	 lasting	 effect’	would	minimize	 these	 problems.108	Others	 at	 the	 conference	 also	 took	 up	the	 problem	 of	 motivating	 individuals	 in	 service	 of	 a	 national	 cause.	 Incentives	 and	disincentives,	 like	contraceptive	technology,	appeared	to	offer	a	solution.	 ‘I	am	hesitant	to	call	them	 disincentives’,	 argued	 S.P	 Jain,	 ‘they	 do	 not	 mean	 denial	 of	 rights	 but	 withdrawal	 of	concessions	 in	 the	 interest	 of	 society’.109	In	Maharashtra,	 he	 noted,	 disincentives	 had	 already	been	 introduced	 for	 a	 number	 of	 cases,	 including	 the	 removal	 of	 free	 medical	 treatment,	maternity	leave,	allotment	of	housing,	“freeships”	and	scholarships	for	certain	families	who	had	over	three	children.110			





life	 insurance	 premiums.	 Other	 measures,	 such	 as	 the	 removal	 of	 scholarships	 and	 other	Government	benefits	to	families	with	more	than	three	children	had	also	been	recommended.111	IMPLEMENTATION:	THE	EMERGENCE	OF	THE	MASS	CAMP	The	system	of	target	setting	and	incentives,	which	also	encouraged	the	use	of	family	planning	“drives”	and	“family	planning	fortnights”	was	being	criticized	by	researchers	in	the	late	1960s.	The	process	of	implementing	the	time-bound	targets	was	challenged	within	the	context	of	the	democratic	claims	of	the	family	planning	program.	Poorer	States	frequently	lacked	well-staffed	family	 planning	 centres	 and	 well-educated,	 highly	 motivated	 extension	 educators,	 and	struggled	 to	 meet	 their	 targets	 with	 negative	 outcomes	 for	 everyone	 involved	 in	 the	 family	planning	program.112	The	intensive	sterilization	and	IUCD	insertion	schemes,	which	had	begun	in	 1964	 and	 1965	 had	 put	 incentivization	 into	 place	 throughout	 the	 whole	 family	 planning	scheme	–	the	“acceptors”,	doctors,	and	non-family	planning	worker	 ‘motivators’	–	all	received	money	for	each	procedure	performed.	Targets	were	closely	connected	to	these	schemes.	From	1965	States	had	been	expected	 to	achieve	 targets	 for	eligible	 couples	 reached,	and	a	 spirit	of	competition	between	the	States	had	been	fostered.	This	was	amplified	under	Chandrasekhar,	as	State-level	progress	in	sterilizations	and	IUCD	insertions	was	measured	on	a	ranking	system	–	taking	both	individual	cases,	as	well	as	“combined	scores”.113		











	 By	1970	the	emphasis	on	 family	planning,	 if	not	 the	underlying	policy,	had	started	to	change.	 Camps,	 which	 had	 been	 used	 in	 the	 family	 planning	 program	 since	 1966,	 were	becoming	 increasingly	 popular.121	Maharashtra	 had	 been	 one	 of	 the	 early	 pioneers	 of	 this	method.	 The	 camp	 set-up	 simplified	 the	 administrative	 aspects	 of	 the	 program,	 allowing	administrators	to	concentrate	supplies	and	personnel	in	one	area,	rather	than	spreading	them	throughout	 the	 villages.	 This	 model,	 which	 had	 been	 bolstered	 through	 incentives	 and	disincentives,	 reached	 its	 apex	 in	 the	Ernakulum	Camps	held	 in	 Cochin	 in	 1970	 and	1971.122	The	 camps	were	 organized	by	 the	district	 collector	 and	district	 family	 planning	bureau,	with	help	from	local	voluntary	agencies	and	‘local-civic	leadership’.123	A	‘family	planning	festival’,	the	two	camps	sterilized	a	world-record	number	of	people	–	78,423	over	the	two	months	the	camps	were	operating.124	The	camps	were	deemed	a	success	by	many,	evidence	that	 ‘large	masses	of	people	 can	 be	motivated	 to	 accept	 sterilization	 in	 a	 short	 span	 of	 time	 by	 an	 organized	 and	concentrated	effort’.125	They	were	intended	to	be	a	‘first	step’	in	the	intensification	of	the	family	planning	program,	and	to	create	an	‘immediate	and	substantial	demographic	impact’.126		







	 Vasectomy	 camps	 proliferated	 throughout	 the	 early	 1970s.	 Chandrasekhar,	who	 had	stepped	down	as	Minister	in	1970	after	losing	his	seat	in	the	Rajya	Sabha	–	was	supportive	of	this	development.129	During	an	eight-	week	campaign	in	Gujarat,	221,935	men	had	vasectomies,	spread	 over	 1,000	 camps	 throughout	 the	 State.130	Camps	were	 also	 carried	 out	 in	 Bihar	 and	Uttar	Pradesh.	Elder	notes	that	the	vasectomy	camp	approach	was	the	first	time	that	the	State	came	 close	 to	 meeting	 its	 targets,	 but	 also	 that	 the	 camps,	 like	 the	 intensive	 efforts	 that	preceded	them,	raised	concerns	over	the	‘case	quality’	and	follow-up	care	offered.	The	payment	of	 large	 incentives,	 he	 argued,	 signalled	 the	 abandonment	 of	 the	 extension	 approach.131	P.M	Blame	questioned	both	the	Ernakalum	Camp	and	subsequent	camps	held	in	Bihar,	noting	‘Were	the	vasectomized	patients	at	the	phenomenally	successful	camp	at	Ernakalum	well-informed	of	the	philosophy	and	techniques	of	family	planning?	Or	was	the	success	due	merely	to	excellent	administration	 and	 the	 putting	 across	 of	 an	 image	 of	 carnival	 and	 profit	 for	 all	 takers’?132	In	even	 less	well-informed	areas	 the	question	–	and	problems	–were	more	significant.	Camps	 in	Bihar,	 Blame	 noted,	 had	 vasectomized	 patients	 who	 were	 ‘extremely	 ill-informed’,	 who	appeared	to	have	accepted	the	vasectomy	‘on	the	spot,	often	because	the	patient	had	run	out	of	money	at	the	fair’.133		POPULATION	CONTROL	AND	THE	POLITICS	OF	FREEDOM	Viewing	 the	 Fourth	 Plan	 as	 determined	 by	 the	 promise,	 availability	 and	 implementation	 of	technological	 and	 technocratic	 approaches	 to	population	obscures	many	of	 the	other	debates	that	 were	 being	 carried	 out	 simultaneously,	 in	 particular	 those	 over	 rights,	 and	 on	 the	democratic	politics	of	population.	While	these	two	often	looked	on	technology	as	a	“solution”	to	the	 population	 problem,	 or	 as	 symbolic	 of	 India’s	 modernity,	 they	 were	 also	 situating	technology	 within	 the	 broader	 framework	 of	 planning,	 policy-making,	 development	 and	democracy;	 processes	 as	 much	 about	 individual	 rights	 and	 freedoms	 as	 they	 were	 about	meeting	demographic	targets	or	the	adoption	of	new	social	norms.		





bare	 necessity…political	 freedom	 without	 economic	 betterment	 and	 social	 progress	 of	 the	masses	is	at	best	a	mockery.	The	fateful	choice	before	the	Government	and	people	of	India	is	not	between	guns	and	butter	but	between	half-men	and	whole	men’.135	Chandrasekhar’s	vision	for	India	was	 one	where	 population	was	 part	 of	 a	 larger	 progress	 towards	 democracy,	 freedom,	and	plenty	–	where	 ‘the	 inventions	of	modern	science’	were	available	 to	all,	 and	people	were	free	 from	 insecurity,	 both	 from	within	 and	 without.136	The	 Government	 was	 instrumental	 in	achieving	this,	so	that	people	could	be	 ‘whole	men’,	participating	in	society,	 though	the	use	of	birth	control	to	reduce	fertility	was	also	an	essential	condition.		
	 The	 rhetoric	 of	 “freedom”	 had	 been	 raised	 again	 in	 1967	 in	 the	 context	 of	 family	planning.	 ‘Freedom	of	 choice’	 and	 ‘improving	 family	 function’	were	euphemisms	 for	 reducing	birth	 rates,	 George	 Foster	 had	 argued	 at	 the	 Behavioural	 Sciences	 and	 Family	 Planning	Conference,	 sparking	 a	 heated	 debate.	 The	 consensus	 that	 emerged	 was	 that	 ‘individual	freedom,	family	integrity	[and]	population	control	are	not	mutually	exclusive	but	can	and	must	be	brought	into	a	working	synthesis’.137	This	characterized	many	of	the	tensions	in	the	Fourth	Plan.	 Between	 1967	 and	 1973	 the	 family	 planning	 program	 in	 India	 varied	 widely,	 with	arguments	being	made,	often	by	the	same	people,	 for	both	greater	freedom	and	more	control.	The	Forth	Plan	had	been	articulated	in	terms	of	national	aims	of	economic	development	and	the	social	good	of	adopting	the	small	 family	norm.	However,	many	of	the	criticisms	levied	against	the	 implementation	 of	 the	 Plan	 by	 the	 early	 1970s	 focused	 on	 how	 the	 policies	 impacted	 on	individuals.	 The	 emphasis	 on	 individuals	 had	 varied	 between	 1967-1972;	 often	 when	individuals	were	evoked	it	was	as	the	‘unmotivated’	and	‘non-acceptors’	of	family	planning,	or	as	the	individual	recipients	of	particular	contraceptive	interventions.		




can	be	seen	in	some	of	his	justifications	for	sterilization:	while	sterilization	was	the	best	method	for	India	owing	to	its	simplicity,	the	need	for	on	a	single	‘acceptance’,	and	separation	from	the	sex-act,	 he	 argued	 it	was	 important	 that	 couples	 also	 have	 recourse	 to	 change	 their	minds	 if	their	 circumstances	 changes	 (for	 example,	 if	 a	 child	 died).	 To	 this	 end,	 he	 supported	recanalization	procedures	 so	 that	 couples	 in	 this	 situation	could	have	 further	 children	 ‘in	 the	natural	way’.140	Likewise,	official	statements	–	while	often	not	upheld	in	practice	–	stressed	that	‘written	consent	of	the	spouse’	was	required	for	sterilization	procedures	to	be	carried	out,	and	a	reliance	on	verbal	consent	could	produce	a	‘risk	of	break-up	of	the	marriage’.141		
	 Chandrasekhar’s	 advocacy	 for	 the	 liberalization	of	 abortion	 in	 India	puts	 the	debates	over	reproductive	rights	during	the	period	of	heightened	technocratic	and	involuntary	rhetoric	into	 a	 different	 light.	 Mohan	 Rao	 argues	 that	 abortion	was	 advocated	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	 the	‘over-riding	 importance	 attached	 to	 controlling	 numbers’,	 and	 while	 this	 certainly	 was	 a	significant	aspect	of	the	legislation,	 it	was	by	no	means	the	only	one.142	Chandrasekhar	saw	in	abortion	another	weapon	in	the	arsenal	of	 family	planning,	as	well	as	a	way	to	fundamentally	alter	society,	advocating	 tackling	 the	problem	of	son-preference	(which	had	been	a	barrier	 to	family	planning	acceptance)	through	the	practice	of	sex	selective	abortion.143	However,	he	also	argued	strongly	that	abortion	should	be	used	to	support	women’s	lifestyle	preferences;	that	it	should	be	available	‘on	demand’	and	‘no	questions	asked’.	‘It	is	my	belief	that	any	woman	in	the	country,	at	any	time,	should	be	able	to	obtain	a	legal	abortion	from	a	public	hospital	or	a	private	physician	 without	 giving	 reason’	 he	 argued.	 ‘It	 is	 high	 time	 that	 women	 become	 their	 own	masters’.144			




Declaration	of	Human	Rights	in	his	discussion	of	planned	parenthood.	India	was	committed	to	being	 a	 social	 welfare	 State,	 he	 argued,	 and	 people	 were	 no	 longer	 content	 to	 ‘accept	 as	axiomatic’	conditions	of	poverty,	misery	or	starvation.	However,	the	State	was	not	in	a	position	to	 offer	 this	 assistance,	 and	 so	 ‘we	 must	 try	 to	 do	 something	 to	 limit	 population’.	 This,	 he	maintained,	 was	 in	 keeping	 with	 civilization;	 the	 control	 over	 the	 animal	 world,	 and	 man’s	intelligence	 to	 adapt	 to	 a	 changing	 environment.146	Even	 Gandhi,	 Radhakrishnan	 noted,	 had	distinguished	been	the	ideal	and	the	permissible	–	and	birth	control,	while	not	ideal,	had	to	be	accepted	as	permissible	in	the	context	of	the	development	of	the	‘social	welfare	State’.147		THE	HIGH	POINT	OF	TECHNOCRACY?	The	late	1960s	and	early	1970s	are	often	presented	as	the	pinnacle	of	technocratic	approaches	to	 family	 planning	 and	 demography,	 approaches	 taken	 to	 extremes	 in	 the	 Fourth	 Plan.	“Gimmicky”	technocratic	solutions	-	such	as	the	transistor	radio	incentive	for	men	who	agreed	to	 be	 sterilized,	 or	 the	 use	 of	 helicopters	 to	 fly	 teams	 of	 family	 planners	 to	 remote	 villages	where	they	could	perform	sterilizations	and	insert	IUDs	-	were	promoted	by	Chandrasekhar	as	part	of	his	efforts	 to	 “try	everything”	and	whip	up	support	 for	 family	planning.148	Radio	–	 the	communications	technology	of	choice	-	was	to	‘do	for	development	communication	what	hybrid	seeds	were	 doing	 for	 agriculture’	 by	 giving	 people	 the	 information	 they	 needed	 to	 be	 ‘more	hygienic,	more	productive…and	more	demographically	responsible’.149	Frank	Wilder	was	even	more	 ambitious,	 arguing	 that	 communications	 was	 going	 to	 be	 revolutionized	 by	 satellite	television,	which	would	be	nation-wide,	broadcasting	 the	 same	message	 to	everyone,	 in	 their	own	 language.	 It	was,	 he	 argued,	 the	 communications-technology	 equivalent	 of	 discovering	 a	chemical	 that	 would	 render	 people	 sterile,	 reversible	 only	 by	 a	 pill	 given	 upon	 proof	 that	 a	family	had	less	than	three	children.150		







that	 had	 been	 made	 only	 four	 of	 five	 years	 previously.151	The	 seeming	 failure	 of	 efforts	 to	change	social	norms	had	promoted	a	revival	in	the	dream	of	the	“ideal	contraceptive”	–	as	had	been	hoped	for	with	the	IUD,	a	simple,	cheap,	acceptable	and	“one-time”	contraceptive	could	cut	across	 the	 need	 to	 motivate	 people,	 and	 across	 the	 problems	 of	 social	 difference,	 as	 Unger	notes,	 ‘technology	promised	to	render	the	complexities	of	human	behaviour	irrelevant’.152	The	need	 to	 cut	 across	 the	problems	of	 both	motivation	 and	 administration	were	manifest	 in	 the	rise	of	the	vasectomy	camps	in	the	early	1970s,	which	eliminated	the	administrative	hassle	of	the	 extension	 approach	 by	 centralizing	 resources,	 and	 undercut	 the	 aim	 of	 the	 approach	 by	offering	steep	incentives.	







ran	 high	 amongst	 some	 of	 India’s	 family	 planners	 and	 among	 the	 international	 population	control	 movement,	 they	 were	 politically	 problematic	 within	 India,	 as	 Chandrasekhar	 had	himself	 discovered	 by	 1970.	 Researchers	working	 in	 and	 on	 India,	 such	 as	 Blame	 and	 Elder	were	also	questioning	the	implementation	of	the	program,	and	particularly	the	development	of	the	mass	camps.	However,	the	largest	indictment	of	the	camps	–	and	evidence	for	their	lack	of	support	as	well	as	the	inability	of	the	Government,	both	Central	and	State,	is	demonstrated	by	the	dramatic	 fall	 in	 ‘acceptors’	at	the	camps	when	incentive	funding	 largely	dried	up	in	1973-1974.157	Even	less	immediately	problematic	suggestions	such	as	raising	the	age	of	marriage	and	introducing	 incentives	 and	disincentives	were	 sources	 of	 political	 contestation	 in	 the	 Central	government.158	While	 raising	 the	 age	 of	 marriage	 had	 been	 envisioned	 as	 part	 of	 a	 larger	process	 of	 social	 change	 and	 demographic	 change159,	 implementation	 was	 again	 a	 severe	setback.	 The	 problem,	 as	 Chandrasekhar	 explained	 it,	 was	 that	 while	 the	 government	 could	legislate	change,	people	in	rural	villages	did	not	have	birth	certificates,	so	it	was	impossible	to	know	how	old	 they	were.160	The	problem	 then,	 as	 he	 saw	 it,	was	 the	Government’s	 ability	 to	know	facts	with	certainty	about	people,	or	people’s	ability	to	accurately	know	themselves,	and	so	comply	with	the	law.		






either	worse-off	districts	or	of	the	distinct	regional	challenges	faced	in	particular	areas.162	This	was	particularly	problematic	in	the	case	of	target-setting,	which	had	been	calculated	on	a	per-head	 basis	 and	 did	 not	 account	 for	 variations	 in	 contraceptive	 acceptance,	 effectiveness,	 or	continuation,	 and	 were	 ‘so	 far	 above	 any	 possibility	 of	 achievement’	 that	 they	 had	 no	credibility.163	
		 By	1972	it	was	being	increasingly	argued	that	the	major	projects	of	the	Fourth	Plan	had	failed.	 The	 infrastructure	 needed	 to	 develop	 the	 program	 has	 not	 been	 forthcoming,	departmental	 co-operation	 was	 lacking,	 and	 overall	 progress	 had	 been	 negligible.	 Many	questioned	 whether	 it	 was	 possible	 to	 transfer	 the	 agricultural	 model	 of	 ‘the	 diffusion	 of	innovations’	 to	 family	planning,	and	criticized	an	 ‘overreliance	on	health	education	strategies’	derived	from	public	health	and	medicine,	rather	than	relying	on	what	was	known	about	market	research	and	advertising.164	These	criticisms	would	seem	to	largely	overlook	the	praise	heaped	on	the	mass	communications	program	by	Wilder	himself	for	doing	exactly	this	and	ignoring	the	advice	 of	 advertising	 experts,	 but	 nevertheless	 appeared	 to	 ring-true	 with	 the	 international	community.	 Emerson	 Foote,	 a	 USAID	 consultant	 and	 ex-head	 of	 two	 of	 the	 world’s	 largest	advertising	firms	-	Foote,	Cone	and	Belding	and	McCann-Erikson	-	had	advised	that	without	a	complete	restructuring	of	the	mass	communications	project	to	bring	it	under	the	control	of	the	Family	Planning	department165,	 the	program	was	 likely	 to	 fail.166	He	had	 further	criticised	the	program,	 arguing	 that	 it	 was	 a	 case	 of	 all	 “warm	 up”,	 with	 no	 effort	 to	 actually	 ‘sell’	 family	planning.	 “The	 plan	 is	 the	 thing”,	 he	 had	 advised,	 and	 without	 a	 solid	 plan,	 little	 would	 be	achieved.167	




office,	many	of	 his	 colleagues	 in	Government	did	not	 share	 this	 tendency.170	The	 relationship	between	 the	 family	 planning	 program	 and	 American	 technical	 advisors	 was	 also	 breaking	down.	 “Washington	 Syndrome”,	 the	 belief	 that	 ‘money	 and	 technology	 can	 solve	 India’s	problems’,	 had	 been	 a	 major	 factor	 in	 the	 disintegrating	 relationship,	 compounded	 by	international	 political	 tensions.171	‘There	 does	 seem	 to	 be	 a	 feeling	 in	 the	 air’,	 noted	Bernard	Berelson,	‘that	the	time	for	foreign	assistance	is	over	or	at	least	running	out’.172	By	1971,	Ford’s	relationship	with	 the	Department	of	Family	Planning	had	officially	 ended,	 and	by	New	Year’s	Day,	1973	the	doors	to	USAID’s	Delhi	office	were	closed.	 The	turn	towards	social	science	and	technology	that	was	at	its	apex	during	Chandrasekhar’s	stint	as	Minister	of	Health	and	Family	Planning,	and	during	the	Fourth	Plan	period,	had	shifted	demographic	thought	towards	the	role	of	 individuals	 as	well	 as	 the	 aggregated	whole,	 and	 envisioned	 technological	 solutions	 to	 the	population	 problem.	 Policies	 designed	 to	 change	 individual	 behaviour,	 such	 as	 strategies	 to	convince	 people	 to	 accept	 the	 small	 family	 norm,	 were	 attempting	 a	 society-wide	transformation	by	 attempting	 to	 change	 individual	 -	 and	 couple-level	 attitudes	 and	practices.	Thus,	 Chandrasekhar’s	 “total	 man”	 needed	 both	 to	 accept	 and	 participate	 in	 society-wide	changes,	 but	 through	 the	 modification	 of	 individual	 patterns	 of	 behaviour.	 This	 was	 a	 stark	change	from	the	arguments	of	the	1950s,	which	had	counted	on	the	wider	forces	of	economic	development	to	gradually	lead	to	changes	that	would	lower	fertility.		










CHAPTER	SIX:	CHALLENGING	THE	POPULATION	PROBLEM	IN	THE	EARLY	1970S	In	 the	 late	 1960s	 and	 early	 1970s	 population	 control,	 family	 planning	 and	 the	 population	problem	 itself	again	became	the	 focus	of	heated	debates.	Population	experts,	 family	planners,	national	 Governments	 and	 international	 organizations	 clashed	 over	 what	 the	 population	problem	 was	 and	 how	 it	 should	 be	 tackled.	 These	 debates	 culminated	 in	 the	 mid-1970s,	reaching	their	pinnacle	at	 the	1974	World	Population	Conference.	This	chapter	argues	that	 in	India	 debates	 about	 the	 population	 problem	 circled	 a	 particular	 set	 of	 questions:	 the	relationship	 between	 population	 growth	 and	 development,	 and	 the	 relationship	 between	individuals	and	society.	Against	the	backdrop	of	challenges	to	development	and	modernization	occurring	around	the	world,	Indian	intellectuals,	social	scientists	and	policy-makers	questioned	the	very	basis	of	population	control	 itself,	reviving	arguments	about	the	relationship	between	population	 growth,	 economic	 growth	 and	 state	 planning	 first	 made	 in	 the	 1940s	 and	 early	1950s.	 These	 debates	 had	 a	 lasting	 impact	 on	 the	 international	 population	 establishment,	reaffirming	 the	 importance	 of	 national	 sovereignty,	 undermining	 the	 scientific	 basis	 of	overpopulation,	and	envisioning	alternatives	to	population	control	policy.	








	 Most	 histories	 of	 population	 in	 India	 look	 to	 the	 relationship	 between	 India	 and	international	population	controllers	in	the	early-to-mid	1970s,	emphasizing	the	financial	aspect	of	this	relationship	and	its	impact	on	population	policy-making.	Matthew	Connelly	argues	that	India	in	the	early	1970s,	while	initially	rejecting	foreign	monetary	support	for	family	planning,	ultimately	capitulated	establishing	a	relationship	between	donors	and	 the	 Indian	government	that	 ‘reinforced	 a	 tendency	 to	 focus	 only	 on	 reducing	 fertility’.4	Rebecca	 Williams,	 in	 her	account	 of	 population	 control	 in	 the	 Emergency,	 places	 greater	 emphasis	 on	 the	 role	 of	 the	Indian	state	in	the	1970s.	She	argues	that	by	1958,	with	the	publication	of	Coale	and	Hoover’s	seminal	study,	Population	Growth	and	Economic	Development,	a	consensus	had	been	established	that	remained	unshaken	until	after	the	Emergency.	The	only	deviation	from	this	consensus,	she	argues,	was	the	statement	‘development	is	the	best	contraceptive’	made	by	Karan	Singh	at	the	1974	World	Population	Conference	–	a	claim	made	as	part	of	wider	Cold	War	politics	with	no	domestic	impact	within	India.5		
	 This	 chapter	 argues	 that	 the	 late	 1960s	 and	 early	 1970s,	 far	 from	 being	 the	continuation	of	an	established	and	largely	uncritical	consensus,	saw	the	rise	of	a	wide	array	of	debates	 about	 family	 planning,	 population	 control	 and	 the	 population	 problem.	 In	 India,	population	experts	and	policy-makers	were	engaged	in	a	wide-ranging	argument	over	nearly	all	aspects	 of	 the	 family	 planning	 programme,	 ranging	 from	 the	 administration	 of	 population	policy,	 to	 the	 validity	 of	 empirical	 data,	 to	 the	 ideology	 of	 population	 control	 and	overpopulation.	They	raised	concerns	about	mass	vasectomy	camps,	engaged	 in	debates	over	different	population	policies	(such	as	camps	versus	extension	education),	and	–	for	a	brief	time	–	saw	the	‘integration	approach’	of	the	Fifth	Plan	as	a	new	and	viable	alternative	to	older	policy	approaches.	 Internationally,	 the	debates	within	India	also	had	a	wide	 impact,	helping	fracture	the	broad	consensus	within	American	demography,	 to	 raise	 the	 issue	of	national	 sovereignty,	and	to	challenge	the	orthodoxy	of	family	planning	within	the	demographic	profession.		




particular,	fears	over	Hindu-Muslim	fertility	differentials	were	rising.7	However,	by	1970,	there	was	hope	that	the	Green	Revolution	had	been	a	success	and	that	the	food	problem	–	one	of	the	main	drivers	of	the	population	problem	–	had	been	solved.8	The	1971	elections,	won	by	Indira	Gandhi	 and	 the	Congress	Party,	had	been	based	on	a	 campaign	 to	 end	poverty	 itself	 and	had	resulted	in	a	landslide	victory:	352	of	518	seats	in	Parliament	had	been	secured.9	By	‘speaking	socialism’,	 Indira	 Gandhi	 had	 brought	 the	 ‘rhetoric	 of	 economic	 populism	 to	 previously	unobtained	 heights’,	 and	 she	 had	 reaped	 the	 rewards.10	Nationalizing	 the	 banks,	 insurance	companies	 and	 coal	 industries	 masked	 the	 lack	 of	 substantial	 structural	 reforms	 in	 land	ownership	and	the	failure	of	the	State	to	increase	its	‘productive	capacities’.11	Nevertheless,	as	Francine	 Frankel	 argues,	 the	 period	 was	 one	 of	 ‘Mrs.	 Gandhi’s	 fantastic	 victory’	 –	 and	 the	election	results	were	taken	as	a	sign	of	a	 ‘new	consciousness	of	the	people’	and	as	 ‘a	sanction	for	the	‘social	transformation	of	India’.12		






period’.16	Driving	 the	 increased	 emphasis	 on	 family	 planning	 was	 the	 fear	 that,	 rather	 than	having	 been	 solved	 by	 the	 efforts	 of	 the	 previous	 Plan	 periods,	 the	 population	 problem	was	getting	worse	–	the	rate	of	growth	had	remained	largely	unchanged,	and	population	continued	to	 present	 ‘a	 very	 serious	 challenge’,	 and	 required	 ‘a	 strong	 purposeful	 Government	 policy,	supported	by	an	effective	programme	and	adequate	resources	of	finance,	men	and	materials’.17				
In	 1970,	 D.	 Banerji,	 reviewing	 the	 family	 planning	 program,	 offered	 an	 unqualified	critique:	 ‘Has	there	been	a	sound	and	coherent	policy,	based	on	scientific	data,	to	ensure	that,	with	the	passage	of	time,	India’s	Family	Planning	Programme	gains	enough	momentum,	so	that	the	declared	goal	of	bringing	down	 the	birth	 rate	 to	23	 is	achieved	by	1978-79?	The	answer,	unfortunately,	 has	 to	 be	 a	 clear	 ‘no’.18	The	 largest	 and	most	 serious	problem	was	 that	 Indian	planners	 had	 ‘over-reacted	 to	 the	 population	 bogey’,	 and	 in	 so	 doing	 had	 ‘grossly	 neglected	certain	key	social	and	economic	sectors	which	are	vitally	important	for	the	promotion	of	a	small	family	norm’.19	Population	growth	presented	a	problem	for	economic	growth,	he	conceded,	but	the	 far	more	 serious	 problem	was	 the	 use	 of	 the	 ‘population	 bogey’	 by	 the	Government	 as	 a	cover	 for	 political	 and	 developmental	 failures	 –	 particularly	 to	 address	 social	 and	 economic	problems.	This	had	been	exacerbated	by	international	concern	for	India’s	population	problem,	which	had,	he	argued,	come	in	very	handy	‘to	perpetuate	this	bogey’.20	He	drew	attention	to	the	differences	 between	 family	 planning	 and	 family	 limitation.	 Family	 limitation,	 he	 argued,	referred	to	the	‘quantitative	aspect’,	while	family	planning	referred	to	the	qualitative	one.21		In	the	context	of	the	‘overriding	urgency	for	bringing	about	family	limitation’,	however,	the	terms	were	being	used	interchangeably.22		




Banerji	 argued,	 ‘no	 demographic	 impact	 whatsoever’.24	Community	 motivation	 formed	 the	basis	of	the	program,	but	its	meaning	had	become	diluted,	and	its	effectiveness	had	been	vastly	overestimated.	Furthermore,	 in	what	was	 ‘perhaps	 the	greatest	mistake	 in	 the	 formulation	of	the	program’,	the	resistance	of	the	community	to	family	planning	and	the	small	family	norm	had	been	grossly	underestimated.25	Motivation	was	not,	Banerji	stressed,	a	‘magic	wand’	that	could	be	 waved	 over	 a	 village	 to	 inculcate	 the	 small	 family	 norm	 and	 make	 people	 accept	 family	planning.	 Banerji	 pointed	 to	 the	 task	 that	 ‘motivators’	 –	 typically	 unemployed	 urban	 youths	who	had	 ‘somehow	graduated	 from	college’	were	being	asked	 to	perform.	Sent	 to	 learn	 from	western	textbooks	and	to	pick	up	the	‘gimmicks	and	tricks	of	his	trade’,	motivators	were	then	expected	 to	organize	extension	work	 for	up	 to	30,000	people,	 in	160	villages.26	They	were	 to	‘identify	and	train	‘local	leaders’’,	and	to	work	with	them	to	organize	‘group	discussion’	and	to	guide	 the	 family	 planning	 workers	 who	 were	 as	 ‘inadequately	 educated,	 ill-trained,	 ill-motivated,	and	ill-supported	as	himself’.27	The	ultimate	expectation	was	that	these	motivators	would	find	a	way	to	‘kindle	a	virtual	social	and	cultural	revolution’	among	people	who	‘have	a	monthly	per	capita	income	of	Rs.19	or	below’.28		





	 Looking	 ahead	 to	 the	 1970s,	 Banerji	 remained	 pessimistic.	 The	 family	 planning	programme	 was	 not	 the	 only	 development	 programme	 to	 have	 largely	 failed	 –	 community	development,	 panchayti	 raj,	 the	 co-operative	 movement	 –	 all	 of	 these	 and	 more	 had	 not	produced	 the	 desired	 results.	 Each	 programme	 shared	 a	 common	 flaw:	 they	 were	 poorly	planned,	 lacking	 in	 scientific	 approach	 and	 hampered	 by	 the	 ‘wasteful,	 obstructive,	 non-innovative	and	rigidly	hierarchical	nature	of	the	operational	set	up’	which,	alongside	an	‘archaic	and	out-dated	approached	to	management’,	meant	that	programmes	were	likely	to	continue	on	a	downwards,	rather	 than	upwards	 trend.35	These	problems	would	be	 further	exacerbated	by	the	 growing	 gulf	 between	 the	 ‘haves’	 and	 the	 ‘have	 not’s’	 he	 argued.	 The	 key	 question,	 as	 a	result,	 was	 ‘whether	 this	 type	 of	 development,	 where	 certain	 basic	 shortcomings	 in	 the	approach	led	to	such	grossly	inadequate	utilization	of	resources	and	where	the	richer,	the	more	privileged	 and	 the	 more	 articulate	 get	 a	 lion’s	 share	 of	 the	 fruits	 of	 investment	 efforts,	 be	allowed	to	go	in	in	the	coming	ten	years?’	36	The	answer,	he	predicted,	would	rest	on	whether	or	not	family	planning	could	actually	result	in	‘a	quick	demographic	transition’.	So	far,	that	seemed	unlikely:	 the	coming	decade	would	see	 ‘massive	social	and	political	 changes	 in	 the	country’.37	There	 would	 be	 a	 rejection	 of	 the	 ‘colonial	 and	 middle	 class	 values’	 that	 dominated	 India’s	social	 and	 economic	 activities,	 replaced	 instead	 by	 a	 ‘genuine	 concern	 for	 the	 poor’.38	This	would	manifest	as	land	reform,	education,	greater	access	to	health	services	and	water	supply.39	Accompanying	 these	 changes	 would	 be	 a	 new	 style	 of	 administration	 and	 planning,	 more	heavily	reliant	on	technocrats	for	‘policy	formulation,	planning,	implementation	and	evaluation	of	 those	 social	 programmes	 which	 need	 specialized	 competence’. 40 	Even	 generalist	administrators	 would	 develop	 ‘strong	 scientific	 overtones’	 and	 an	 ‘experimental	 attitude’,	taking	advantage	of	techniques	such	as	‘operational	research,	system	analysis	and	work	study’	to	replace	committees	and	other,	older,	styles	of	decision-making.41		




which,	 alongside	 the	 ‘reinvigoration	 of	 the	 planning	 and	 administrative	 machineries’	 would	considerably	 accelerate	 the	pace	of	 social	 and	 economic	development.42	Crucially,	 ‘as	 a	 direct	consequence	 of	 the	 change	 in	 the	 value	 system	 of	 the	 political	 leaders,	 the	 planners,	 the	administrators	and	the	specialists	and	consultants’,	efforts	would	made	to	be	far	more	effective	to	 implement	 development	 programmes.43	Secondly,	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 ‘scientific	 approach	 to	organization	 and	 management’	 would	 result	 in	 a	 far	 more	 effective	 use	 of	 resources.44	The	practice	 of	 offering	 incentives	 and	 of	 ‘motivating’	 people	 through	 canvassers	 would	 be	abandoned,	 Banerji	 predicted,	 by	 the	 end	 of	 the	 decade	 –	 and	 while	 the	 results	 of	 the	programme	would	not	be	felt	immediately,	by	the	1980s	they	would	begin	to	be	seen.45	





THE	IDEOLOGY	OF	POPULATION	CONTROL	In	 many	 ways,	 the	 changes	 and	 challenges	 to	 demography,	 family	 planning	 and	 population	policymaking	 that	 emerged	 over	 the	 late	 1960s	 and	 early	 1970s	 reflected	 broader	 anxieties	about	social	change	and	the	proper	role	of	 the	state	 in	shaping	 it.	Demography	and	the	social	sciences,	 which	 promised	 to	 scientifically	 measure	 and	 chart	 social	 change	 were	 being	increasingly	 challenged	 in	 this	 regard,	 particularly	 as	 population	 policy,	 social	 science	 and	family	planning	had	moved	explicitly	towards	generating	social	change.	Reconciling	the	desires	of	the	individual	with	the	needs	of	the	nation,	and	the	need	for	family	planning	to	be	recognized	as	 one	 aspect	 of	 broader	 policies	 of	 social	 and	 economic	 development	 shaped	 debate	 on	population	since	the	late	1960s.	
	 Kingsley	Davis’	highly	influential	1967	article	on	population	policy,	‘Population	Policy:	Will	Current	Programmes	Succeed’	made	a	set	of	arguments	that	had	a	long	reach	and	a	lasting	impact	 on	 population	 control	 and	 family	 planning.	 Davis	 presented	 a	 blistering	 critique	 of	family	planning,	and	of	the	population	policies	that	had	been	adopted	around	the	world	by	the	late	 1960s.	 The	main	 problem,	Davis	 argued,	was	 the	 disconnect	 between	 the	 logic	 of	 family	planning	–	which	be	definition	concerned	only	individuals	–	and	the	needs	of	national	planning.	‘Obviously,	couples	do	not	plan	the	growth	of	national	income	or	the	highway	network.	There	is	no	 reason	 to	 expect	 that	 millions	 of	 decisions	 about	 family	 size	 made	 by	 couples…will	automatically	 control	 population	 for	 the	 benefit	 of	 society’.52	Fundamentally,	 Davis	 argued,	population	policies	were	not	about	giving	individuals	the	right	to	have	as	many	children	as	they	wanted.	They	were	instead	about	giving	societies	the	ability	regulate	the	number	of	people	that	were	needed.	The	society,	and	not	the	individual	couple,	needed	to	be	placed	paramount.		
	 At	the	Ford	Foundation,	John	C.	Cool,	reacting	to	the	deteriorating	relationship	between	the	Foundation	and	the	Indian	Government,	which	by	1970	was	under	heavy	strain,	53	argued	strongly	 for	 the	 need	 to	 look	 ‘beyond	 technical	 assistance’.54	The	 managerial	 and	 technical	competence	needed	to	‘upgrade	the	family	planning	program’	was	already	present	within	India,	which	meant	the	basic	rationale	for	providing	technical	aid	–	to	develop	skills	and	resources	not	otherwise	available	–	no	longer	held.55	Cool	took	aim	at	the	arrogance	and	pretention	that	had	characterised	 demographic	 research	 and	 family	 planning	 advice	 during	 the	 previous	 decade.	‘Unlike	the	field	of	plant	breeding	or	small-pox	eradication’,	he	argued,	 ‘outsiders	don’t	have	a	
																																																																				




body	 of	 tested	 empirical	 evidence	 or	 doctrine	 on	which	 to	 base	 their	 advice’.56	Instead,	 they	were	 still	 uncertain,	 and	 the	 key	 variables	 that	 had	 resulted	 in	 changing	 attitudes	 and	behaviours	were	still	unknown.	Given	this,	it	was	unclear	if	these	factors	could	be	isolated	from	‘the	more	 comprehensive	 process	 called	 “modernization”’.57	What	was	 needed	 instead	was	 a	‘significant	 and	 planned	 change	 in	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 Foundation’s	 role’	 that	 would	 ‘take	cognizance	of	the	altered	circumstances	of	the	1970s	including,	most	importantly,	the	changing	realities	of	 India’.58	Ultimately,	Cool	argued,	 India’s	population	problem	was,	however	much	it	might	be	important	to	the	‘world	community’,	the	responsibility	of	India’s	leaders.59	‘Let	me	be	clear’,	Cool	concluded,	‘I	believe	the	Foundation	should	be	willing	to	abdicate	its	authority	with	regard	to	the	allocation	of	resources	in	the	family	planning	field’.	This	authority,	he	continued,	should	belong	to	the	Indian	government.60	Making	these	changes	could	provide	a	way	forward	for	 the	 Foundation	 -	 ‘It	 is	 just	 possible	 that	 a	 pattern	 could	 be	 evolved	 which	 would	 have	significance,	not	only	in	India	but	as	a	model	–	beyond	technical	assistance	–	for	the	1970s’.61	
	 Around	 the	 world,	 Bernard	 Berelson	 observed,	 there	 was	 a	 growing	 concern	 over	population	policy.62		It	seemed	for	Berelson	that	the	current	situation	was	defined	as	much	by	politics	and	ideology	as	by	data	and	territory.	‘To	someone	coming	into	the	field’,	he	observed,	‘it	is	impressive…how	population	policies	are	tied	to	social	or	political	ideologies’63.	From	Plato	to	Mercantilists,	from	Malthus	to	Mill,	and	more	recently,	from	Marx	to	Sanger,	the	politics	and	ideology	 of	 population	 was	 unavoidable.	 ‘Population	 views’,	 he	 noted,	 ‘are	 strongly	 felt	precisely	because	they	are	tied	to	deeper	intellectual	or	political	positions’	in	a	relationship	that	was	 ‘reciprocally	sustaining’	and	provided	an	air	of	certainty	 that	often,	he	admitted,	stepped	beyond	the	bounds	of	both	evidence	and	rationality.64		 		




determining	 how	population	 problems	would	 be	 addressed	 –	 ‘it	 is	 the	 task	 of	 the	 student	 of	population	 not	 to	 select	 the	 ends,	 or	 the	 trade-offs	 among	 them,	 but	 rather	 to	 inform	 the	selection,	 by	 government	 and	 citizenry,	 through	 clarifying	 the	 contribution	 of	 different	demographic	means’.65	
	 In	 India,	 ‘dissenting	 demographers’	 had	 also	 begun	 to	 question	 some	 of	 the	assumptions	 being	made	 about	 demography,	 family	 planning	 and	 population	 policy	 in	 India	during	 the	 1960s.66	Two	 women-demographers,	 Malini	 Kakal,	 senior	 research	 officer	 at	 the	DTRC,	and	Kumudini	Dandekar,	who	held	a	senior	position	at	 the	Gokhale	 Institute,	had	both	questioned	 the	 policies	 suggesting	 raising	 the	 age	 of	 marriage	 which	 had	 been	 argued	 for	during	 Chandrasekhar’s	 stint	 as	 Minster,	 particularly	 by	 S.N	 Agarwala.	 Both	 Karkal	 and	Dandekar	 argued	 that	 the	 reduction	 in	birth	 rates	 that	 accompanied	 a	 rising	 age	of	marriage	were	 the	 results	 of	 ‘changes	 in	 the	 outlook	 of	 society	 towards	 the	 role	 of	 women’,	 and	 that	legislation	 without	 substantive	 social	 and	 cultural	 change	 was	 unlikely	 to	 have	 a	 significant	impact.67	This	was	part	of	a	shift	towards	what	Rajani	Bhatia	and	Ashwini	Tambe	term	‘social	change	 activism’,	 which	 often	 ran	 counter	 to	 the	more	 widespread	 numerical	 and	 statistical	logic	 of	 population	 control.68	The	 resistance	 of	 demographers	 like	 Karkal	 and	 Dandekar	 to	attempts	 to	 legislate	 social	 change	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 population	 growth	 is,	 they	 argue,	indicative	 of	 the	 ‘growing	 conflict	 between	 those	 who	 pursued	 a	 numbers-based	 population	control	agenda	and	those	who	centered	the	human	rights	and	needs	of	women’.69	This	conflict	played	out	during	the	 first	half	of	 the	1970s,	as	demographers,	population	experts	and	family	planning	workers	challenged	many	of	the	assumptions	underlying	population	policy.	
	 By	 1971,	 it	 was	 clear	 to	 both	 the	 government	 and	 to	 population	 experts	 that	 the	population	 programme	 had	 not	 produced	 the	 expected	 results.	 The	 outcome	 was	 to	 spread	doubt	about	the	basis	of	the	population	policy	itself.	To	this	end,	the	Central	Ministry	of	Health	and	Family	Planning	 threw	open	the	subject	of	population	policy	 to	public	discussion,	 ‘with	a	view	 to	 identifying	 the	 problems	 in	 their	 contemporary	 context…to	 find	 out	 the	 reaction	 of	knowledgeable	 people	 to	 the	 raison	 d’etre	 of	 the	 policy	 itself’.70	Three	 seminars	 were	 held,	funded	by	the	Ministry	and	attended	by	a	wide	range	of	intellectuals,	policy-makers	and	family	planning	 workers.	 The	 sessions	 were	 shaped	 by	 the	 growing	 fears	 over	 the	 ‘population	explosion’.	However,	while	 acknowledging	 that	 the	 population	 explosion	 ‘lent	 seriousness’	 to																																																																					
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the	population	problem,	there	were	strong	arguments	being	made	to	counter	it.	‘Population	has	to	be	 looked	at	as	one	facet	–	though	very	significant	–	of	the	total	picture…the	density	of	the	population,	rather	than	the	magnitude	of	the	total	population,	 is	perhaps	a	better	 indicator’.71	Drawing	 attention	 towards	 density	 revealed	 an	 important	 fact:	 while	 in	 absolute	 numbers,	India’s	 population	was	 second	 only	 to	 China’s,	 in	 terms	 of	 density,	 it	 was	 far	 lower	 –	 below	countries	 like	 Belgium,	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 West	 Germany	 and	 the	 Netherlands	 –	 none	 of	which	 were	 said	 to	 have	 ‘population	 problems’.72	This	 innocuous	 seeming	 comparison	 hid	 a	wealth	 of	 ideological	 arguments	 that	 emerged	 over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 three	 seminars.	 The	guiding	concern	was	not	only	what	was	wrong	with	population	policy,	but	whether	India	could	even	be	said	to	have	one.		THE	THREE	SEMINARS		The	Minister	of	State	in	Health	and	Family	Planning,	D.P	Chattopadhyaya	had	requested	that	the	first	seminar	‘tell	the	Government	as	to	what	they	thought	ought	to	be	done	in	the	field	of	family	planning	 and	 population	 control’.73	Chattopadhyaya	 argued	 that	 general	 awareness	 of	 family	planning	had	already	been	widely	established	and	that	 ‘social	acceptability’	had	been	created.	What	was	needed,	he	went	on,	was	 to	know	 if	 it	was	possible	 to	 find	 ‘new	approaches	 in	 the	field	of	motivation’,	and	to	know	how	to	‘bridge	the	gap	between	wide	awareness	but	low	levels	of	acceptance’.74	He	made	a	‘forceful	plea’	for	modernization	‘in	all	directions	which	could	lead	to	the	acceptance	of	the	small	family	norm…the	small	family	norm	has	to	be	presented	as	part	of	 the	total	development	package	 in	political,	social	and	economic	terms’.75	What	 the	Minister	received	 was	 broad	 criticism	 of	 the	 basic	 assumptions	 and	 administration	 of	 the	 program,	ranging	 from	 its	 understanding	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 individual	 and	 the	 state,	 and	between	population	growth	and	development,	 to	 the	problems	associated	with	administering	family	planning	as	a	Central-Government	run	‘administrative	experiment’.		






promoted	as	one	such	bridging	solution,	but	had	largely	floundered	owing	to	the	Government’s	insistence	on	‘one	or	other	particular	method’.77	There	was	a	further	aspect	to	be	considered	as	well.	While	the	reduction	of	birth	rates	as	a	national	goal	and	family	planning	as	a	personal	goal	were	 often	 presented	 as	 a	 dichotomy,	 this	 obscured	 further	 complexities	 in	 the	 relationship	between	 the	 State	 and	 the	 individual.	 ‘What	 is	 not	 often	 realized	 or	 openly	 acknowledged’,	Mitra	argued,	was	 that	at	 the	sub-national,	 regional	or	 local	 level,	population	size	determined	financial	and	political	benefits	and	allocations.	This	had	the	effect,	he	explained,	of	‘building-in’	and	perpetuating	 ‘stubborn	areas	of	conflict	between	national	and	sub-national	 interests	over	population	 growth’.78	The	 outcome	 was	 that	 attaining	 the	 national	 goal	 would	 most	 likely	therefore	 rely	 on	 people	 attaining	 their	 individual	 goals	 and	 bypassing	 the	 jockeying	 of	 sub-national	and	regional	interests.79		




sensibilities,	 bypassing	 what	 he	 termed	 the	 ‘metaphysics’	 of	 the	 small	 family,	 happy	 family	approach.	 Instead	 of	 appealing	 to	 people’s	 happiness,	 he	 advocated	 for	 economic	 straight-talking:	 ‘why	 can’t	 we	 tell	 the	 masses	 that	 there	 are	 too	 many	 people	 on	 the	 land,	 that	 the	burden	of	dependency	is	increasing,	that	there	is	growing	unemployment	and	that	there	are	not	enough	schools,	houses	and	hospitals?’84		
	 Family	planning	administration	and	the	relationship	between	the	state	and	individuals	generated	 heated	 discussion	 in	 the	 first	 seminar.	 Dubbed	 ‘the	 problem	 of	 numbers’,	participants	questioned	the	inter-relationship	between	population	growth	and	growth	in	goods	and	 services,	 arguing	 that	 the	 traditional	 fears	 about	 population	 growth	 ‘outstripping’	resources	 appeared	 to	 have	 been	 largely	 laid	 to	 rest	 by	 scientific	 and	 technological	developments. 85 	This	 critique	 was	 extended	 into	 broader	 questions	 about	 the	 ‘new	respectability	 of	Malthusianism’.86	Many	 argued	 that	 the	 emphasis	 placed	 on	 family	 planning	had	 been	 to	 cover	 the	 ‘deficiencies	 or	 failures	 of	 the	 Government’s	 development	 plans’.87	In	response,	 attendees	 had	 argued	 that	 population	 growth	 did	 not	 present	 an	 insurmountable	problem,	as	each	“burdensome	mouth”	was	‘accompanied	by	two	hands	and	a	brain’.88	This	was	contested	by	those	who	argued	that,	while	the	family	planning	programme	was	not	effectively	administered,	the	problem	remained	one	of	growth	and	absolute	numbers,	which	were	going	to	outpace	 resources.	 What	 was	 needed	 instead	 was	 for	 family	 planning	 programmes	 to	 be	pursued	even	more	vigorously,	‘in	their	purely	physical	form’.89	







family	planning	programmes	should	be	based.92	The	second	seminar	had	elaborated	on	 these	points,	and	underlined	the	problems	many	had	with	the	view	that	a	‘global	view	of	reduction	in	numbers’	could	serve	as	the	basis	for	increased	per	capita	income,	which	was	‘neither	logical	or	convincing’.93	The	 mass	 camp	 approach	 also	 came	 under	 criticism,	 with	 the	 penal	 measures	imposed	by	 the	Government	and	 the	 ‘intensive	Government	action’	 regarded	as	 infringing	on	individual	 decisions	 about	 fertility.94	There	 were,	 however,	 opposing	 views	 as	 well.	 Some	claimed	that	the	results	achieved	by	the	programme	so	far	were	the	best	that	could	be	expected	so	 long	 as	 the	 programme	 continued	 to	 ‘work	 within	 the	 constitutional	 framework’,	 and	adopted	‘democratic	methods	for	dealing	with	the	problem’.95	






endeavours,	 which	 would	 produce	 the	 facts	 in	 question.	 Frank	 Notestein	 stated	 this	 plainly,	arguing	 that	 ‘probably	 the	 best	 way	 to	 make	 progress	 in	 a	 dangerous	 field	 is	 to	 sponsor	‘research’	rather	than	‘action’.	Who	can	be	against	the	truth?’99		
	 By	 the	 early	 1970s,	 the	 established	 truth	 and	 population	 ‘facts’	 were	 coming	 under	attack.	 One	 of	 the	 best-known	 studies	 of	 the	 data	 gathered	 by	 ‘overpopulation	 theorists’	 is	Mahmood	Mamdani’s	The	Myth	of	Population	Control,	published	in	1972.	Mamdani	revisited	the	equally	 famous	 Khanna	 Study	 and,	 through	 it,	 offered	 a	 critique	 of	 the	major	 data	 gathering	practices	 that	 had	 characterized	 family	 planning	 and	 population	 research	 in	 the	 1950s	 and	1960s.	 His	 arguments	 went	 to	 the	 core	 of	 how	 overpopulation	 itself	 had	 been	 conceived,	researched,	and	measured.	There	were	two	common	problems,	he	argued.	The	first,	shared	by	research	and	by	overpopulation	discourse	in	general,	was	a	‘misinterpretation	of	social	reality’	–	 the	 idea	 that	 large	 families	 were	 poor	 because	 they	 were	 large.100	The	 second,	 which	 was	shared	 by	 the	 family	 planning	 studies,	 was	 a	 tendency	 to	 misinterpret	 their	 results	 –	 to	attribute	 declining	 birth	 rates	 to	 birth	 control	 programs,	without	 looking	 at	 other	 factors.101		Mamdani	argued	that	the	‘empirical	facts’	collected	by	‘overpopulation	theorists’	suffered	from	a	serious	flaw.102	Collected	through	KAP	surveys,	the	research	produced	“empirical”	measures	of	 acceptance	 or	 rejection	 of	 contraceptives.	 This	was	 not	 in	 itself	 problematic.	 However,	 as	Mamdani	 argues,	 the	 interpretation	 of	 such	 findings	 is	 crucial.	 ‘’If	 one	 understands	 it	 as	 an	
attitude’,	 he	 noted,	 ‘then	 the	 emphasis	 will	 be	 on	 the	 social	 reality	 in	 which	 this	 attitude	originates’.103	However,	if	the	finding	is	presented	as	a	fact	–	which	the	results	of	KAP	surveys	invariably	were	–	then	it	becomes	problematic.	Facts,	Mamdani	argued,	were	‘stripped	of	their	relation	 to	 other	 social	 phenomena’,	 and	 without	 this	 relationship,	 their	 “social	 life”	 was	obscured	–	what	was	in	fact	a	social	and	collective	phenomenon	was	reduced	to	the	‘thinking	of	isolated	 individuals’.	This	 in	 turn	 impacted	 the	whole	 research	design	–	KAP	surveys	became	oriented	 towards	 individual	 opinions,	 rather	 than	 seeking	 to	 understand	 ‘the	 basis	 of	 the	opinions	themselves	in	their	social	context’.104		




control	 conclusively	 lowered	 birth	 rates.	 They	 also	 demonstrated,	 Mamdani	 argued,	 the	political	 reasons	 for	 this	 optimism	 –	 ‘family	 planning	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 a	 substitute	 for	structural	 and	 institutional	 change’.106	This	 was	 –	 as	 Davis	 had	 also	 noted	 in	 1967	 –	 the	argument	of	 the	political	 conservative,	 a	way	 to	 induce	demographic	 change	without	altering	the	structural	status	quo.	By	not	accounting	for	the	social	life	of	‘facts’,	overpopulation	theorists	made	 a	 number	 of	 egregious	 errors	 in	 both	 gathering	 and	 interpreting	 their	 data.	 The	most	glaring	 problem	 faced	 by	 the	 study	was	 its	 inability	 to	 grasp,	 and	understand,	 the	 difference	between	what	people	said,	and	what	they	actually	did	–	removed	from	their	social	context,	the	‘facts’	 about	 ‘acceptance’	 collected	 in	 the	 survey	 appeared	 to	 depict	 a	 version	 of	 reality	 that,	when	 faced	 with	 non-use,	 led	 to	 misunderstandings	 and	 constant	 reformulations	 of	 study	design.107	This	emerged	as	the	 ‘KAP-gap’	that	plagued	family	planning	researchers	and	policy-makers	in	the	1960s.	The	more	serious	problem,	however,	was	what	Mamdani	identified	as	the	complete	 misunderstanding	 of	 the	 population	 problem.	 The	 Khanna	 Study	 had	 understood	overpopulation	as	an	epidemiological	and	demographic	problem	when,	Mamdani	argued,	it	was	actually	 a	 sociological	 one.	 To	 the	 researchers	 and	 overpopulation	 theorists,	 population	was	problematic	–	hampering	economic	development	and	keeping	people	 in	poverty.	However,	he	argued,	 to	 the	 villages	 the	 large	 family	 was	 economically	 rational;	 it	 would	 lift	 them	 out	 of	poverty.				
	 The	act	–	and	in	many	cases	the	absence	–	of	going	into	the	field	and	collecting	data	was	also	being	critiqued	more	generally	 in	 the	1970s.	M.N	Srinivas	gave	a	critical	overview	of	 the	status	and	practice	of	field	research	in	India,	arguing	that	the	lack	of	field	research	and	flaws	in	data	 collection	 that	 typified	 social	 science	 research	had	produced	not	only	bad	data,	but	 –	 as	Mamdani	had	argued	–	a	profound	misunderstanding	of	 the	realities	of	 life.	The	need	to	have	‘useful’	 (i.e.	 policy-relevant)	 data	 had	 turned	 the	 study	 of	 single	 villages	 or	 small	 areas	 into	wasted	 time.	 And,	 more	 significantly,	 being	 alienated	 from	 ‘grassroots	 reality’	 had	 led	 to	‘fanciful	assumptions	about	the	behaviour	of	ordinary	people’,	resulting	in	a	‘woeful	ignorance’	about	 the	 interactions	 between	 ‘economic,	 political	 and	 social	 forces	 at	 local	 levels’.108	This	showed	very	clearly,	Srinivas	argued,	in	how	the	elite	investigator	and	analyst	saw	the	peasant	–	as	irrational,	ignorant,	and	‘resistant	to	progress’.109	However,	much	as	The	Myth	of	Population	





analyst.	Not	only	did	this	distance	create	profound	misunderstandings	about	the	realities	of	life	in	 India,	 it	 also	 helped	 encourage	 fabrications	 of	 another	 kind	 –	 the	 practice	 of	 faking	 data,	particularly	 for	 long,	 complicated,	 or	 socially	 sensitive	 surveys	was	 rife,	 he	 argued.111	Faking	was	not	limited	only	to	the	surveyor;	further	up	the	analysis	chain	data	was	often	‘laundered’	–	brought	in	line	with	other	results	–	so	that	the	data	showed,	at	minimum,	a	general	uniformity.	‘Anyone	 who	 bothers’,	 he	 argued,	 ‘will	 find	 that	 underneath	 the	 decorous	 surface	 there	 is	 a	whole	 body	 of	 folklore	 about	 how	 investigators	 fake	 information	 and	 how	 their	 supervisors	fake	supervision’.112	





THE	1974	WORLD	POPULATION	CONFERENCE:	REDEFINING	THE	POPULATION	PROBLEM	The	actions	taken	to	address	and	change	fertility	in	India	had	been	predicated	on	the	belief	that	India	 was	 overpopulated.	 Accepting	 this	 belief	 had	 led	 to	 a	 series	 of	 choices:	 to	 transform	population	through	socio-economic	development;	through	a	policy	of	family	planning	(or	both);	to	 advocate	 ‘natural’	 or	 artificial	methods	 of	 birth	 control’	 to	 find	 the	 artificial	methods	 that	worked	best	and	were	‘acceptable’;	and,	by	the	late	1960s,	to	determine	whether	the	program	should	 be	 voluntary	 or	 compulsory.117	These	 aspects	 of	 the	 programme,	 however,	 had	 come	under	criticism	in	the	early	1970s,	as	the	political	aspects	of	family	planning	in	India	began	to	be	reconsidered	in	the	light	of	the	Third	and	Fourth	Plans.	Some	debates	centred	on	the	use	of	high	motivational	or	 incentive	payments	during	 the	Fourth	Plan,	while	others	 considered	 the	role	 of	 demographic	 change	 in	 affecting	 basic	 democratic	 procedures	 such	 as	 voting	 –	 with	fewer	people,	states	would	be	able	to	secure	fewer	seats	in	Parliament,	even	as	they	achieved	their	family	planning	goals.118		
	 More	 broadly,	 however,	 countries	 were	 beginning	 to	 re-assess	 population	 control	policies	in	the	light	of	new	arguments	about	development.	By	the	late	1950s,	population	growth	and	its	negative	effect	on	the	economy	was	considered	to	be	a	given.	The	Second	Five	Year	Plan	had	expressed	with	confidence	that	‘the	logic	of	facts	is	unmistakable,	and	there	is	no	doubt	that	under	 the	 conditions	 prevailing	 in	 countries	 like	 India,	 a	 high	 rate	 of	 population	 growth	 is	bound	to	adversely	affect	the	rate	of	economic	advance	and	living-standards-per-capita’.	By	the	mid-1970s,	however,	the	‘logic	of	facts’	linking	population	growth	to	developmental	difficulties	was	coming	into	question.	The	debates	held	in	India	in	the	early	1970s	had	demonstrated	the	extent	 to	 which	 population	 experts,	 policy-makers	 and	 field	 workers	 were	 beginning	 to	challenge	many	of	the	assumptions	that	had	formed	the	basis	of	the	family	planning	program.		





would	need	to	be	able	to	do	so,	regardless	of	financial	or	social	conditions.119	Conferences	held	in	India	in	the	build-up	to	Bucharest	had	emphasised	similar	points.		G.S	Pathak,	Vice-President	of	 India	had	said	 in	his	speech	at	the	Conference	on	Growth	and	Human	Development	(1973)	that	‘we	must	seek	and	find	human	solutions	to	the	population	problems,	which	are	essentially	the	problems	of	ordinary	men	and	women’.	This,	he	noted,	needed	to	be	recalled	in	the	face	of	the	‘impersonal	statistics’	and	‘population	data’.	Population	policy,	he	emphasized,	had	to	be	‘an	integral	 part	 of	 socio-economic	 development	 strategies’,	 and	 the	 problem	 solved	 through	international	co-operation.120			 	
	 1974	had	been	designated	World	Population	Year	by	the	UN,	and	India	had	used	this	to	provide	an	impetus	to	its	own	programmes	at	the	beginning	of	the	Fifth	Plan	Period.121	A	World	Population	 Year	 Committee	 was	 constituted,	 and	 ‘a	 suitable	 programme	 was	 drafted	 for	observance	 of	 the	 year’.122	Unlike	 the	 Rome	 (1954)	 and	 Belgrade	 (1965)	 Conferences,	which	had	 been	 attended	 by	 individuals	 in	 their	 expert	 capacities,	 the	 Bucharest	 conference	 was	intergovernmental,	 attended	 by	 138	 governmental	 delegations.123	It	 had	 its	 origins	 in	 1970,	when	 a	 resolution	 was	 passed	 by	 the	 UN	 to	 authorize	 a	 conference	 with	 the	 objective	 of	considering	 ‘basic	 demographic	 problems,	 their	 relationship	 with	 economic	 and	 social	development,	 and	 population	 policies	 and	 action	 programmes	 needed	 to	 promote	 human	welfare	and	development’.124	By	this	time,	family	planning	was	believed	to	be	widely	accepted,	and	even	respectable.125		







proposed	68	amendments	to	it.127	The	debates	that	the	conference	sparked	over	the	population	problem	 gave	 ‘some	 older	 hands	 a	 bad	 case	 of	 déjà	 vu’,	 noted	 J.	 Mayone	 Stycos.128	It	 had	seemed,	he	argued,	that	in	the	build-up	to	Bucharest	there	was	little	to	be	excited	about	or	look	forwards	to	–	‘the	major	opposition	to	population	control’	appeared	to	have	been	‘muted,	if	not	silenced’.129	This	impression	was	soon	dispelled	upon	receipt	of	the	materials	produced	by	the	UN.	The	Action	Pack,	he	said,	made	it	clear	that	‘every	old	ghost	of	the	anti-Malthusian	past	had	resurfaced,	 clothed	 in	 the	 new	 slick	 trappings	 of	 demographic	 chic’. 130 	Even	 the	 World	Population	 Year	 Slogan,	 ‘Love	 the	 World’s	 People’	 betrayed	 this	 shift,	 he	 argued,	 being	 as	inappropriate	 ‘as	 an	 unqualified	 ‘Love	 Motherhood’	 sticker	 at	 a	 Planned	 Parenthood	convention’. 131 	The	 second	 slogan	 of	 the	 conference	 was	 ‘Take	 Care	 of	 the	 People	 and	Population	 Will	 Take	 Care	 of	 Itself’,	 joined	 by	 ‘Population	 is	 Only	 a	 Problem	 if	 the	 World’s	Wealth	Cannot	Support	the	World’s	People’,132	which	revealed	the	main	thrust	of	the	arguments	being	made	 at	 Bucharest	 –	 it	was	 not	 population	 numbers	 that	were	 causing	 the	 population	problem.	 Stycos	 argued	 that	 these	 arguments	 had	 resuscitated	 the	 classic	 debate	 between	Malthus	and	Marx,	and	was	being	further	buoyed	up	by	arguments	and	accusations	that	‘family	planning	had	failed’	and	that	development	needed	to	extend	beyond	population	control.	Stycos	firmly	 disagreed	 with	 this	 position,	 arguing	 that	 it	 set	 up	 a	 false	 dilemma	 between	 family	planning	on	the	one	hand,	and	population	control	on	the	other.133		





optimistically	declaring	that	‘the	future	of	mankind	is	infinitely	bright’.136	The	delegations	from	the	Third	World	 argued	 that	 the	population	problem	 resulted	 from	poverty,	 colonialism,	 and	imperialism	in	its	historical	and	new	forms,	and	was	not	the	result	of	population	growth.137		
	 Two	 themes	 dominated	 discussion	 at	 the	 Conference	 –	 the	 relationship	 between	population	and	development,	and	the	role	and	status	of	women.138	While	some	Latin	American	and	African	nations	rejected	family	planning	outright,	many	of	the	underdeveloped	countries	in	Asia	were	spilt.	The	Republic	of	Korea	pointed	to	the	successes	it	had	achieved	with	its	family	planning	 programme,	 and	Bangladesh	 openly	 praised	 international	 efforts	 to	 promote	 family	planning.139	Japan	argued	that	the	severity	of	the	population	problem	was	now	such	that	it	had	transcended	 national	 borders	 and	 national	 sovereignty,	 and	 needed	 to	 be	 considered	 ‘an	international	 problem’.140	These	 arguments	 reflected	 broader	 changes	 in	 the	 international	political	system.141	As	Finkle	and	Crane	argue,	the	‘politicization	of	population’	that	occurred	at	Bucharest	had	less	to	do	with	the	Malthus-Marx	debate	and	instead	reflected	the	‘contemporary	struggle’	over	how	resources,	wealth	and	power	were	distributed	between	the	Third	World	and	the	‘industrial	nations’.142	Members	of	the	International	Youth	Population	Conference	were	also	deeply	 polarized	 along	 these	 lines,	 and	 calls	 to	 throw	 off	 the	 ‘contraceptive	 corset	 of	 the	capitalist	countries’	were	made.143		






‘deep	 and	probing	 reappraisal’	 of	 ‘the	 entire	 population	 effort’	was	 needed.147	In	making	 this	statement	 Rockefeller	 aligned	 himself	 with	 many	 of	 the	 arguments	 that	 had	 been	 made	throughout	the	early	1970s.	He	called	for	the	greater	integration	of	family	planning	with	social	and	 economic	 development	 programmes,	 and	 stressed	 the	 need	 for	 ‘each	 nation	 to	 solve	 its	development	problems	 in	 its	 own	way’.148	He	 also	 stressed,	 that	 role	of	women	needed	 to	be	emphasized	 in	 development	 plans,	 and	 further	 to	 ‘recognize	 that	 women	 themselves	 should	decide	what	their	role	would	be’.149		
	 In	 his	 speech	 at	 the	 Conference,	 Karan	 Singh,	 India’s	 Minister	 of	 Health	 and	 Family	Planning	 emphasized	 the	 importance	 of	 a	 developmental	 approach	 to	 family	 planning.	While	contraceptive	 research	 and	 the	 delivery	 of	 family	 planning	 service	 continued	 to	 form	 an	important	 part	 of	 India’s	 program,	 ‘we	 are	 quite	 clear	 that	 fertility	 levels	 can	 be	 effectively	lowered	only	if	family	planning	becomes	an	integral	part	of	a	broader	strategy	to	deal	with	the	problems	of	poverty	and	underdevelopment’.150		This,	he	said,	was	the	‘heart	of	the	problem’.151	Singh’s	 statement	offered	up	 the	 reformulated	understanding	of	 the	population	problem	 that	had	been	so	hotly	debated	in	India	in	the	early	1970s.	Overpopulation,	he	argued,	was	caused	by	poverty,	and	the	‘path	to	family	planning’	relied	on	solving	the	problem	of	poverty.152	Singh	urged	 that	 the	main	question	before	 the	Conference	 should	be	 to	 ensure	 at	 the	 international	level	 that	 there	would	be	co-operation	and	common	action	towards	 ‘development	on	a	global	scale’.153		




own	 population	 policy	 recognized.156	The	 principles	 and	 objectives	 of	 the	 Plan	 reflected	 the	strength	with	which	 underdeveloped	 countries	 had	made	 their	 arguments:	 the	 principle	 aim	enshrined	 population	 policies	 as	 part	 of	 social,	 economic	 and	 cultural	 development,	 and	subsequent	aims	stressed	the	importance	development,	respect	for	human	life,	and	the	role	of	women	in	development	process.157	




FROM	THE	STATISTICAL	POPULATION	TO	THE	POLITICAL	POPULATION	By	1976,	commentators	looking	back	over	the	early	1970s	were	assessing	the	extent	of	the	split	showcased	at	Bucharest.	The	stress	placed	by	underdeveloped	countries	on	integrating	family	planning	 within	 broader	 economic	 and	 social	 development	 frameworks	 could	 be	 taken	 to	reflect	 a	 belief	 that	 educational	 programs	would	work	 to	 spread	 the	 small	 family	 norm,	 but	‘more	probably’	was	an	 indication	of	 ‘unwillingness	 to	go	 into	 the	hard	questions	 involved	 in	the	conflict	between	the	rights	of	individuals	and	those	of	society’.165	However,	underdeveloped	countries	had	not	shirked	from	these	debates	in	the	late	1960s	and	1970s	–	instead,	they	had	permeated	nearly	every	aspect	of	population	debate.	
	 The	potential	of	 the	 ‘Bucharest	era’	was	soon	dashed.	While	 it	had	seemed	as	 though	India	were	 poised	 on	 the	 edge	 of	 a	 ‘switch	 away’	 from	 the	 family	 planning	 strategies	 of	 the	previous	decade,	difficulties	 in	making	the	broad	structural	changes	needed	to	 implement	the	Minimum	Needs	Programme,166	tensions	within	the	Congress	Party,	the	growing	strength	of	the	Bihar	movement	and	‘widespread	political	disillusionment’	culminated	in	the	declaration	of	the	Emergency	and	‘reversed	the	trend’.167	However,	critiques	of	the	population	problem	begun	in	the	late	1960s	and	early	1970s	continued	to	develop	post-Bucharest.	In	a	1976	special	issue	on	Population	 and	 Poverty,	 Economic	 and	 Political	Weekly	 featured	 articles	 that	 challenged	 the	basic	 assumptions	 of	 the	 population	 problem	 –	 from	 the	 meaning	 of	 overpopulation	 to	 the	economic	value	of	‘births	prevented’.168		





international	 context	were	 the	 cause	 of	 the	problem.	Mamdani	went	 further.	 This	 ideological	critique	was	just	the	first	step	–	what	was	needed	was	to	join	it	with	‘a	scientific	explanation’	of	continued	population	 growth.172	While	 population	 control	made	 sense	 in	 one	 situation,	 it	 did	not	in	all	situations	–	neo-Malthusian	‘ideological	thought’,	Mamdani	concluded,	‘’is	not	simply	false…it	presents	 an	aspect	of	 reality	 as	 reality	 and	obscures	 the	 relation	between	 the	aspect	and	 the	 totality’,	 obscuring	 specific	 social	 and	 historical	 circumstances.	 This	 was	 crucial	because	 ‘how	 a	 problem	 is	 defined,	 greatly	 affects	 the	 formulation	 of	 the	 solution.	What	 the	phenomenon	 is	defined	as	 the	 ‘population	problem’,	 its	core	assertion	 is	 that	people	are	poor	because	they	are	too	many.	Exploitation	 is	reduced	to	poverty	and	the	explanation	of	poverty	becomes	the	poor	themselves!’173	
	 This	line	of	analysis,	which	was	stridently	championed	at	Bucharest,	was	taken	up	by	a	number	of	scholars.	M.V.	Nadkarni	argued	like	Mamdani	that	large	families	were,	far	from	being	a	 liability,	 an	 asset	 to	 the	 rural	 poor.174	The	problem,	 he	 explained,	was	 in	 the	 links	 that	 had	been	formed	to	establish	overpopulation	as	a	concept,	particularly	regarding	unemployment.	‘It	is	only	with	regard	to	the	human	asset’,	he	argued,	‘that	underutilization	is	mistakenly	taken	to	indicate	unwantedness’.175	Unemployment	was	instead	an	indicator	of	economic	management	–	and	there	could	exist,	he	pointed	out,	high	unemployment	 in	a	country	with	a	 low	population	density.	The	second	argument	for	overpopulation	was	expressed	as	‘control	population,	banish	poverty’,	and	this	too	was	not	based	in	reality.	Instead,	it	served	to	distract	attention	away	from	the	exploitation	of	the	underdeveloped	world:	‘the	accusing	finger	is	at	our	breeding	habits	and	not	at	the	developed	countries!’176		




to	 accentuate	 the	 economic	 crisis	 in	 rural	 areas	 –	 the	 rich	 had	 gotten	 richer,	 and	 the	 poor	became	 poorer.178	In	 the	 late	 1960s,	 the	 Green	 Revolution	 had	 been	 proclaimed,	 but	 ‘the	greenery	did	not	spread	out	of	the	seed	bed’.179	And	now,	 in	the	1970s,	he	argued,	 ‘we	do	not	speak	of	the	green	revolution	but	of	poverty,	inequality,	and	the	weaker	sections	of	society’.180	These	 experiences,	 he	 noted,	 cast	 doubts	 about	 the	 eventual	 outcome	 of	 the	 family	 planning	programme.	 ‘Presently,	 euphoria	prevails	on	 the	expectation	of	 a	drastic	 fall	 in	 the	birth-rate	from	the	scattered	facts	obtained	from	various	parts	of	India’.	But,	he	questioned,	‘how	reliable	may	this	prognosis	be	in	the	light	of	our	experience	with	the	other	developmental	actions	and	programs?	 The	 quandary	 prompts	 us	 to	 re-examine	 the	 crucial	 question	 to	 be	 asked	 for	 any	course	of	planning	to	be	successful	–	can	it	develop	into	a	self-generating	process?’181	
	 The	outcome	of	the	changing	nature	of	the	population	problem,	and	of	the	stance	taken	at	 Bucharest	 also	 had	 a	 lasting	 impact	 on	 how	 population	 was	 perceived	 by	 the	 population	establishment.	 Significantly,	 the	 Bucharest	 Conference	 served	 to	 ‘disturb	 the	 easy	 consensus’	that	had	previously	dominated	population	thought.182	Frank	Notestein	admitted	that	Bucharest	had	been	 ‘humbling’.183	In	 the	wake	of	 the	Conference,	many	population	experts	 turned	to	re-examine	 the	 basis	 of	 population	 thought.	 A	 second	 population	 journal,	 Population	 and	
Development	 Review	 was	 founded	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 Bucharest.	 Located	 in	 the	 social	 science	research	division	of	the	Population	Council,	 the	 journal	rejected	the	narrow	technical	 focus	of	
Demography	 and	 aimed	 to	 promote	 a	 broader	 research	 focus,	 looking	 to	 the	 relationships	between	 economic,	 social	 and	 demographic	 change,	 as	 well	 as	 at	 population	 policy.184	The	Editor’s	Note	wrestled	with	the	problems	that	had	preoccupied	demographers	and	population	experts	throughout	the	1970s:	how	to	advance	individual	freedoms	while	also	working	toward	the	 common	 good?	 How	 should	 public	 policy	 navigate	 between	 socioeconomic	 development	and	population	change?185		





typically	 referred	 only	 to	 ‘economic	 rationality’,	 which	 relied	 on	 a	 set	 of	 ethnocentric	 and	Western	values.187	In	essence,	Transition	Theory	argued	that	the	‘economically	rational’	family	was	 the	 nuclear	 family,	 and	 it	was	 rational	 for	 the	 family	 to	maximise	 expenditure	within	 it.	However,	 Caldwell	 argued,	 this	was	 not	 the	 only	 form	 of	 economic	 rationality	 –	 all	 societies	were	economically	rational.	Accepting	this,	he	argued,	was	crucial	to	understanding	population	change,	 to	 rework	 demographic	 transition	 theory,	 and	 to	 ‘make	 adequate	 predictions	 for	planning	purposes’.188	This	reformulation,	he	explained,	righted	an	aspect	of	Transition	Theory	that	had	been	hotly	 contested	at	 and	 leading	up	 to	Bucharest,	 namely	 that	 the	Third	World’s	fertility	behaviour	was	‘irrational’.			





religious	 on	 the	 other’.194	Such	 a	 commitment	 had	 to	 spring	 from	 the	 ‘remote	 half-forgotten	villages’	as	much	as	from	New	Delhi.195		
	 The	 ‘ideological	 ambivalence’	 of	 the	Government	must	 be	 challenged,	 Chandrasekhar	argued,	 particularly	 in	 the	 face	 of	 opposition	 from	 Indian	 Communists,	 and	 from	 those	 who	would	denounce	 family	planning	 ‘as	an	 imperialist-cum-capitalist	 trick	of	 the	Government’.196	The	Government	of	India,	he	argued,	had	been	driving	the	creation	of	the	largest	official	family	planning	programme	in	the	world.	This	was,	he	maintained,	 ‘easily	 the	strongest	 factor	 in	 the	promotion	 of	 birth	 control	 in	 India	 today’.197	Despite	 the	 successes	 of	 the	 programme,	 the	familiar	problems	of	motivation,	communication	and	finding	an	ideal	contraceptive	remained	–	‘how	does	one	motivate	an	average	husband	or	wife…in	 the	milieu	of	 rural	poverty	or	urban	slums…without	 using	 coercion	 or	 compulsion?’198	Communication	 and	 contraception	 were	other	 serious	 problems	 –	 illiteracy,	 and	 the	 problem	 of	 reaching	 people,	 and	 the	 further	problem	of	having	and	ideal	method	to	supply	them	with	remained	unsolved.199	In	the	face	of	these	problems,	he	argued,	there	was	a	‘great	need	to	mount	a	campaign….	to	qualify	the	right	to	reproduce’.	200	The	constitutional	and	 legal	right	 to	have	 ‘an	unlimited	number	of	children’,	he	 elaborated,	 ‘must	 be	 questioned	 and	 should	 not	 be	 taken	 for	 granted	 any	 longer’.201	In	 its	place,	 Chandrasekhar	 offered	up	 a	 set	 of	 ‘fundamental	 biological	 obligations’	 that	 all	married	couples	should	abide	by,	 including	limiting	family	size	to	two,	with	the	third	child	 ‘considered	an	 unwanted	 child	 by	 society’,	 to	 not	 ‘produce	 children	 in	 response	 to	 political	 demands,	religious	injunctions	or	cultural	compulsions’,	to	not	have	children	who	would	be	‘defective’	or	‘less	than	normal’,	and	finally,	to	have	the	two-child	norm	recognized	throughout	society.202			




different	 from	 that	 of	 1951.	 For	 the	 better	 part	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 India	 had	 been	engaged	 in	 sweeping	 development	 projects	 intended	 to	 transform	 the	 nation.	 Part	 of	 these	projects	had	involved	the	collection	of	an	unprecedented	amount	of	new	information	about	the	population	of	India.	Indeed,	‘the	population	of	India’	had	itself	emerged	out	of	this	project	–	as	an	aggregate	figure	which	could	be	broken	down	and	analysed	according	to	various	categories,	collected	through	the	census,	the	national	sample	survey,	vital	statistics,	and	a	host	of	surveys	and	other	research.	It	also	emerged	as	part	of	a	broader	understanding	about	the	relationship	between	‘population’	–	made	up	of	individuals	–	and	the	national	population,	as	the	society.		





India’s	 demographic	 ‘dividend’	 is	 now	 a	 popular	 and	powerful	 idea	 driving	 a	 new	 reading	 of	population,	 planning	 and	 prospects	 for	 the	 future.	 Rather	 than	 holding	 India	 back,	 there	 is	renewed	hope	that	a	 large	and	young	population	could	hold	the	key	to	economic	growth,	and	even	 to	 help	 solve	 the	 problem	 of	 poverty.1 	Yet,	 as	 Jyoti	 Shankar	 Singh	 highlights,	 the	demographic	dividend	has	not	eliminated	the	 idea	that	 India	also	has	a	population	problem	–	the	need	to	stabilize	population	growth	remains	a	concern	of	the	Government,	and	arguments	in	favour	of	 ‘severe	methods’	to	achieve	demographic	aims	remain.	 ‘Population	control’,	Singh	observes,	 ‘has	 not	 gone	 out	 of	 vogue	 in	 India,	 though	 nobody	 can	 define	 what	 population	control	would	mean	in	practice’.2	Many	of	the	suggested	methods,	however,	will	seem	familiar:	incentives	and	disincentives,	cash	bonuses,	birth	spacing	and	education,	alongside	maternal	and	infant	health,	and	increased	access	to	family	planning	and	health	services.	Coercive	measures,	Singh	believes,	are	untenable	after	the	Emergency	and	incompatible	with	democracy.	3			
	 This	thesis	has	explored	aspects	of	how	population	control	came	‘into	vogue’	in	India,	and	how	–	between	the	1930s	and	1970s	–	demographers,	social	scientists	and	policy-makers	worked	to	define	not	only	what	population	control	meant,	but	also	how	to	carry	 it	out.	While	this	 story	has	most	 commonly	been	 told	 through	a	 focus	on	how	 the	 Indian	government	 and	predominantly	American	foundations	acted	to	control	population	through	contraceptives,	 this	thesis	has	attempted	to	reveal	the	importance	of	other	aspects	of	the	program:	research,	data	and	policies	intended	to	produce	social	change.		




as	 the	 aggregated	 whole	 presented	 by	 the	 census,	 but	 also	 in	 terms	 of	 specific	 locations	 –	particularly	 the	 village.	 Contained	within	 these	 new	ways	 of	 grasping	 population	 statistically	were	 larger	questions	about	whether	population	could	be	 considered	a	problem.	While	 there	was	 undoubtedly	 an	 established	 core	 of	 birth	 control	 activists	 and	 intellectuals	 who,	 for	numerous	reasons,	believed	population	was	a	problem,	there	was	no	agreement	as	to	why	this	was	 so:	 population	 was	 not	 one	 problem,	 but	 many	 –	 it	 was	 about	 food	 and	 agriculture,	eugenics	 and	 sex,	 poverty	 and	 development,	war	 and	 peace.	 To	 these	many	 arguments	were	added	 new	 ones,	 in	 particular,	 about	whether	 the	 population	 problem	was	 local,	 regional	 or	national.		
	 Research	 and	 data	 are	 the	 key	 to	 understanding	 how	 Indian	 debates	 about	 the	population	problem	that	continued	into	the	post-colonial	period	navigated	and	negotiated	with	the	 rising	 tide	 of	 American	 demography	 in	 the	 post-war	 world.	 Indian	 and	 American	demographers,	who	were	closely	connected	through	international	intellectual	networks	as	well	as	through	their	interpretations	of	demographic	change,	nevertheless	had	key	differences.	Most	often	 seen	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 American	 demographers,	 the	 Indian	 Government’s	 1952	inclusion	of	a	population	policy	in	the	First	Five	Year	Plan	is	presented	as	the	start	of	national	planning	 and	 the	 international	 population	 control	 movement.	 However,	 by	 looking	 to	 how	demographers	and	social	scientists	worked	to	collect	their	data	and	understand	population	in	the	 years	 leading	 up	 the	 First	 Plan,	 it	 is	 clear	 how	 a	 ‘national’	 policy	 emerged	 out	 of	 data	collected	on	 a	 regional	 and	 local	 basis.	 Carrying	on	 from	 the	 early	1940s,	 demographers	 and	social	 scientists	worked	 to	 create	 the	 ‘national	population	problem’	on	which	policy	 could	be	made	 through	 the	use	of	 the	new	methods	of	 research	popularized	during	 the	Second	World	War:	the	sample	survey.	The	debates	over	the	National	Sample	Survey,	about	the	use	of	data	for	policy-making,	about	the	links	between	demography	and	development,	and	the	new	arguments	being	made	by	the	private	and	non-state	research	efforts	of	demographers	and	social	scientists	were	 key	 in	 linking	 population	 to	 ideas	 about	 the	 nation,	 development,	 the	 economy,	 and	planning	–	both	national	planning,	and	family	planning	–	in	the	early	1950s.	
	 Arguments	 about	 fertility	 change	 linked	 to	 broader	 social	 change	 were	 closely	connected	 to	 the	 understanding	 of	 the	 population	 problem	 that	 emerged	 from	 the	 work	 of	demographers	and	social	scientists	on	the	attitudes	and	practices	of	family	planning	in	the	First	and	Second	Plan	periods.	As	policy	shifted	from	the	 ‘passive’	approach	of	the	First	Plan	to	the	more	 interventionist	 approach	 of	 the	 Second	 Plan,	 and	 the	 infrastructure	 for	 demographic	research	 and	 family	 planning	 research	 became	 more	 closely	 intertwined,	 the	 importance	 of	motivation	 to	 family	 planning	 increased.	 The	 growing	 importance	 of	 KAP	 survey	 research	helped	to	make	attitudes	available	to	policy	makers	and	to	drive	the	importance	of	motivation	as	a	point	of	policy	intervention.		
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	 This	 thesis	 has	 argued	 that	 attempts	 to	 understand	 and	 manipulate	 the	 social	processes	of	 fertility	 change	 (to	practice	 ‘social	 engineering’)	 though	campaigns	of	 education,	advertising,	 incentives	 and	 disincentives	 are	 as	 significant	 for	 understanding	 the	 history	 of	population	 control	 as	 medical,	 technological	 and	 biological	 interventions	 to	 lower	 fertility	(through	contraceptive	drugs	or	 techniques).	By	 the	Third	Five	year	plan	 the	 family	planning	policy	 had	 undergone	 another	 shift,	 moving	 from	 an	 emphasis	 on	 research-cum-action	 to	action-research,	and	a	broader	change	in	programme	philosophy	reflected	in	the	shifts	from	the	clinic	 approach,	 to	 the	 extension	 education	 approach,	 to	 the	 IUCD	 approach.	 This	 change	coincided	 with	 the	 changing	 relationship	 between	 family	 planning,	 population	 and	development,	 with	 development	 increasingly	 predicated	 on	 fertility	 decline.	 The	 1960s	 also	saw	a	change	in	debates	about	scale.	While	in	the	1950s	there	had	still	been	discussion	about	whether	a	 ‘national	program’	should	be	 implemented	the	same	way	 for	all	people	and	places,	the	policies	 implemented	by	 the	mid-1960s	no	 longer	had	 these	concerns:	 IUCDs	were	 for	all	women,	 incentives	 and	 disincentives	 for	 all	 families.	 	 The	 short-lived	 extension	 education	approach	was	also	an	attempt	at	an	alternate	model	of	development	and	family	planning	that	was,	 by	 the	mid-1960s,	 rejected	 in	 favour	 of	 IUCD.	 The	 rejection	 of	 the	 extension	 education	approach	was	 further	 indicative	 of	 the	 changing	 relationship	 between	 research	 and	 policy	 –	while	the	extension	education	research	was	largely	considered	to	be	successful,	the	policy	was	not.	By	1966,	despite	evidence	in	its	favour,	the	approach	was	passed	over.		
	 The	 late	 1960s	 and	 early	 1970s	 are	 often	 regarded	 as	 an	 innovative	 period	 in	population	policy,	characterized	by	the	use	of	new	administrative	techniques	such	time-bound	target-oriented	policies,	mass	camps	and	widespread	use	of	incentives	and	disincentives,	with	heavy	emphasis	on	vasectomy	and	the	IUCD.	However,	this	thesis	has	shown	that	it	was	also	a	period	 of	 innovation	 in	 education,	 mass	 communications	 and	 the	 commercialization	 of	contraceptives.		Many	of	the	defining	features	of	the	inter-plan	period	and	the	Fourth	Plan	–	the	incentives,	 targets,	 and	 the	 attempt	 to	 spread	 the	 small	 family	 norm	 –	 had	 their	 basis	 in	 the	broader	project	of	 family	planning	as	behavioural	 change	 that	had	 its	origins	 in	research	and	emphasis	on	attitude	and	motivation	that	had	emerged	during	the	late	1950s	and	1960s.	During	the	 late	 1960s,	 the	 emphasis	 on	 social	 change	 that	 had	 characterized	 the	 programs	 of	 early	1960s	was	reoriented	away	from	the	small	group	onto	the	individual.	The	reached	its	apex	in	the	mass	camps	of	the	1970s.	This	period	also	saw	a	shift	in	the	relationship	between	research	and	policy	–	while	research	had	been	seen	as	a	base	for	research	in	the	1950s,	by	the	late	1960s	it	was	 increased	 being	 deployed	 to	 assess	 policy	 outcomes.	 This	 again	 raised	 the	 problem	of	representativeness.	Policies	had	been	developed	on	the	basis	of	unrepresentative	data	(in	areas	with	higher	 than	average	 access	 to	 administrative	 and	medical	 infrastructure),	which	was,	 in	the	context	of	a	 target-setting	approach	conducted	on	a	per-head	basis,	unable	 to	account	 for	regional	 variations	making	 targets	 unrealistic	 if	 not	 completely	 unobtainable.	 The	 inter-plan	period	 and	 the	 Fourth	 Plan	 period	 saw	 the	 rising	 importance	 of	 individuals	 as	 well	 as	 the	
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aggregated	 whole.	 It	 also	 saw	 the	 growing	 significance	 of	 technological	 solutions	 to	 the	problem,	which	were	married	under	Chandrasekhar	during	his	period	as	Minister	of	Health	and	Family	 Planning,	 with	 widespread	 efforts	 to	 instil	 -	 through	 mass	 communication	 and	commercialization	 schemes	 -	 the	 small	 family	 norm.	 Underlying	 this	 was	 the	 idea	 that	modifying	individual	behaviour	would	change	society,	in	stark	contrast	to	the	arguments	of	the	1950s	that	posited	widespread	structural	change	as	the	key	to	lowering	fertility.		 	
	 This	 thesis	 has	 argued	 that	 population	 control	 policies	 carried	 out	 in	 India	 in	 the	second	 half	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century	 need	 to	 be	 considered	 as	 predominantly	 national	arguments	made	 in	 the	context	of	debates	about	economic	growth	and	national	development	and	population.	The	politics	of	demography	and	population	 control	had,	 since	 the	 late	1940s	and	 early	 1950s,	 most	 commonly	 been	 inflected	 around	 debates	 about	 development	 –	 in	particular,	 around	national	planning.	However,	by	 the	1970s,	demographers,	 social	 scientists,	intellectuals	 and	 policy-makers	 were,	 in	 addition	 to	 engaging	 with	 arguments	 about	development	 –	 raising	 questions	 about	 individual	 rights	 and	 the	 social	 good,	 the	 connection	between	demography,	democracy	and	population,	 the	potential	 justifications	 for	coercion	and	the	 impact	of	a	highly	unequal	 international	economic	order.	 	These	debates	revived	many	of	the	questions	that	had	been	asked	about	demography,	data,	population	and	the	state	since	the	1930s	and	1940s:	what	data	was	needed	for	policy	making;	what	were	the	empirical	facts	about	population;	what	scale	should	population	be	considered	on;	what	was	the	relationship	between	population	 and	 development	 and;	who	 had	 the	 appropriate	 expertise?	 These	were	 joined	 by	new	 questions	 that	 had	 emerged	 over	 the	 course	 of	 India’s	 programme	 –	 how	 should	 these	problems	be	addressed	in	a	democratic	way;	how	should	the	relationship	between	individuals	and	the	social	good	be	considered,	and;	was	there	a	place	for	coercion	or	compulsion?	
	 These	questions	were	raised	against	the	backdrop	of	emerging	challenges	to	policies	of	population	control,	development,	and	modernization	raised	by	 the	Third	World	 in	 the	1970s,	and	 had	 a	 long-lasting	 impact	 on	 the	 international	 population	 control	 movement.	 These	challenges	were	most	strongly	expressed	at	the	1974	World	Population	Conference,	where	the	importance	of	national	 sovereignty	was	 reaffirmed	and	 the	 ideological	 and	empirical	basis	of	population	 policies	 challenged.	 The	 legacy	 of	 the	 early	 1970s,	 both	 in	 the	 arguments	 for	 and	against	 population	 control	 remains	 in	 the	 debates	 about	 population	 and	 population	 policy	today,	with	many	of	the	same	questions	and	concerns	being	raised.		FUTURE	RESEARCH	In	writing	this	thesis	several	avenues	for	future	research	have	emerged.	The	first	is	the	need	to	contextualize	India’s	family	planning	programme	in	the	context	of	the	many	other	development	
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schemes	 being	 carried	 out	 in	 India.	 Recent	 work	 by	 Daniel	 Immerwahr4	has	 indicated	 the	importance	 of	 looking	 at	 development	 schemes	 such	 as	 Community	 Development	 and	 their	value	 in	 unsettling	 narratives	 about	 science	 and	 modernity	 in	 Independent	 India.	 Family	planning,	which	is	likewise	often	cast	as	part	of	a	modernizing	narrative,	could	be	productively	re-cast	through	greater	contextualization	in	the	other	development	schemes	being	carried	out	by	the	state,	private	enterprise	and	local	and	international	non-governmental	organizations	at	this	time.		
	 Secondly,	 whilst	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 existing	 literature	 on	 population	 control	 has	emphasized	the	significance	of	America	(in	term	of	experts,	ideology,	financial	aid,	and	political	influence),	 this	 thesis	 has	 shown	 the	 significance	 of	 Indian	 expertise,	 research,	 and	 policy-making	 in	 the	 formation	 and	 implementation	 of	 population	 policy.	 Future	 research	 might	productively	be	conducted	looking	at	the	role	of	India	in	influencing	the	population	policies	of	other	Third	World	countries	during	this	period.	The	establishment	of	India	as	a	regional	hub	for	demographic	research	during	the	1950s	has	not	been	explored,	and	neither	has	the	 impact	of	Indian	schemes	of	mass	communication	and	family	planning	education	(in	particular,	 the	Red	Triangle),	 which	 were	 exported	 and	 adopted	 as	 the	 symbols	 of	 family	 planning	 in	 other	developing	countries.	This	research	could	work	towards	reframing	India	not	as	a	‘laboratory’	or	recipient	 of	 population	 policies	 or	 development	 policies,	 but	 rather	 as	 an	 instigator	 and	exporter	of	policy,	expertise	and	ideology.	In	a	similar	vein,	while	the	role	of	American	expertise	and	models	of	development	have	been	widely	addressed	in	literature	on	population	and	family	planning,	 impact	 and	 significance	 of	 the	 ideological,	 political	 and	 programmatic	 relationship	between	the	Soviet	Union	and	China	has	not	been	widely	considered.		
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